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As the primary transmitter of advanced skills and incubators of new knowledge, colleges
and universities play a crucial role in modern economies. In the U.S., the higher education
sector consists of a diverse set of institutions. Public, private non-profit, and private for-
profit organizations coexist in this market. Although large research universities constitute
what we usually think of as higher education institutions, the vast majority of colleges
and universities do not follow the model of the research university. Some are two-year
institutions with Associate’s degrees as their highest degree offering. Some are Baccalaureate
institutions offering undergraduate education only. Some are Master’s universities who offer
some graduate instruction but do not engage in research as much as research universities do.
Unlike traditional firms that rely on sales revenue to cover their costs, many colleges and
universities rely on external funding from the government and private donors. Like other
non-profit institutions, many of them have large amounts of endowment funds that general
investment income to support the institution.
Given the diversity of organizations in this sector, how well do conventional economic
theory describe their behavior? Do non-profit and for-profit institutions face the same incen-
tives? How does the profit status affect the behavior of the university? What is the role of
endowments in higher education finance? How does the performance of the endowment affect
the real operations of the university? Are instructions at two-year and four-year colleges of
similar quality? Is it wise for some students to start in two-year colleges and transfer to a
four-year college rather than starting in a four-year college directly? These are the questions
I attempt to answer in this dissertation.
Chapter 1 investigates whether for-profit and public community colleges respond dif-
ferently to increases in demand for occupational education. I exploit a regulatory change,
which broadened the scope of practice for dental assistants (DAs) and led to significant in-
creases in DAs’ wages and employment. In response to this change, for-profit universities
substantially expanded their DA programs, whereas most community college DA programs
maintained their existing size. Moreover, community colleges that charged a high premium
for the DA program expanded their DA programs, whereas those that did not charge a pre-
mium downsized their DA programs. These results are consistent with a for-profit sector
that maximizes profits and a public sector that sets capacity to balance its budget.
Chapter 2 studies how universities responded to the large and negative financial shocks
to their endowments induced by the Great Recession. Exploiting variations across universi-
ties in the relative size of their investment losses during the Great Recession, I found sharp
contrasts among Doctoral, Master’s, and Baccalaureate Universities both in how they re-
sponded to the endowment shocks and in how their students fared after the Great Recession.
In response to large, negative endowment shocks, Doctoral Universities cut down on instruc-
tional expenses and reduced faculty and staff of all types; Baccalaureate Colleges cut down
on administrative and supportive expenses and reduced non-tenure-track instructors and
staff; Master’s Universities reduced research expenses and size of the tenure-track faculty.
Meanwhile, Doctoral Universities cut student financial aid and admitted fewer low-income
and Hispanic students. Master’s and Baccalaureate institutions also admitted fewer low-
income students. Most notably, the negative endowment shocks led to significant reductions
in student persistence and graduation rates at Doctoral and Master’s Universities, while
having no such effects on Baccalaureate Colleges.
As the tuition and living expenses of four-year colleges continue to rise, spending the
first two years of college at a community college and transferring to a four-year college
has become a more cost-effective way to obtain a university degree. In Chapter 3, a joint
paper with Zach Brown, we examine the labor market outcomes of transfer students relative
to students who attend a four-year institution directly in the United States. We find a
large negative effect on wages driven by selection on unobservables. Instrumental variable
estimates using data from the National Education Longitudinal Study imply a 27% reduction
in wages from attending a two-year college conditional on eventually attending a four-year
institution. This is true regardless of whether we control for four-year college quality. Since
students who obtain a bachelor’s degree have no reason to reveal their transfer status to
employers, this is evidence that college quality has important implications for labor market
returns independent of signaling effects. We also find some evidence that the negative effect
of transferring is largest for women as well as students at the lowest and highest ends of the
ability distribution.
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Chapter 1
What Explains the Rise of For-Profit Universities?
Evidence from Dental Assistant Programs
1
1.1 Introduction
Over the past three decades, enrollment increased nine-fold in for-profit universities, in
contrast to a mere fifty percent rise in traditional public and private non-profit colleges.1
The rapid growth of for-profit universities is puzzling given that they compete with open-
enrollment, low-tuition, public community colleges (Cellini, 2009). Existing discussions on
public versus private for-profit colleges largely focus on the affordability and quality of the two
types of colleges. Many argue that the increasing generosity of federal student aid have made
colleges more affordable and thus spurred the growth of for-profit universities. Indeed, fed-
eral student aid substantially increased college enrollment rate among older, working adults
(Seftor and Turner, 2002; Deming and Dynarski, 2009). These non-traditional students often
commute to college and enroll in occupational programs, which are predominantly offered
by community colleges and for-profit universities.
Yet, differences in affordability and quality alone cannot explain why for-profit colleges
have grown faster than public community colleges. Attending a for-profit university is much
more costly than attending a community college. Average out-of-pocket costs for students are
nearly $20,000 higher at for-profit universities (Cellini, 2012). Besides, studies that compare
students’ educational attainment and labor market outcomes across the two sectors have
not found any significant advantages of attending a for-profit university.2 Why then did
increasing numbers of students forego the public sector to attend for-profit universities?
1Author’s calculations with data from Digest of Education Statistics: 2013 (NCES, 2015). Throughout
the paper, “for-profit universities” refers to accredited, degree-granting, private for-profit post-secondary
institutions. Non-accredited for-profit colleges are excluded from consideration because they are likely to be
of lower quality and data are in general not available for these schools. In the context of dental assistant
programs, students from non-accredited programs may not be eligible for state certification exams upon
graduation. See Cellini and Goldin (2014) for a discussion of the differences between accredited and non-
accredited colleges.
2Deming et al. (2012) find that students who started at for-profit colleges are more likely to complete a
certificate or associate’s degree program but are significantly less likely to be employed within six years of
initial enrollment. Two resume audit studies — Deming et al. (2014) and Darolia et al. (2015) — do not find
any significant difference in employer call back rates between the two sectors for brick-and-mortar programs.
Studies that compare labor market returns — Lang and Weinstein (2013) and Cellini and Chaudhary (2014)
— do not find any statistically significant difference between the two sectors among certificate and associate’s
degree programs.
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This chapter investigates whether for-profit and community colleges respond differently
to changes in demand for occupational programs and whether these supply-side differences
have contributed to the rise of for-profit universities. Specifically, I examine whether for-
profit universities are more flexible than community colleges in adjusting the capacity of
occupational programs according to market demand and the incentive structures that may
have contributed to the rigidity of the public sector.
To compare how for-profit and community colleges respond to changes in demand for
occupational programs, we need an exogenous shock to the demand for some programs. A
plausibly exogenous change is found in the profession of dental assisting, where productiv-
ity and returns to schooling are determined by the scope of practice permitted by state
regulations. One particular event, the permission for dental assistants to take X-rays (X-
ray permission), generated substantial increases in demand for dental assisting education
programs because it improved the productivity and employment opportunities for dental
assistants (DAs) and at the same time increased the importance of proper training for DAs.
All states have adopted the X-ray permission but did so at different points in time. The
staggered adoption of this regulatory change across states provides a quasi-experiment to
identify its effects on for-profit and community colleges.
Because my analysis of the education market is predicated on the assumption that the
X-ray permission increases the productivity and employment opportunities of DAs, I start
the empirical analysis by verifying the labor market effects of the X-ray permission. Using
data from the Current Population Survey (CPS), I find a 5% increase in average DA wages
and a 21% increase in full-time-equivalent employment of DAs following the adoption of the
X-ray permission. The evolution of wages and employment after the regulatory change is
consistent with the hypothesis that new DAs would gradually obtain training and enter the
DA labor market after learning of the increase in demand.
I then evaluate how public and for-profit institutions responded to this demand shock.
In response to the X-ray permission, I find a large (34%) and statistically significant increase
3
in the total number of DA graduates from for-profit universities and a small (5%) and
statistically insignificant increase from public institutions. For programs that existed both
before and after the regulatory change, the average for-profit program expanded by 22% after
the regulatory change, whereas the average public program experienced almost no change
in its size. Program capacity data from the American Dental Association (ADA) provides
evidence that these results are driven by colleges’ program capacity choices, rather than
students’ choices between school types.
What could account for the lack of response from the public sector? To understand
the incentives at play, I develop a simple framework to model programs’ capacity expansion
decisions. The framework captures the following features of community colleges.
First, a typical community college offers a wide variety of programs and relies on tuition
and state and local funding to cover its operating expenses. Yet, neither tuition nor funding
is perfectly tied to the costs of individual programs. Most community colleges charge a single
tuition rate for all programs to fulfill their mission of meeting a wide range of educational
needs at a minimum cost to the students. As such, although per-student cost may vary
across programs, per-student revenue would be similar across programs. Some colleges do
allow certain programs to charge a premium, usually through miscellaneous fees or other
charges. In such cases, the per-student revenue is more aligned with the per-student cost of
individual programs.
Second, due to their high intensity of laboratory sessions, which require more faculty
input than traditional classes, occupational programs such as dental assisting have higher
marginal costs of enrolling additional students than the average community college program.3
For these high-cost programs, the marginal revenue generated by each additional student
through tuition and per student reimbursement is likely well below the marginal cost. Hence,
community colleges limit enrollment for these high-cost programs to balance their budgets.
3Dental labs, for instance, usually have 6 to 12 dental chairs so that no more than 12 students can be
admitted to a single class session. To accommodate more students, programs often have to offer more class
sessions. As such, the marginal cost of enrolling more students does not decrease as enrollment rises.
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Third, to incorporate dental X-ray training into the curriculum, programs need to add
more radiographic practice sessions. Radiographic sessions require even higher faculty-to-
student ratios than other DA classes. Hence, the addition would result in further increases
in per-student costs. After the adoption of the X-ray permission, community college DA
programs would have to reduce their capacity unless they could increase per-student revenue
through raising tuition. Therefore, whether a community college DA program could maintain
or expand its size hinges on its ability to charge a program-specific premium. Without the
discretion to do so, they would have to charge the college-wide tuition rate, which is unlikely
to change in response to the X-ray permission.
This prediction is borne out in the data. The final set of results exploit variations across
community colleges in the level of premium DA programs are allowed to charge beyond the
college-wide tuition rate. Although most community colleges maintained the size of their DA
programs after the X-ray permission, those with the lowest level of DA program premium
significantly downsized their DA programs (by 7.8%), whereas those with the highest level
of DA program premium significantly expanded their DA programs (by 14.7%).
These mechanisms may apply to a broad set of occupational programs other than dental
assisting and could partially explain the disproportional growth of for-profit universities in
the higher education market. Among all fields of study offered at community colleges, oc-
cupational programs in technical and health-related fields tend to have higher labor market
returns than non-STEM fields (Jacobson et al., 2005a,b; Jepsen et al., 2014; Lang and We-
instein, 2013; Dadgar and Trimble, 2014). Like dental assisting, these programs also feature
higher marginal costs due to the high intensity of laboratory or hands-on practice sessions.
Because neither funding nor tuition at community colleges is directly tied to the costs of
each program, community colleges may limit enrollment for high-cost programs even when
demand for these programs is rising. In contrast, for-profit universities have the flexibility
to adjust tuition and program size according to the costs and demand for each program.
Therefore, when the demand for some occupational programs rises over time, enrollment
5
soars at for-profits while remaining stagnant at community colleges.
These findings add to a body of literature that demonstrates the importance of funding
and pricing policies in shaping the structure of the higher education market. Recent research
has found a causal relationship between the sluggish growth of state funding for public
universities and the reduction in degree completion rate (Bound and Turner, 2007; Bound
et al., 2010). Fluctuations in community college funding have also been found to affect
the entry, exit, and enrollment levels of for-profit universities (Cellini, 2009; Turner, 2006;
Goodman and Henriques, 2015). This chapter shows that funding and tuition policies also
affect how community colleges allocate resources across different fields of study, which then
determines individual program’s ability to respond to changes in the labor market. To the
extent that fields with high returns also require more educational inputs, the conventional
practice of charging a single tuition across all programs encourages community colleges to
limit capacity for high-return fields, which then forces students to either forego the high-
return major or attend a for-profit institution at higher expense.
Differential pricing, the alternative practice that better aligns price with instructional
costs and students’ ability to pay post-graduation, has gained more attention in state policy
debates in recent years. Stange (2014) exploits the staggered adoption of differential pricing
policy across four-year research universities and finds that the enactment of a program-
specific tuition reduces enrollment in engineering and business fields, but increases enroll-
ment in nursing (although the estimates for nursing degrees are not statistically significant).
His estimates reflect the combined effects of an increase in tuition on the demand side (stu-
dent choices) and the supply side (institutional responses), while holding constant the labor
market demand for graduates from each major. His findings suggest that nursing degrees
were supply constrained before the adoption of differential pricing and increase in program-
specific tuition enabled an expansion in nursing positions. While information is not available
on when community colleges adopted differential pricing, my results suggest that those that
give DA programs larger flexibility to charge program premiums are more likely to expand
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program capacity when labor market demand for their program graduates rises. As nursing
and DA programs employ similar education production functions, my results are consistent
with Stange (2014)’s findings.
The scope of for-profit universities’ offerings has largely been confined to occupational
education programs. This fact does not imply that the mechanisms (of capacity choice based
on funding and pricing policies) found here do not apply to other post-secondary programs.
Rather, it is because the nature of occupational education facilitates its provision by newly-
founded, private for-profit institutions. For traditional academic programs, the content and
quality of instruction are non-contractible. The non-profit status may protect donors, in-
structors, and students from ex-post expropriation of profits by the owner of the college
(Hart et al., 1997; Glaeser and Shleifer, 2001; Cowen and Papenfuss, 2011). Moreover, since
skills acquired in traditional academic programs are not directly observable to employers,
employers may rely on college reputation to infer students’ ability and skill levels (MacLeod
and Urquiola, 2015). For these reasons, traditional academic programs may only be credibly
provided by well-established public or private non-profit institutions.
In contrast, in the market for occupational education, newly-founded for-profit providers
could compete head-to-head with well-established public and private non-profit institutions
because the concern for school reputation is minimal. MacLeod et al. (2015) provide evidence
that if employers can rely on other credible signals for student ability (college exit exams in
their case), college reputation would play a less significant role both in the employers’ hiring
decisions and in prospective students’ college choices. In the market for occupational edu-
cation in the U.S., employers can easily test students’ technical skills through an interview.
Besides, state licensing exams and national certification exams are readily available for many
occupations in engineering and health-related fields.4 With these alternative assessments to
4Kleiner and Krueger (2010) estimate that around 30% of all occupations now require either an occu-
pational license or certification. For dental assistants, there is a national certification exam offered by the
Dental Assisting National Board (DANB). Although not all states require certification for X-rays procedures,
many employers prefer candidates who have passed the certification exam.
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measure technical skills, the profit status of one’s college has little impact on employers’
expectations of one’s skills, as evidenced by recent audit studies Deming et al. (2014) and
Darolia et al. (2015).
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 provides background information
on the profession of dental assisting and DA education programs. Section 1.3 presents the
sources of data for my empirical analysis. Section 1.4 presents my empirical results on how
wages, employment, and different types of post-secondary institutions responded to the X-
ray permission. Section 1.5 provides a conceptual framework that lays out the objectives and
choices of public and for-profit DA programs to understand the differences in their responses.
Section 1.6 presents results on the heterogeneous responses from public programs that sheds
some light on why public programs did not respond to the demand increase on average.
Section 1.7 concludes with policy implications.
1.2 Background on Dental Assistants and DA Programs
This section offers background information on dental assistants and dental assistant educa-
tion programs. I will explain why the permission for DAs to take dental X-rays without the
immediate supervision of a dentist increases demand for DAs, and how it may affect DA
education programs.
Dental Assisting and the X-ray Permission
Traditionally, DAs’ primary duties were to prepare patients, sterilize equipment and pass
instruments to the dentist during treatment. They may be asked to perform more advanced
procedures, provided that the dentist is physically present in the operating room and autho-
rizes every procedure. Familiarity with the dentist’s routine practices was more important
than formal knowledge of dentistry. As a result, many DAs were trained on the job by their
employer-dentist, even though educational programs were available in many states. High
school graduation was sufficient for an entry-level DA job.
8
Due to a shortage of dental health workers, States gradually expanded the set of pro-
cedures DAs were allowed to perform. One of the permitted procedures is to take X-rays
without the immediate supervision of a dentist. This permission is particularly impactful
because it allows the dentist to work with other patients while DAs are taking X-rays. Since
X-ray procedures are time-consuming and frequently practiced,5 the X-ray permission creates
higher demand for DAs. At the same time, taking X-rays independently requires knowledge
on X-ray equipment operation, infection control, and emergency management, which means
formal training is more important for DAs who take X-rays.
In some states, the state Dental Practice Act or its equivalent directly specifies the scope
of practice for DAs and the level of supervision required for each procedure. In other states,
the state law does not directly define permissible acts for DAs but gives the state dental
board full authority to enact rules and regulations regarding DAs’ scope of practice. In both
cases, the state dental board, an appointed board that consists predominantly of dentists,
serves as the chief source of advice for law-making authorities.
Variations in the timing of X-ray permission adoption across states reflect the chang-
ing needs and influence of different specialties within the dentist community. Some dentists
may worry that allowing DAs to take X-rays compromises the quality of their service, while
other dentists who need more X-rays taken prefer to adopt the X-ray permission. Different
specialists vary by how intensely they use X-rays. Pediatric dentists and orthodontists, for
example, need to take more X-rays than general dentists. These trade-offs and internal bat-
tles determine the timing of the X-ray permission. Identification of the causal effects of the
X-ray permission requires the assumption that the timing of its implementation is uncorre-
lated with other time-varying determinants of DAs’ employment conditions and incentives
5According to Mettler Jr et al. (2009), the number of dental radiologic examinations taken in the U.S.
increased around 10-fold from 1964 to 2006. Their estimates show that the number of bite-wing X-ray
exposures, the most common type of X-ray for detecting tooth decay, was 500 million in 2006. It is worth
noting that there are other clinical procedures that DAs are allowed to perform, such as coronal polishing
and the application of topical fluoride. However, states vary in the set of procedures allowed. Additionally,
these other procedures are not as widely performed as X-rays. Hence, the permission of other procedures
has a smaller impact on DA employment and education investments.
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to invest in education. In Section 1.4, I provide evidence supporting this identification as-
sumption.
Data on the timing of the regulatory changes were obtained through searches of state
statutes and administrative rules on LexisNexis Academic. In cases where details of amend-
ments to existing regulations were not available on LexisNexis, I consulted official state
publications that contain information on proposed regulations and rule-making activities.
Details of the statutes and rules governing the X-ray permission are presented in Appendix
Table A.10.
Dental Assisting Education
Dental assisting education programs are usually housed in the Department of Allied Health
Sciences, where related programs such as dental hygiene, medical assisting and emergency
medical services are offered. A typical DA program lasts 9 to 18 months and leads to a
post-secondary certificate. A small set of DA programs (13%) also offer the associate degree
as an option for students who have earned a certain number of credits in general arts and
sciences in addition to fulfilling the DA requirements. Many dental auxiliaries enter the
dental service profession as a DA after completing a DA certificate program. After a few
years of work experience as a DA, they may progress up the career ladder by gaining another
associate or bachelor’s degree in dental hygiene. Hence, the majority of DA graduates (over
90%) receive only a certificate.
Regardless of the type of degree conferred, the set of dental assisting related courses is
very similar across programs. As such, the two types of degrees require the same amount
of resources from the DA department. Because this chapter focuses on program capacity
decisions, in the subsequent empirical results section I only present results that treat both
degree types as identical. The results are robust to focusing on certificate programs alone.
A typical DA program devotes more than half of its instructional time to lab and
clinical sessions. As a result, recent movements towards online learning have had little
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impact on the education production function for DAs. Moreover, class sizes for dental lab
sessions are in general small and are restricted by the number of dental chairs available in the
lab. To guarantee safety and maximize learning outcomes, the American Dental Association
(ADA) recommends no more than six students per instructor during radiography and clinical
practice sessions, and no more than twelve students per instructor during laboratory and
preclinical instruction in dental materials and chairside assisting procedures. Hence, for a
program to expand, it has to add more class sessions, because increasing class size is not an
option.
Following the X-ray permission, DA programs must incorporate dental radiographic
practices into their curriculum. Because radiography practice sessions require even lower
student-teacher ratios, programs must either increase the number of instructors or increase
instructional time for existing instructors.
For-profit DA programs typically admit anyone with a high school degree or GED who
can afford the tuition. Courses start at multiple times throughout the year, and students
are admitted to the next starting cohort with available slots. When demand rises, for-
profit programs typically add more class rotations to accommodate more students, rather
than acquiring more equipment or facilities. Public DA programs typically have one or
two starting cohorts each year, with a limited number of slots for each cohort. Prospective
students must apply for the program a few months ahead of the starting date. For the subset
of ADA accredited public programs, the total number of applications per year exceeds the
total number of admissions by around 50 percent.6 Information posted on the websites
of various public programs indicates the following three most commonly used methods for
selecting student: 1) many public programs accept students on a first-come/first-served basis
with priority given to in-district students; 2) some use a lottery system; 3) a small set of
programs uses interviews and previous academic records to select the best ones among all
6ADA’s annual publication, Survey of Allied Dental Education, publishes total number of applications for
all programs each year. Unfortunately, applications data is not published for each individual school.
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applicants.
1.3 Data and Summary Statistics
1.3.1 Data on Dental Assistants’ Labor Market Outcomes
To verify the effect of X-ray permission on DAs’ labor market outcomes, I extract wage and
employment information from the Current Population Survey (CPS). Wage data are drawn
from the CPS Outgoing Rotation Group (ORG) earnings files for January 1979 through
December 2014.7 Employment data are estimated using the Basic Monthly CPS (all rotation
groups) for January 1976 through December 2014.8 CPS contains detailed occupation code,
which allows me to identify DAs from the pool of all respondents, and reasonably large
samples of DAs to conduct my labor market analysis. Compared to other potential data
sources, such as the American Community Survey (ACS) and the Bureau of Labor Statistics’
Occupational Employment Statistics (OES), CPS covers a much longer time span.9 Since
the X-ray permission was adopted in most states between 1970 and 2011, the longer time
horizon covered by CPS greatly facilitates my difference-in-differences empirical strategy. In
addition, CPS provides a rich set of individual characteristics. The monthly structure also
allows me to allocate individuals to pre- and post-treatment groups precisely to the month
7Due to the low wage levels of DAs, potential issues such as top-coding, which often plagues wage analysis
with CPS data, does not affect my analysis.
8Employment of DAs are estimated for each state-year by summing the person weights of all CPS respon-
dents in the state-year that are employed at the time of survey and report DA as their primary occupation
(More precisely, the sum is then divided by 12 because CPS weights are designed for monthly employment
estimates). As an alternative measure, I use the reported weekly hours and earnings weight in CPS-ORG
to estimate full-time equivalent employment of DAs. The validity of these estimates lies in the definition of
the person weight in the CPS data. There has been some changes in CPS’ sampling methodology over time,
which may affect the comparability of my employment estimates over time. However, because my subse-
quent regression analysis employs a difference-in-differences estimation strategy, these changes in sampling
methodology will not bias my regression results as long as their timing is not correlated with the timing of
the X-ray permission. The year fixed effects included in the regressions will also control for any national
level changes in CPS’ sampling methods.
9Although ACS also provides occupation level wage information, it is only available after 2000. OES
provides estimates for state-level average wage and employment of DAs, but it is only available after 2002.
(Although OES estimates are available from 1997 onwards, estimates for years before 2002 are not suitable
for comparisons over time due to changes in occupational classification systems, data collection methods and
survey reference periods.)
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics of CPS Dental Assistant Sample
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Mean (Std. Dev.)
N (1979-2014)
Hourly Wage (2014 $) 13.52 (4.73) 15.52 (6.46)
Hours Per Week 33.10 (9.40) 34.16 (8.43)
Age (years) 30.74 (10.47) 35.27 (11.63)
Experience 11.98 (10.53) 16.10 (11.66)
Female 98.5% (0.12) 96.8% (0.17)
Race and Ethnicity
      African American 4.7% (0.21) 6.2% (0.24)
      Hispanic 4.3% (0.20) 14.8% (0.36)
      Other Minority 0.6% (0.08) 5.0% (0.22)
Education
      High School or GED 45.7% (0.50) 34.5% (0.48)
      Some College 43.2% (0.50) 52.7% (0.50)
      BA and/or Graduate degree 5.5% (0.23) 9.4% (0.29)
Married 57.3% (0.49) 59.4% (0.49)
Veteran Status 0.8% (0.09) 1.5% (0.12)
Full-time 61.2% (0.49) 57.0% (0.50)
Covered by a Union Contract 0.5% (0.07) 0.5% (0.07)
Panel B: State Level Employment Estimates (using CPS Basic Monthly 1976-2014)
Number of Respondents per State-Year 24.59 (22.45) 29.26 (24.60)
Estimated Employment 2873.94 (3,214.33) 4743.67 (6,049.99)
Panel C: State Level FTE Employment Estimates (using CPS-ORG 1979-2014)
Number of Respondents per State-Year 5.89 (5.42) 7.25 (6.19)
Estimated FTE Employment 2525.82 (2,819.73) 4079.60 (5,221.68)
Before X-ray Permission After X-ray Permission
Panel A: Individual Level Data (from CPS-ORG 1979-2014)
3831 7965
Notes: Panel A includes all individuals in the CPS-ORG who are employed at the time of
survey, report non-zero earnings, and report DA as his or her primary occupation. Individual-
level statistics are weighted by the CPS-provided person weights. Panel B shows employment
estimates using the Basic Monthly CPS sample. Number of respondents is the average number
of individuals per state-year that are employed at the time of survey and report DA as their
primary occupation. State-level employment is estimated using the person weight of each DA
respondent. Panel C shows full-time equivalent employment estimates using the CPS-ORG
sample. State-level FTE employment is estimated using the reported weekly hours of each
respondent and their person weights.
of interview. Both features help improve the precision of my wage analysis.
Summary statistics for wages, employment, and other characteristics of DAs in the
CPS-ORG sample are reported in Table 1.1. Dental assistants are predominantly female
and non-unionized. Their average wage increased considerably after the X-ray permission.
Notably, after the adoption of X-ray permission, the average wage of DAs is higher than that
of an average female high school graduate. Although there is little change in the weekly hours
worked by the average DA, employment increased substantially after the X-ray permission,
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indicating that more individuals entered the profession after the regulatory change. In
addition, the percentage of minorities, especially Hispanics, increased considerably after
the X-ray permission.
1.3.2 Data on Dental Assisting Education Programs
I draw from two sources of data for dental assistant education programs. The key variables
of interests are the size and tuition rate of dental assistant programs and the college-wide
tuition rate of the community college that houses the DA program. I use two different
variables to measure program size: the number of graduates from each program and the
maximum capacity of each program. Although program capacity is a better measure of an
institution’s choice of program size, it is only available for three-quarters of public programs
and a small set of for-profit programs. The number of graduates is available for almost all
DA programs, I, therefore, use this alternative measure whenever it is necessary to consider
all DA programs. Available data indicate that enrollment is close to full program capacity for
most public programs and that graduation rates vary little both across institutions and over
time, suggesting that the number of graduates from each program is also a good measure of
institutional choice of program size.
Data on the number of graduates from DA programs and college-wide tuition come
from the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) provided by the Na-
tional Center for Education Statistics (NCES). IPEDS contains a broad set of administrative
information of all accredited, degree-granting postsecondary education providers. Data on
public and private non-profit institutions are available from 1984 onwards, and data on for-
profit institutions are available from 1987 onwards. In particular, IPEDS Completion module
contains information on the number of degree completers by Classification of Instructional
Programs (CIP) code, from which I extract data on the number of DA certificate or asso-
ciate degree completers.10 Besides, IPEDS collects the college-wide average tuition if a flat
10For a subset of states, for-profit colleges did not report degree completion data from 1990 to 1994. How-
ever, enrollment and degree completions data was reported in the Student Charges for Vocational Programs
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tuition rate applies to most undergraduate majors at the institution. Alternatively, if the
institution charges different tuition rates for most of its programs, IPEDS collects program-
specific tuition for the six largest programs. Most public 4-year and 2-year colleges reported
college-wide average tuition, and most for-profit colleges reported program-specific tuition.
Data on DA program capacity and program-specific tuition rate come from the Allied
Dental Education Surveys, a series of reports published by the American Dental Association
(ADA) annually from 1973 onwards. It contains information on capacity, enrollment, com-
pletion, and tuition rate of all DA programs accredited by the ADA.11 Because participation
in the ADA accreditation is voluntary, this alternative data set contains only a subset of DA
programs, but it covers a longer time horizon. To obtain and maintain ADA accreditation,
programs must incur an annual cost and abide by the ADA’s standards regarding curriculum
design and faculty-to-student ratios.12 Accreditation by the ADA signals higher quality of
instruction and enables program graduates to take national certification exams immediately
upon graduation. Graduates from non-ADA-accredited programs are still eligible for state
board exams upon graduation, but must have two years of relevant work experience to be
eligible for the national certification exam. Each year, around 75% of public programs are
accredited by the ADA, while only a small number of for-profit institutions are accredited.
Table 1.2 shows summary statistics for dental assistant programs. Several features
are worth highlighting. First, private non-profit institutions rarely offer DA programs, as
evidenced by the minuscule number of programs and graduates. Among the small set of
Survey for the six largest programs at each vocational college. For most state-year pairs, I am able to find
DA degree completions information for all institutions. However, for a few states, degree completions infor-
mation was missing for all for-profit colleges in 1993 and 1994. These state-year pairs are dropped from the
state level analysis. .
11I thank Rachel Morrissey and the ADA Health Policy Institute for providing historical editions of the
survey.
12As of 2014, new programs must pay $15,000 to apply for ADA accreditation, and existing programs must
pay $1,500 annually to maintain accreditation status. As for accreditation requirements that are relevant
for this study, programs are required to provide in-depth lab and clinical training for any procedures dental
assistants are authorized to perform in the state where the program is located. Faculty/student ratio must be
kept below 1/6 during radiography and clinical practice sessions, and 1/12 during laboratory and preclinical
instruction in dental materials and chairside assisting procedures.
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Public Sector 3.79 6.27 56.94 105.06
Non-Profit Sector 0.09 0.22 1.72 3.99
For-Profit Sector 1.70 4.03 46.09 191.38
Public Program 16 17 $2,086 $2,452
Non-Profit Program 13 17 $8,309 $15,382
For-Profit Program 32 50 $9,722 $13,027
Public Program 30 30 $2,933 $3,820
Non-Profit Program 50 43 $12,518 $16,148
For-Profit Program 73 122 $10,057 $14,068
Public Program 83% 76% 75% 75%
Non-Profit Program 66% 71% 88% 71%
For-Profit Program 61% 75% 92% 81%
Panel C: Program Level Averages, ADA Sample (1973 - 2013)
Capacity Limit Program Tuition (2013$)
# Programs Per State
# Graduates Per Program
Panel A: State Level Averages (1987 - 2013)
# Graduates Per State
Panel B: Program Level Averages, IPEDS Sample (1987 - 2013)
College-wide Tuition (2013$)
Enrollment to Capacity Ratio Graduate to Enrollment Ratio
Notes: This table reports the sample means of each variable by type of school and by periods
before and after the X-ray permission. Panel A presents state-level averages of of all DA
programs. “Number of programs per state” is the count of the number of institutions that has
at least one dental assistant graduate in the corresponding year. Panel B presents program-
level averages calculated using the IPEDS universe, whereas Panel C presents program-level
averages calculated using the subsample of ADA-surveyed programs. “College-wide tuition”
is the average of tuition and fees for full-time in-district attendees of the college that houses
the DA program. “Program tuition” is the tuition and fees of the DA program for in-district
attendees. “Enrollment to capacity ratio” measures the ratio of October enrollment to program
capacity. “Graduate to enrollment ratio” measures the ratio of program completers to October
enrollment of the previous year.
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private non-profit institutions that offer DA programs, there is a large degree of variation
in their mission and source of funding.13 For this reason, private non-profit programs are
excluded from this study. Second, there are substantial increases over time in the number
of DA programs in both the public and for-profit sectors. Yet, program size changed little
in the public sector but increased substantially in the for-profit sector. This applies to both
measures of program size – the number of graduates per program and the program capacity
limit. Third, DA program tuition is higher than the college-wide tuition at all types of
colleges, which is consistent with the fact that the cost of instruction is higher for the DA
program than the average academic program in a community or for-profit college. Fourth,
tuition for a public DA program is only one-third of that of a typical for-profit program,
indicating that state and local funding substantially reduces the costs of attending a public
program. Finally, all DA programs are highly subscribed and enjoy much higher graduation
rates than the typical program at community and technical colleges, although it is important
to keep in mind that these graduation rate statistics are from the set of ADA-accredited
programs, which may be of higher quality than other DA programs. The high graduation
rates for for-profit programs, in particular, are calculated from 66 programs, although 591
for-profit programs were ever in operation.
1.4 Empirical Models and Results
My empirical analysis consists of two parts. First, I estimate the labor market effect of the
X-ray permission to provide evidence that it increases the demand for skilled DAs. I then
measure how public and private for-profit programs respond to the X-ray permission.
For all of the empirical analysis, I employ a difference-in-differences strategy exploiting
13Some programs are funded by external grants with specific purposes. For example, Columbia University
received a grant in 1998 to provide DA training for minority students in order to increase minority represen-
tation in dentists’ offices in New York City. Some programs are offered in for-profit institutions that recently
turned into non-profit institutions. For example, Remington College, which offers DA programs in several of
its campuses, was a for-profit university until it changed its status to non-profit in 2011. Some DA programs
are offered in privately funded non-profit community colleges, such as Harcum College and Manor College.
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the staggered implementation of X-ray permission across states. The key identification as-
sumption is that the timing of this regulatory change is uncorrelated with other determinants
of the outcomes of interest. Several tests will be performed to verify the reliability of this
assumption indirectly. To provide evidence that the results are not driven by existing pre-
trends in the outcome variable before the regulatory change, I estimate event-study versions
of all subsequent empirical models to examine the pre-trends. To confirm that timing of the
X-ray permission is uncorrelated with other time-varying determinants of the dental labor
market, I perform falsification tests using dental hygienists as a placebo group.
1.4.1 Effects on Labor Market Outcomes
In this subsection, I provide evidence that the X-ray permission increases demand for skilled
DAs that are eligible to perform X-rays. Because the X-ray permission increases job com-
plexity and requirements for professional knowledge, we should expect higher wages for DAs
after the passage of the X-ray permission. To the extent that the supply of skilled DAs
cannot adjust immediately, we should expect the wage effect to be the strongest on impact
and gradually move to its long-run equilibrium as new assistants acquire training and enter
the labor market. Similarly, we should expect a small initial effect on employment and a
larger effect over time.
To estimate the effect of the X-ray permission on DAs’ wages, I take advantage of the
individual-month level data in the CPS-ORG sample. The individual level data allow me to
control for individual characteristics such as race, ethnicity and labor market experience that
may affect wages. They also allow me to include month-of-interview dummies to control for
seasonality in wages. I allocate an individual to the post-treatment group if X-ray permission
has been implemented in her state in or before the month of her CPS interview. These
measures are expected to improve the precision of the estimates. Because the regulatory
change occurs at the state level, I cluster my standard errors at the state level to avoid
aggregation bias (Moulton, 1990) and to account for serial correlations across time within
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the same state (Bertrand et al., 2004). I estimate the following equation
ln(wage
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(1.4.1)
for each individual i, in state s, surveyed in year y, and month m that reports dental assisting
as their main occupation. Here, T
sym
is dummy variable equal to one if state s has adopted
dental X-ray permission in survey year y and month m. Z
isym
is a vector of time-varying
individual demographic controls, including experience, experience squared, gender, marital
status, veteran status, race or ethnic origin, whether the individual works full-time, whether
the individual is covered by a union contract, and whether the individual reports “dentist’s
office” as his or her main industry of work. For some specifications, Z
isym
also includes
dummies for each education level. X
sy
is a vector of basic state controls including state
unemployment rate and per-capita personal income. All specifications include a state fixed
effect µ
s
, a year fixed effect ⇡
y
, and a month-of-interview fixed effect  
m
. Some specifications
also include state-specific time trends  
s
⇥ y, which allows and controls for differential linear
time trends in the outcome of interest. The key coefficient of interest here is  , which
measures the effect of the X-ray permission on the wage of a typical dental assistant.
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for each state s, year y. Here, the outcome is measured at the state-year level. T
sy
is a dummy
variable equal to one if state s has adopted dental X-ray permission in survey year y. X
sy
is
a vector of basic state controls including state unemployment rate and per-capita personal
income. All specifications include a state fixed effect µ
s
and a year fixed effect ⇡
y
. Some
specifications also include state-specific trends  
s
⇥ y. The key coefficient of interest here is
 , which measures the effect of dental X-ray permission on dental assistants’ employment.
Figure 1.1 and 1.2 present estimates of the event-study versions of Equation 1.4.1 and
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Figure 1.1: Effect of X-ray Permission on Dental Assistants’ Wages by Year
Notes: This figure shows the coefficients (in solid lines) and 95% confidence intervals (in dashed
lines) from regressing log real wages of each dental assistant on a set of dummies indicating the
5 years before the X-ray permission was adopted, the year of adoption, and the 7 years after
adoption. Because CPS data is collected through monthly interviews, each respondent is put
into a year category according to the month of interview. If a respondent is interviewed within
the first 12 months of the adoption, she is put in the “0~1 year” category, and so forth for all
other years. For states where the month of adoption of X-ray permission is unknown, I assume
that July is the month of adoption. The year before the regulatory change (-1) is omitted. The
first dummy (-5) is an indicator for being five years before the adoption or earlier. The last
dummy (+7) is an indicator for being 7 years after the adoption or later. The regression is
run at the individual level after partialing out controls for individual characteristics and state
economic conditions, as described in the notes for Table 1.3. Other controls include a set of
state fixed effects and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at the state level.
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Figure 1.2: Effect of X-ray Permission on Dental Assistants’ Employment by Year
Notes: This figure shows the coefficients (in solid lines) and 95% confidence intervals (in dashed
lines) from regressing estimated employment of dental assistants on a set of dummies indicating
the 5 years before the X-ray permission was adopted, the year of adoption, and the 7 years after
adoption. For those states that adopted the X-ray permission in or after July, I assume that
the year of adoption is the year after the actual calendar year of adoption. For states where the
month of adoption of X-ray permission is unknown, I assume that July is the month of adoption.
The year before the regulatory change (-1) is omitted. The first dummy (-5) is an indicator
for being five years before the adoption or earlier. The last dummy (+5) is an indicator for
being 5 years after the adoption or later. The regression is run at the state-year level after
partialing out controls for state economic conditions, as described in the notes for Table 1.4.
Other controls include a set of state fixed effects and year fixed effects. To increase precision of
estimates, states that had zero DA respondent in any of the years between 1976 and 2014 are
excluded from the sample. This procedure ensures a balanced sample. Consequentially, nine
states (AZ, DE, IN, MS, MT, NH, VT, WV, WY) and D.C. are excluded. The corresponding
graph with all 50 states and DC is available upon request. Robust standard errors are clustered
at the state level.
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Table 1.3: Effect of X-ray Permission on Dental Assistants’ Wages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DA Permitted to expose X-ray 0.0424** 0.0418** 0.0418** 0.0405** 0.0488**
in State in Year of Observation (0.0211) (0.0192) (0.0190) (0.0196) (0.0206)
State FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month of the Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual Education Level Yes Yes Yes
State Controls Yes Yes
State-Specific Trend Yes
Observations 11,793 11,793 11,793 11,793 11,793
Adj. R-squared 0.0635 0.133 0.148 0.148 0.150
Pre-Treat. Mean Wage (in 2014$) 13.67 13.67 13.67 13.67 13.67
Log Real Wage of Each Respondent
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the state level are shown in parentheses. Outcome
variable is log real wage measured in 2014 dollars. Unit of observation is at the individual-year
level. Sample includes all individuals in the CPS-ORG (1979-2014) who are employed at the
time of survey, report non-zero earnings, and report dental assisting as their primary occupa-
tion. Each column is a separate regression using OLS estimation. Controls for individual char-
acteristics include experience, experience squared, a dummy for each of the following variables:
female, married, veteran, black, Hispanic, of other minority origin, living in a metropolitan
area, living in the central area of a city, being covered by a union contract, working full time,
and reported dentist’s office as industry of work. Controls for education level include a dummy
for each of the following: having high-school graduation or GED, having some college degree
but no BA, having a BA or more advanced degree. State controls include state unemployment
rate and per capita personal income. All regressions are weighted by the CPS earnings weight.
Significant levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
1.4.2, respectively. Although estimated with limited statistical precision, the two graphs
provide a test for my predictions of the time pattern of wage and employment effect. Both
predictions are borne out in the data: the wage effect is the strongest on impact and declines
slightly over time, whereas the effect on employment is trivial on impact and gradually rises
over the next two years.
Table 1.3 presents the corresponding parametric estimates of Equation 1.4.1. Column
(1) shows estimates for the simplest specification with the treatment dummy and fixed effects
alone. Columns (2) to (5) gradually introduce individual demographic characteristics, indi-
vidual educational controls, state time-varying characteristics and state-specific time trends.
While some of the controls are significant explainers of wage differences across individuals,
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Table 1.4: Effect of X-ray Permission on Dental Assistants’ Employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DA Permitted to expose X-ray 0.204*** 0.198*** 0.194*** 0.242*** 0.247*** 0.241***
in State in Year of Observation (0.0595) (0.0575) (0.0675) (0.0670) (0.0654) (0.0731)
State FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-Specific Trend Yes Yes
Observations 1,924 1,924 1,924 1,558 1,558 1,558
Adj. R-squared 0.822 0.822 0.830 0.810 0.811 0.820
Pre-Treat. Mean FTE Employment 2873.94 2873.94 2873.94 3421.25 3421.25 3421.25
All 50 States and DC 41 States 
Log FTE Employment of Dental Assistants in Each State
Notes: Outcome variable is estimated employment of dental assistants. Unit of observation is at the state-
year level. Employment is estimated using CPS Basic Monthly Sample (1976-2014). For states that adopted
the X-ray permission in or after July, I assume that the year of adoption is the year after the actual calendar
year of adoption. For states where the month of adoption of X-ray permission is unknown, I assume that
July is the month of adoption. State controls include state unemployment rate and per capita personal
income. Columns (1) to (3) include all 50 states and DC. Columns (4) to (6) restrict the sample to the 41
states that has at least one DA respondent in each year from 1976 to 2014. Nine states (AZ, DE, IN, MS,
MT, NH, VT, WV, WY) and D.C. are excluded. Robust standard errors clustered at the state level are
shown in parentheses. Significant levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
their inclusion has little effect on the coefficient of interest. The preferred specification,
Column (5), shows that the X-ray permission increases the wage of an average DA by 5%.14
Note that I do not observe whether each DA in the sample is eligible to take X-rays.
Presumably, the X-ray permission only increases the productivity of skilled DAs that are
eligible to take X-rays. To the extent that only some of the DAs in the CPS sample are
skilled enough to take X-rays, the estimated wage effects will underestimate the true effect
of the X-ray permission on well-trained DAs.
Table 1.4 presents the corresponding parametric estimates of Equation 1.4.2. The out-
come variable here is the estimated employment of DAs in each state-year. Because the
outcome variable is an estimate based on sample weights of respondents in the CPS survey,
I present two sets of results here. The first set, columns (1) to (3), includes all 50 states
14All individual level wage regressions are weighted by the CPS provided person weights. Unweighted
regressions yield slightly larger coefficient estimates that are also statistically significant for all specifications.
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and DC. State-year pairs with zero dental assistant respondents in the CPS Basic Monthly
sample are dropped, resulting in an unbalanced panel. The second set, columns (4) to (6),
includes only those states that have at least one DA respondent in each year from 1976 to
2014. This reduces the sample to 41 states. Reassuringly, estimates of the coefficient of
interest are robust and statistically significant across all specifications. The preferred speci-
fication, column (3), shows that the X-ray permission increases FTE employment of DAs by
21%.15
These results also add support to the identifying assumption that labor market condi-
tions for dental assistants would be similar across states in the absence of the X-ray permis-
sion. In both sets of event study estimates, there are no statistically significant pre-trends
before the regulatory change, nor did the inclusion of state-specific time trends alter the
coefficient estimates in either of the two regressions.
Taken together, these results support the claim that the X-ray permission had increased
the productivity of and demand for DAs, which should translate into higher demand for DA
education programs. I now turn to the analysis of DA education programs.
1.4.2 Response from Postsecondary Education Programs
The conceptual framework in section 1.5 predicts that for-profit programs would be more
responsive to the X-ray permission than public programs. In pursuit of larger profits, a
for-profit program will expand to accommodate the increased demand. In contrast, public
programs will be constrained by their budgets. Because incorporating X-ray practices into
the curriculum raises costs, public programs would have to downsize unless they could either
receive more funding or charge higher tuition.
These predictions are tested in the next three subsections. In subsection 1.4.2.1, I
15As a robustness check, I also estimate the same model using employment estimates based the CPS-
ORG only. The estimates are very similar to the ones shown in Table 1.4 and figure 1.2. However, the
corresponding event study graph is estimated with much less precision due to the fact that the number of
DA respondents are even much lower in the ORG sample. 18 states (compared to 9 here) besides D.C. have
zero DA respondent for at least one year in the time period studied. These results are available upon request.
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test whether the for-profit sector as a whole is more responsive than the public sector.
These estimates capture the combined responses from both margins: changes in the number
of institutions offering DA programs and changes in the size of each program. Subsection
1.4.2.2 evaluates how the size of each program responds to the X-ray permission. The results
show that the average for-profit program expanded, whereas the average public program
experienced no change in size.
1.4.2.1 Response in Total Number of Graduates by School Type
To test whether the for-profit sector as a whole is more responsive than the public sector, I
estimate the effect of the X-ray permission on the total number of DA graduates from each
sector.16 Because of the large amounts of zero-valued observations in the for-profit sector in
the early years, log transformations would result in the loss of a large number of observations.





















for each school type c, in each state s, and academic year t. Here, school type c is either
public or for-profit. Y
cst
is the total number of DA graduates from school type c in state s year
t. T
st
is a dummy variable that equals one if X-ray is permitted in state s in academic year
t.18 Z
st
is a set of state time-varying characteristics, which include the state’s poverty rate,
EITC rate, minimum wage rate, a dummy for having a Democratic governor, the fraction
of the house that is Democratic, and a set of controls for the racial and age composition of
16Number of graduates is chosen as the outcome variable here, because alternative measures such as
enrollment and program capacity are not available for all programs.
17As a robustness check, I estimate the linear version of all subsequent models with both log(outcome)
and log(outcome + 1) as the dependent variable. Point estimates of are comparable between the Poisson
estimates and the OLS estimates. However, whenever the outcome variable contains a large proportion of
zero-valued observations, the standard errors are noticeably larger under the linear specifications. Estimates
for the linear models are available upon request.
18To be consistent with NCES-IPEDS data reporting standards, I assume the academic year runs from
July 1 to June 30. As an example, a graduate of the academic year 2010 refers to a student that obtained a
degree at some point between July 1, 2009, and June 30, 2010.
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the state. Some specifications also include a set of controls for annual government funding





. I use region-by-year fixed effects instead of year fixed effects to account
for regional differences in the demand for formal training in dental assisting. State-specific
trends  
s
⇥t are included in some of the specifications. As in the last section, standard errors
are clustered at the state level to accounts for serial correlations across time within the same
state.
Equation 1.4.3 is estimated separately for each school type. As such, identification
assumes common trends within each sector in the absence of the regulatory change, but does
not assume common trends across the two sectors. The coefficients of interest here are  
Public
and  
For-Profit, and we are especially interested in whether  For-Profit >  Public.
Figure 1.3 shows the effect of the X-ray permission on the number of total DA graduates
in each state by school type. These graphs plot the coefficients and 95% confidence intervals
from estimating an event-study version of Equation 1.4.3. The lack of statistically significant
pre-trends in these graphs lends support to the identifying assumption that the timing of the
regulatory change is uncorrelated with pre-existing trends in the demand for DA education.
The differential responses of the two school types are made evident in the post-trends in
Figure 1.3. In the public sector, there is no statistically significant difference in the total
number of graduates before and after the regulatory change. In contrast, in the for-profit
sector, there is a significant increase in the total number of graduates immediately after the
regulatory change, followed by even greater responses a few years after the change.
19Controls for the racial and age composition of the state include the percent of the population that are
non-Hispanic white, the percent of the population that is between age 15 and 24, and the percent of the
population that is over 65. These population-level data come from a database maintained by the Survey of
Epidemiology and End Results (SEER). SEER provides annual population estimates for each age and racial
group based on Census information. Controls for government funding for higher education include three
variables that measure the state sum of grants and appropriations for all higher-ed institutions from federal,
state or local governments, and two other variables that measure the sum of appropriations for all 2-year
public colleges from state or local governments. These statistics come from collapsing IPEDS institution-level
data into state-year cells. Log levels of these funding variables are used in regressions. Data on all other
state time-varying characteristics come from a database maintained by the University of Kentucky Center
for Poverty Research.
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Figure 1.3: Effect of X-ray Permission on Total DA Graduates by School Type by Year
Notes: This figure shows the coefficients (in solid lines) and 95% confidence intervals (in dashed lines) from
a Poisson QMLE regression where the outcome variable is the total number of DA graduates in each state
by type of institution. This outcome is regressed on a set of dummies indicating the 5 years before the X-ray
permission was adopted, the year of adoption, and the 5 years after adoption. The year before the regulatory
change (-1) is omitted. The last dummy (+5) is an indicator for being 5 years after the adoption or later.
The regression is run at the state-year level after partialing out controls for state time-varying characteristics
and public funding for higher education, as described in the notes for Table 1.5. Other controls include a set
of state fixed effects and region-by-year fixed effects. Panel A shows the results for public college graduates,
and Panel B for graduates from for-profit institutions. Robust standard errors are clustered at the state
level.
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Table 1.5 shows the corresponding parametric difference-in-differences estimates of Equa-
tion 1.4.3. Columns (1) to (3) present estimates for  
Public
, and columns (4) to (6) present
estimates for  
For-Profit. The results suggest that the response from the public sector is small
in magnitude and statistically insignificant. In contrast, the number of DA graduates from
for-profit institutions increased significantly after the regulatory change. The estimate in the
preferred specification, column (6), implies a 34 percent increase in the number of for-profit
graduates. The estimates are robust across different specifications. In particular, the inclu-
sion of state-specific linear time trends in columns (3) and (6) does not substantially change
estimates for the key coefficient of interest. This again adds confidence to the identifying
assumption that in the absence of the X-ray permission, within each institution type (public
or for-profit), different states would have similar trends in the number of DA graduates.
A potential issue with identification is that while most states adopted X-ray permission
between 1970 and 2011, data for the full set of for-profit institutions are only available after
1987. As a robustness check, I estimate Equation 1.4.3 with only the 33 states that adopted
the X-ray permission after 1987. This sample restriction results in slightly smaller coefficient
estimates, but the level of statistical significance remains the same. Estimating off only the
variation in timing of reform for these 33 later-reformed states is sufficient to identify the
large response from the for-profit sector. These results are reported in Appendix Table
A.11. In further robustness testing, I also experiment with dropping each state one at a
time from the sample. These results are also robust and similar to the ones shown in Table
1.5, suggesting that the identified responses are not subject to serious biases due to sample
selection issues.
These results indicate that the for-profit sector is more responsive to demand changes
than the public sector. The estimated responses are the combined results from two margins:
the opening of new DA programs in institutions that did not have one before, and the ex-
pansion in the size of existing DA programs. Ideally, we would like to separately measure
the responses from both channels. On the extensive margin, the summary statistics shown
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Table 1.5: Effect of X-ray Permission on Total DA Graduates by School Type
Dependent Variable Total Number of DA Graduates in Each State
Public Institutions For-Profit Institutions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DA X-ray Permitted 0.0946 0.0985 0.0463 0.290*** 0.283*** 0.296***
in State-Year (0.0684) (0.0712) (0.0582) (0.101) (0.106) (0.107)
State FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region-by-Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Time-Varying Char. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Public Funding for High-Ed Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-Specific Trend Yes Yes
Observations 1,528 1,528 1,528 1,166 1,166 1,166
Number of States 51 51 51 45 45 45
Pre-Treat. Mean of Dependent 63.18 63.18 63.18 46.09 46.09 46.09
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the state level and shown in parentheses. Unit of observation
is at the state-year level. Each column is a separate regression using Poisson Quasi-Maximum Likelihood
estimation. For columns (1) to (3), the dependent variable is the total number of DA graduates from public
institutions; sample includes all 50 states and DC from 1984 to 2013. For columns (4) to (6), the dependent
variable is the total number of DA graduates from for-profit institutions; sample includes 45 states and years
1987 to 2013; DC and 5 states (ME, MT, SD, VT, and WY) are dropped because these states have zero
for-profit DA graduates for all years in the sample and the Conditional Maximum Likelihood estimation
process drops groups with no variation in the outcome variable. All regressions include state fixed effects,
region-by-year fixed effects, and a set of controls for state time-varying characteristics. State time-varying
characteristics include: state poverty rate, state eitc rate, state minimum wage, a dummy for having a
Democratic governor, the fraction of the house that is Democratic, the percent of the population that are
non-Hispanic white, the percent of the population that is between age 15 and 24, and the percent of the
population that is over 65. Columns (2), (3), (5) and (6) also include controls for public funding for higher
education aggregated at the state-year level. These controls include total funding for all higher-ed institutions
within state from federal, state or local governments, and total appropriations for all 2-year public colleges
within state from state or local government. Log levels of these funding variables are used in the regressions.
Columns (3) and (6) also include a set of state-specific time trends. Significant levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1
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in Table 1.2 indicate that there is substantial entry of new programs within both sectors
over time. Unfortunately, the difference-in-differences strategy does not lend itself well to
measuring the effect of the X-ray permission on the opening and closure of DA programs.
Event-study estimates reveal significant pre-trends that are sensitive to the set of states in-
cluded in the estimation. The difference-in-differences regression estimates are also sensitive
to the exclusion of certain states and time periods. Both indicate failure of the parallel trends
assumption. After all, the opening of new programs requires large amounts of one-time cap-
ital investments, which are often supported by one-time grants funded through donations
or government-issued bonds. Hence, different state systems have different decision processes
regarding the opening of new programs. The parallel trends assumption – that different
states would have similar trends in the number of DA programs in the absence of the X-
ray permission – is unlikely to hold here. Therefore, we cannot interpret these extensive
margin results as causal effects of the X-ray permission, and I do not report them in the
paper. These results are available upon request. On the intensive margin, general operating
expenses of the DA program are usually funded by annual state and local appropriations
through a stable funding formula. Therefore, the size of each DA program should follow
similar trends in the absence of the X-ray permission. I now turn to the intensive margin to
evaluate how individual programs respond to the demand shock.
1.4.2.2 Response in Program Size by School Type
In this subsection, I assess how individual schools respond to the X-ray permission. Before
estimating parametric models of the effects of the X-ray permission on program size, it is
instructive to evaluate the raw data on program size. Figure 1.4 presents kernel density
estimates of the distribution of program size for each school type before and after the reg-
ulatory change.20 From these density plots, we can observe that both before and after the
20When comparing public and for-profit programs, I use the number of graduates from each program as
the measure of program size because this is the only outcome variable that is available for all institutions.
Two alternative measures, enrollment and program capacity, are only available for programs in the ADA
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regulatory change, for-profit programs tend to be larger than public programs. Over time,
there is little change in the distribution of public program size, whereas the distribution of
for-profit program size flattens and shifts to the right after the X-ray permission. These
density estimates offer descriptive evidence that, compared to public programs, for-profit
programs are larger and more likely to expand after the regulatory change.
To establish a causal relationship between the regulatory change and the size of each
program, I return to the difference-in-differences regression framework. Using the size of
















for each program i, of school type c, in state s and academic year t. Again, the equation
is estimated separately for each school type. All specifications include a year fixed effect ⇡
t
and an institution fixed effect µ
i
. Some specifications also include an institution-specific time
trend  
i
⇥ t to control for differential growth patterns of each program. To generate a long
panel for each program, I combine data from IPEDS and ADA and make use of all program
size information from 1973 to 2013. Due to the exceptional length of this panel, institution
and state level control variables are not available for all years. Thus, no control variables are
included in this program level analysis. Standard errors are clustered at the state level to
account for aggregation bias and serial correlations across time within the same state. The
coefficient of interest,  
c
, measures the average treatment effect of the X-ray permission on
the size of DA programs in sector c.
I use the number of graduates from each institution as a measure of program size.21
sample. I use them for robustness checks. Appendix Figure A.5 plots the kernel density estimates of the
distribution of program capacity. Basic features of the graph are similar to Figure 1.4, especially for public
institutions.
21Using program capacity as the outcome variable yields very similar estimates for public programs. For
for-profit programs, however, the coefficients are not as precisely estimated because the number of for-profit
programs in the ADA sample is very small. Only 20 for-profit institutions reported program capacity at least
once both before and after the adoption of the X-ray permission. These results are reported in Appendix
Table A.12.
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Figure 1.4: Distribution of Program Size by Institution Type
Notes: This figure plots the density of number of graduates from each individual institution
in each year. The dashed blue line plots distribution of all public institution-year pairs before
the regulatory change. The solid blue line plots distribution of all public institution-year pairs
after the change. Similarly, the dashed and solid red lines plot distribution of all private for-
profit institution-year pairs before and after the regulatory change, respectively. For illustrative
clarity, density estimates for programs larger than 100 graduates are not plotted in this graph.
Before the regulatory change, there are 0.06% of public institution-year observations and 3.7%
of for-profit institution-year observations larger than 100. After the change, there are 0.32% of
public institution-year observations and 10% of for-profit institution-year observations larger
than 100.
Source: American Dental Association Survey of Allied Dental Education 1973 to 2013.
IPEDS Completions Survey and 1984 to 2013. & IPEDS Student Charges by Program 1986 to
1994.
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Figure 1.5: Effect of X-ray Permission on Individual Program Size by School Type by Year
Notes: This figure shows the coefficients (in solid lines) and 95% confidence intervals (in dashed
lines) from a Poisson QMLE regression where the outcome variable is the number of DA
graduates from each institution by institution type. This outcome is regressed on a set of
dummies indicating the 5 years before the X-ray permission was adopted, the year of adoption,
and the 4 years after adoption. The year before the regulatory change (-1) is omitted. The last
dummy (+4) is an indicator for being 4 years after the adoption or later. The regression is run
at the institution-year level. Controls include a set of institution fixed effects and year fixed
effects. Panel A shows the results for public institutions, and Panel B for for-profit institutions.
Robust standard errors are clustered at the state level.
The sample is restricted to DA programs that are in operation at least one year before and
one year after the X-ray permission. Programs that entered the market after the X-ray
permission are excluded from the sample because new programs may grow at a different
speed from old programs. This process leaves us with a sample of 268 public institutions
and 67 for-profit institutions. The resulting regression estimates shed light on how existing
programs respond to the demand shock induced by the X-ray permission.
Figure 1.5 shows the results from estimating an event study version of Equation 1.4.4.
There is no statistically significant change in the size of public programs after the regulatory
change. In contrast, for-profit programs expanded 23% immediately after the X-ray permis-
sion. This effect persists for three years and eventually tapers down to around 8%. The
weakening of long-run effect could be a result of the entry of new programs.
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The long-run effects on for-profit program size are also estimated with less precision
than the short-run effects, indicating a greater degree of heterogeneity in the long run. Two
factors may have contributed to this. First, institution turnover rates are rather high among
for-profit universities. Financial or regulatory distress can lead to the shut-down of the
entire campus, which then leads to terminations of all programs even if some of them are in
good health. Therefore, for-profit programs, in general, have lower survival rates. Second,
many for-profit campuses are owned and operated by the same corporation as a “for-profit
chain school.” Long-run decisions are made centrally by the headquarters. In my sample,
each campus of a large for-profit chain is reported and coded as a single institution. If in
the long-run, a for-profit chain responds to the demand shock by either consolidating DA
programs in various campuses into one large program or splitting an existing program into
several programs in different locations, these activities would result in greater dispersions in
program size in the long run. My measure of “individual program response” here does not
take these long-run institutional responses into account. Despite these potential caveats, the
results presented here do show that for-profit programs are significantly more responsive to
the X-ray permission than public programs.
Table 1.6 presents the corresponding coefficient estimates from estimating Equation
1.4.4. The inclusion of institution-specific time trends in Table 1.6 does not qualitatively
change the effect. This is consistent with the lack of pre-trends in Figure 1.5. These results
provide evidence that the estimated responses measure for-profits’ ability to adjust capacity.
They are not the results of for-profits’ foresight in predicting the regulatory change, nor their
power to lobby for the regulatory change.
1.4.3 Falsification Tests Using Dental Hygienists
As an additional robustness check, I use dental hygienists as a placebo group to test whether
the timing of the X-ray permission is correlated with other concurrent factors that affect the
labor or education market for allied dental professions.
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Table 1.6: Effect of X-ray Permission on Individual Program Size by School Type
Dependent Variable Number of DA Graduates from Each Program
Public Institutions For-Profit Institutions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DA Permitted to Take X-ray -0.0174 0.00184 0.193* 0.202**
in State in Year of Observation (0.0374) (0.0368) (0.102) (0.0807)
Institution FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Institution-Specific Trend Yes Yes
Observations 8,395 8,395 1,306 1,306
Number of Institutions 268 268 67 67
Pre-Treat. Mean of Dependent Var. 18.12 18.12 35.52 35.52
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the state level and shown in parentheses. Unit of observation
is at the institution-year level. Dependent variable is the number of DA graduates from each program each
year. Each column is a separate regression using Poisson Quasi-Maximum Likelihood estimation. Sample
includes all DA programs in ADA survey (1973-2013) or IPEDS sample (1984-2013) that was in operation
at least one year before and one year after the X-ray permission. All regressions include institution fixed
effects and year fixed effects. Columns (2) and (4) also include institution-specific time trends. Significant
levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Hygienists and assistants are both commonly used auxiliary personnel in dentists’ offices.
Both are regulated by the same state agencies. Their education programs are usually under
the same department of a college. Changes that affect the overall dental labor market or
education market affect both hygienists and dental assistants. However, the X-ray permission
exploited here should only affect dental assistants.22
Motivated by these facts, I run a falsification test, estimating the effect of the X-ray
permission on hygienists’ wages, employment and post-secondary education participation.
Results for the three outcome variables are reported in Appendix Tables A.15, A.16, and
A.17, respectively.23 The estimated effects are small in magnitude for all three outcomes in all
specifications. None of the estimates are statistically significantly different from zero. These
results rule out the possibility that my earlier findings are driven by other concurrent factors
affecting either the labor market or the education market of allied dental professionals.
1.5 A Framework to Understand the Public Sector
What could account for the lack of response from the public sector? This section introduces
a simple framework to analyze how public and for-profit universities might respond to the
X-ray permission. The main objective is to clarify existing programs’ incentives to adjust
their capacity. I therefore abstract away from an institution’s long-term decisions of entry
into or exit from the dental education market and take a DA program’s long-term decisions
such as investments in equipment and facilities as pre-determined.24 I address the following
22It is worth mentioning that dental hygienists are allowed to take dental X-ray. However, the majority
of their time at work is spent on teeth and gums cleaning, which generates higher revenue for the dental
practice than X-rays. Therefore, the permission for dental assistants to perform X-rays will likely have little
effect on hygienists’ productivity, or employment.
23For the effect of X-ray permission on hygienists’ education participation, the outcome variable is the total
number of dental hygiene graduates from all types of institutions. I do not estimate the effect by the school
type because the for-profit sector in most states did not start providing dental hygiene programs until recent
years. Therefore, there is not enough variation across time in the number of for-profit hygienist graduates
to identify the effect of the X-ray permission separately for them. Nevertheless, results in Appendix Table
A.17 show that the X-ray permission had zero effect on overall education participation in dental hygiene
programs.
24I abstract away from long-term capital investment decisions because state and local authorities have
separate budgeting processes for community college general operating expenses and capital outlay. Gen-
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question: given a program’s pre-existing level of equipment and facilities, how might it adjust
its staffing and class schedules in response to the change in demand and average variable
cost induced by the X-ray permission?
This simple model consists of three agents: a for-profit DA program, a public DA
program, and the community college that houses the public DA program. Every year, the
for-profit DA program sets its tuition to maximize profits. The community college receives
an amount of funding from state and local governments, sets a college-wide tuition rate to
balance its overall budget, and allocates funding to each program within the college. Each
program charges its students the college-wide tuition unless a program-specific tuition is
negotiated between the program and the college. The public DA program aims to balance
its budget. If the sum of tuition and per-student funding is below the average variable costs
of the program, the program sets a capacity limit to keep its budget balanced.
Details of the model are as follows. Suppose that demand for for-profit and public DA
programs can be specified by DFP (tuition) and DP (tuition), respectively. All DA programs
incur a fixed cost of operation every year, FC, and a constant average variable cost, C, for
each student enrolled. Examples of the fixed cost include rent for classrooms, electricity,
and lab maintenance costs. Examples of variable costs include costs of instruments and
instructors’ salaries. Average variable cost is assumed to be constant to reflect the fact that
each incremental student requires the same amount of instructional input for lab and clinical
sessions. Both FC and C are predetermined by the level of existing facilities at the school.
25
To fulfill its mission of meeting a wide range of educational needs at minimum costs
eral operating expenses are usually funded by annual state and local appropriations through a funding
formula, whereas capital investments are usually supported by one-time grants funded through donations or
government-issued bonds.
By fixing the level of equipment and facilities, I am implicitly assuming that the number of students
permitted in each lab or clinical session will not change. Hence, the only way to increase program capacity
is to increase the amount of instructional time, perhaps through hiring more instructors.
25Although I specified the same costs, FC and C, for all DA programs, this assumption is not necessary
for the predictions of this model. The crucial assumption is that per student cost increases after the X-ray
permission.
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to the students, the community college keeps an open-enrollment policy and charges a flat
college-wide tuition rate, tuitionCC , to all students. Although in-demand programs such as
dental assisting may set a capacity limit to restrict enrollment, the open-enrollment policy
requires the college to accept all prospective students with a high school degree or GED, who
are willing to pay the basic tuition. Marginal students are accommodated through marginal
courses – under-subscribed courses that any student could enroll in.26 As such, enrollment
is determined by tuition and demand for the marginal courses, enrlCC = DCC(tuitionCC).
The community college faces an average variable cost AV CCC that is dependent on the
level of enrollment, and an annual fixed cost of operation, FCCC . The intensive laboratory
experience renders dental assisting one of the more costly programs; thus, C > AV CCC for
any potential level of community college enrollment.
State and local funding for the community college follows a formula, FundCC +RCC ⇥
enrlCC , where FundCC is a lump-sum fund which does not depend on enrollment levels,
RCC a per student reimbursement rate, and enrlCC the realized enrollment level at the
community college. Once the college sets its college-wide tuition rate tuitionCC , it allocates
funds to the DA program according to a formula FundDA +RDA ⇥ enrlP , where FundDA is
a lump-sum fund, RDA is a per-student reimbursement rate for the DA program, and enrlP
is the enrollment level in the public DA program. DA program tuition, tuitionP , is equal
to tuitionCC unless a different tuition rate is negotiated between the college and the DA
program.
I make two assumptions about the state and local funding formula. Both are crucial to
the predictions of this model. One, the per-student reimbursement rate, RCC , is lower than
the average variable cost of the DA program, C. Two, the state and local funding formula,
FundCC +RCC ⇥ enrlCC , does not change when the DA program’s costs change.
These two assumptions are supported by the following facts. First, state and local
26In some community colleges the marginal courses are remedial education classes, where students who
are unqualified for other classes are generally sent to. For other community colleges, marginal courses are
the less popular programs where enrollment is well below capacity.
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funding formulas usually take limited account of the differential cost across programs. In
some states, funding formulas do not take into account the differential costs at all. The
same per-student reimbursement rate RCC applies to all colleges regardless of the program
composition at the college. In other states, the funding formulas account for cost differences
across broad program categories, reimbursing high-cost programs such as technical and health
related programs at a higher rate than traditional academic programs. Yet, even in those
states, the funding formulas have up to six levels of different reimbursement rates. No state
ties the reimbursement rate, RCC , to the cost of the DA program directly.27 Moreover,
regardless of the specifics of the funding formula, these formulas are rarely fully funded
(Katsinas et al., 2008, 2004; Hudson, 2008). Rather, funding levels are highly influenced by
business cycles and Medicaid expenditures (Kane et al., 2003). Hence, for high-cost programs
such as dental assisting, the cost of the program is likely much higher than the per-student
funding reimbursement rate.
The objectives of the three agents are as follows. The for-profit DA program sets tuition
to maximize its annual profits
⇧
FP
= (tuitionFP   C)⇥ enrlFP   FC
I assume that the for-profit program can accommodate any demand at its chosen tuition
level.28 Therefore, enrollment is determined by tuition according to enrlFP = DFP (tuitionFP ).
Once enrollment is realized, staffing decisions and class schedules will follow suit.
27See Boswell (2000) for a detailed discussion of state and local funding formulas for community colleges
during the late 1990s. State funding is in general tied to enrollment levels. 16 out of the 50 states surveyed
in Boswell (2000) reported using program costs to determine per-student reimbursement rate. Technical
and health related vocational programs enjoyed higher reimbursement rates than other academic programs.
However, most states had up to six levels of different reimbursement rates. Local funding for community
colleges exhibit larger variation across states. Some districts offer a lump-sum payment unrelated to the size
of enrollment; some districts use a formula that resembles or complements the state funding formula.
28This is a plausible assumption given the nature of a for-profit institution. Anecdotal evidence suggests
that they are nimble enough to adjust class sessions by hiring or firing part-time instructors as demand
fluctuates.
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The public DA program is subject to its budget constraint
BudgetDA = FundDA + (RDA + tuitionP   C)⇥ enrlP   FC   0
Funding and tuition are pre-negotiated between the DA program and the community college.
The public DA program chooses its admissions criterion to balance its budget. One of the
following three scenarios occurs:
S1 If tuition and per-student reimbursement are enough to cover the average variable cost
of the program, i.e. tuitionP + RDA   C, then the public DA program admits all
students that are willing to pay the tuition rate.
S2 If tuition and per-student reimbursement are not enough to fully cover the variable
cost, but lump-sum fund is greater than the fixed cost, i.e. tuitionP + RDA < C and
FundDA > FC, then the public DA program sets a capacity limit, Cap, and admits
students up to Cap. Enrollment is determined by enrlP = min{Cap,DP (tuitionP )}.
The budget balancing capacity level is Cap = FundDA FC
C tuitionP RDA .
S3 If tuition, per-student reimbursement and lump-sum fund are all very low such that
tuitionP +RDA < C and FundDA < FC, then the program shuts down for that year.
Once capacity and enrollment are determined, staffing decisions and class schedules will
follow accordingly. Therefore, the capacity of the public DA program hinges on the level of
funding and tuition of the DA program. I now turn to the objectives of the public community
college to analyze which scenario the DA program is in.
The community college sets college-wide tuition rate, tuitionCC , to balance its budget
BudgetCC = FundCC + (RCC + tuitionCC   AV CCC)⇥ enrlCC   FCCC   0
Public policy prohibits the college from running a budget surplus. Therefore, with sufficient
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funding, tuitionCC would be below the average variable cost. Once tuitionCC is set, the
college then allocates funding to each program and negotiates program specific tuition with
each program.
Due to the many competing needs for funding, the community college has little incentive
to reimburse the DA program at a rate beyond RCC . Because tuition and funding rates are
both set to balance the budget for the average program and the DA program is more costly
than the average program (C > AV CCC), it is unlikely that RDA+ tuitionDA can fully cover
the high variable costs of the DA program. Therefore, most public DA programs will be in
scenario S2, where the DA program sets a capacity limit according to Cap = FundDA FC
C tuitionP RDA
and admits students up to this limit.
The X-ray permission affects this market in two ways: it substantially increases demand
for DA programs, and it also increases the average variable cost C. Enrollment in the for-
profit program rises as long as the increase in demand is more substantial than the increase in
average variable cost.29 For the public program, due to the demand increase, it is more likely
for enrollment to reach capacity after the X-ray permission if it has not before. Meanwhile,
the change in average variable cost also affects the budget-balancing capacity limit. The
exact changes in program capacity after the X-ray permission depend on whether funding
and tuition could respond accordingly after the X-ray permission:
S2-1 If both funding and tuition stay unchanged after the X-ray permission, i.e. FundDA,
RDA and tuitionP all stay the same, then Cap falls due to the increase in C.
S2-2 If program tuition increases and funding does not fall, then Cap may stay unchanged
and even increase if the increase in tuition is substantial.
S2-3 If funding increases, through either an increase in FundDA or an increase in RDA , and
tuition does not fall, then Cap may stay unchanged and even increase if the increase
in funding is substantial.
29Whether tuitionFP increases or not is determined by the elasticity of demand and the nature of compe-
tition in the local market. In theory, it could go either way.
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Given that the DA program is a small part of a typical community college, changes in the
demand and costs of the DA program would have a small impact on the college’s budgeting
decisions. Therefore, both the college-wide tuition tuitionCC and funding for the DA program
would likely stay unchanged after the X-ray permission.30 The capacity of the public DA
program would then depend on the degree of discretion the DA program has to change its
tuition, tuitionP .
Typically, a flat tuition rate applies to all programs within a community college. Some
community college boards, however, do allow high-costs programs to charge a premium,
usually through miscellaneous fees such as lab fees and instrument fees. Once these fees
are allowed, the program will have some discretion over the level of these fees. For colleges
that restrict tuitionP to be equal to tuitionCC , tuitionP is de facto set by the college and
would not change after the regulatory change. For colleges that allow for program-specific
fees and surcharges, the program will have some discretion over the amount of surcharge
tuitionP   tuitionCC .
In subsequent empirical analysis, I do not observe the amount of funding allocated to
DA programs, which precludes me from testing whether scenario S2-3 occurs. However, I do
observe both tuitionP and tuitionCC for the majority of community college DA programs,
which allows me to test the predictions of scenarios S2-1 and S2-2: public DA programs with
no or low levels of discretion over program tuition (i.e. low levels of tuitionP   tuitionCC)
will experience large reductions in program capacity; programs with high levels of discretion
over program tuition (i.e. high levels of tuitionP   tuitionCC) will experience less reduction
in program size; and if tuitionP is allowed to be sufficiently close to C, programs may even
be able to expand their capacity.
30An increase in FundDA and RDA means the college commits to increasing funding for the DA program
every year. Although a one-time increase in funding is plausible given the change in demand, a permanent
increase in annual funding is not as likely given the competing demands for funding at the college. Even for
states where funding formulas account for the cost differences across programs, the reimbursement rates are
based on broad major categories, and are therefore unresponsive to changes in one particular major.
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1.6 Heterogeneous Responses Among Community College Programs
The last subsection documents that, on average, public programs did not respond to the
X-ray permission. This subsection explores heterogeneity in responses among community
college programs to understand the mechanisms behind their seeming lack of response.
Because incorporating X-ray practices into the curriculum increases the average vari-
able costs of DA programs, as predicted in the conceptual framework developed in Section
1.5, public programs would have to downsize unless they could raise more revenue. For
community colleges, where most of the public DA programs are housed, funding is generally
unresponsive to changes in the costs of specific programs. This leaves tuition the main in-
strument programs can deploy to cope with changes in cost. Yet, not all community college
programs have the discretion to adjust tuition. Since community colleges are highly subsi-
dized, tuition is highly regulated, and a single rate usually applies to all programs within a
college. However, some colleges do allow certain programs to charge a higher price through
course fees or lab fees. Once allowed, the program has more discretion over the level of fee it
charges beyond the college-wide tuition. These surcharges can be used to defray part of the
additional costs of expensive laboratory classes. This subsection explores the relationship
between DA program surcharges and their change in size after the X-ray permission.31
Although we do not observe which programs are given permission to raise tuition, we
do observe the realized difference between the DA program tuition and the college-wide
tuition (henceforth, tuition surcharge).32 I assign community college DA programs to quartile
31The empirical analysis of this section focuses exclusively on community college DA programs. A few
public DA programs are offered in four-year colleges, usually affiliated to a dental school. Programs in four-
year colleges are excluded in this section because the model from Section 1.5 is unlikely to apply to them:
although DA is among the more costly programs at a community college, it may not be more costly than
other programs at a four-year college. Hence, we would not expect the same relationship between tuition
surcharge and changes in program size for programs at four-year colleges.
32All subsequent reference to “tuition” means the sum of tuition and fees charged to in-district students
for one academic year of full-time enrollment. The ADA survey series contain tuition data for all years from
1873 to 2013, except for 2011. IPEDS provides data on average annual tuition for (almost) all colleges from
1987 to 2013, and a small number of colleges in 1986. My measure of “tuition surcharge” is, therefore, only
available for years after 1987.
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categories according to the observed tuition surcharges. In order to utilize tuition surcharge
information from all available years, I use two different measures — the mode and the mean of
annual tuition surcharge — to separate programs into quartile groups. For each year, I rank
all community college programs by their tuition surcharges and assign an annual quartile
category indicating which quartile of the tuition surcharge distribution the program falls
into. The mode and the mean of annual quartile categories are taken as the two measures of
a program’s final quartile category. If a program has multiple modes, the max mode is taken
as the final quartile category. By the “mode” categorization, the average tuition surcharge is
$517 for the lower quartile group, $1,415 and $1,589 for the second and third quartile groups,
and $2,531 for the upper quartile group.33
To assess the heterogeneous responses among community college DA programs, I esti-


















for each public program i, in state s and academic year t. Here, D
i
is a vector of four
dummies indicating whether program i is in each of the four tuition surcharge quartiles.   is
a vector of four coefficients measuring the average response from programs in each quartile.
Year fixed effects are interacted with the tuition surcharge quartiles to allow for differential
trends across the four quartile groups. Hence, estimating Equation 1.6.1 is equivalent to
estimating Equation 1.4.4 separately for the four quartile groups. As in the previous subsec-
tion, all specifications include a year fixed effect ⇡
t
and an institution fixed effect µ
i
. Some
specifications also include an institution-specific trend  
i
. Standard errors are clustered at
the state level to account for aggregation bias and serial correlations across time within the
same state.
33All tuition figures are measured in constant 2014 dollars. For a back-of-the-envelope calculation, the cost
of a part-time instructor for a three-credit course at a community college is around $3,000. For radiography
and clinical practice sessions that require one instructor for every six students, the $2,500 surcharge to each
student would be able to cover the instructor salary of 5 courses.
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Table 1.7: Heterogeneous Responses Among Public Programs
Dependent Variable Capacity of Community College DA Program
Categorization 1 Categorization 2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DA X-ray Permitted in State-Year
× Lower Quartile of -0.171** -0.0747** -0.216** -0.0614*
Tuition Surcharge (0.0674) (0.0376) (0.0881) (0.0364)
× Second Quartile of -0.0365 0.0327 -0.0484* -0.0654
Tuition Surcharge (0.0411) (0.0480) (0.0293) (0.0407)
× Third Quartile of -0.0124 0.0201 0.0295 0.0876**
Tuition Surcharge (0.0473) (0.0313) (0.0347) (0.0354)
× Upper Quartile of 0.110** 0.137** 0.111*** 0.126**
Tuition Surcharge (0.0494) (0.0658) (0.0402) (0.0600)
Year-by-Quartile FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Institution FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Institution-Specific Trend Yes Yes
Observations 6,257 6,257 6,257 6,257
Number of States 196 196 196 196
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the state level are shown in parentheses. Sample includes all
community college DA programs accredited by the ADA from 1973 to 2013 and was in operation at least
one year before and one year after the X-ray permission. Unit of observation is at the institution-year
level. Dependent variable is program capacity. Coefficients are reported for the interactions of DA X-ray
permission and four dummies indicating each quartile of tuition surcharge. Tuition surcharge is measured
by the difference between DA program tuition and the average tuition at the public college.
Columns (1) and (2) show results using the first method of categorizing programs into quartiles: First,
programs are ranked by tuition surcharges within each year. Then, the mode of a program’s quartile
categories from all years are assigned to each program as its program quartile category. Columns (3) and
(4) show results using the second categorization method: programs are ranked by the mean of their tuition
surcharge from all years where data is available.
Each column is a separate regression using Poisson Quasi-Maximum Likelihood estimation. All columns
include year fixed effects interacted with tuition surcharge quartiles. All regressions include institution fixed
effects. Columns (2) and (4) also include institution-specific time trends. Significant levels: *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.7 presents results of estimating Equation 1.6.1 using the two measures of cate-
gorization. In the first two columns, community college programs are stratified by the mode
of annual tuition surcharges. In the last two columns, community colleges are stratified by
the mean of tuition surcharges. Columns (2) and (4) also include institution-specific trends.
The reported coefficient estimates are for the interaction terms between the X-ray permission
and the four dummies indicating each tuition surcharge quartile.
In Table 1.7, the coefficient estimates for the lower quartile group are negative and
statistically significant across all specifications. This suggests that programs whose tuition
rates are always close to the college-wide tuition experienced significant reductions in pro-
gram capacity. The preferred specification, column (2), estimates a capacity reduction of
7.8% for the lower quartile group. The coefficient estimates for the second and third quartile
groups are all small in magnitude and statistically insignificant, indicating that programs
with some discretion to charge higher program-specific tuition did not experience significant
changes in their program size. The coefficient estimates for the upper quartile group are
all significant and positive, indicating that those with a large degree of discretion to charge
higher tuition significantly expanded their programs. The preferred specification, column
(2), estimates a capacity expansion of 14.7% for the upper quartile group. Furthermore, in
each of the four specifications, the coefficient estimates grow monotonically as we move from
the lower quartile to the upper quartile. These patterns are consistent with the hypothesis
that the higher a program’s ability to surcharge beyond the college-wide tuition, the more
likely the program will expand after the X-ray permission.
Program capacity is used as the outcome variable here because it directly reflects each
community college’s capacity choice, and it is available for over 75% of community college DA
programs. As a robustness check, I also estimate this model using the number of graduates
from each program as the outcome variable. This alternative outcome variable is available
for all community college programs. Although estimated with less precision, the results
follow the same patterns found here — the coefficient is negative for the lower quartile group
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and gradually increases as tuition surcharge increases. The results are reported in Appendix
Table A.13.
I test the sensitivity of these results to two alternative methods of categorizing programs.
Both alternatives are still based on the annual difference between DA program tuition and the
college-wide tuition, but uses different ways to attend to the panel nature of the data. The
first alternative categorization addresses concerns that the differences in tuition surcharge
are driven by cross-state differences in tuition policies, which may be correlated with cross-
state differences in funding policies that we do not observe. To address this concern, I rank
programs relative to other programs in the same state. Instead of ranking programs within
each year, programs are ranked by tuition surcharges within each state-year. The mode of
all quartiles is assigned to each program as its final quartile category. Since the ranking is
relative to other programs within state, the estimated coefficients will inform us how much
within-state differences in tuition setting discretion affects a program’s ability to maintain
or expand its capacity. Estimates of Equation 1.6.1 with this alternative categorization are
reported in the first two columns of Appendix Table A.14. The basic patterns observed
under the baseline quartile categorization still remain here.
The second alternative categorization addresses concerns that there may have been
changes over time in a program’s tuition setting discretion. If this is the case, then it
is the amount of discretion in the years following the X-ray permission that affects their
ability to maintain and expand DA programs after the regulatory change. Therefore, the
second alternative categorization ranks programs only by their tuition surcharges in the
years following the X-ray permission.34 The corresponding results using this alternative
categorization are reported in columns (3) and (4) of Appendix Table A.14. Again, this
alternative categorization did not appreciably alter the basic patterns already observed under
the baseline categorization.
34Specifically, within each year, programs in states that have already passed the X-ray permission are
ranked by tuition surcharges. The mode of a program’s quartile categories from all years post X-ray permis-
sion are assigned to each program as its final quartile category.
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As another robustness check, I separate programs into two, three, or five quantile groups
and estimate the models with these alternative numbers of groups. The same patterns
observed under the quartile partition are repeated under each alternative partition. The
estimated coefficients are negative for the lowest tuition surcharge group and positive for the
highest tuition surcharge group in all specifications, and are statically significant in almost
all specifications. Furthermore, dropping each state one at a time from the sample does not
appreciably change these results.
Altogether, these results are consistent with the hypothesis that public programs are
constrained by their funding budget. Programs that could raise tuition to defray part of the
cost of instruction are more flexible in the face of rising demand and marginal costs.
1.7 Conclusions
This chapter finds that for-profit and community colleges respond very differently to changes
in the demand for occupational programs. When a regulatory change increased the wages,
employment, and educational requirements of dental assistants, for-profit universities swiftly
expanded their DA programs to accommodate the rise in demand. In contrast, most public
community colleges did not expand their DA programs.
These results provide empirical endorsement of the idea that for-profit institutions are
more responsive to changes in market conditions. Yet, the findings of this chapter also suggest
that the rigidity of public institutions may simply be a consequence of their constrained
budget. My results show that community colleges that did not charge a premium for their
DA programs significantly downsized the DA program, whereas those that charged high
premiums significantly expanded. This is consistent with the fact that funding for community
colleges does not fully account for the differences in costs across fields of study, and that
dental assisting is more costly than the average program in a typical community college.
According to the BLS’ employment projections for the next decade, most of the fastest-
growing occupations are in health- and STEM-related fields. Like dental assisting, a large
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percent of these jobs require specialized training in the exact field of employment. The avail-
ability of the corresponding post-secondary education program is an important determinant
of labor supply for these occupations. Many health- and STEM-related education programs
share one thing in common with the DA program — they require more educational inputs
than traditional academic programs. If neither funding nor tuition can be adjusted according
to changes in student demand and instructional costs, public colleges are unlikely to be able
to accommodate the rising demand in these fields. Nursing is another prominent example
where there is a severe shortage for the occupation, but limited capacity in existing nurse
education programs. There are numerous anecdotes of community college students who have
to wait for many years to enroll in the nursing program after completing all pre-requisite
classes, because there are simply too few slots in the nursing program.35
The findings of this chapter suggest that if policymakers seek to maximize the aggregate
labor-market returns from community colleges, they should consider the cost differences
across programs when designing funding and tuition policies. A policy that ties the sum of
per-student reimbursement rate and tuition rate to the cost of each program would allow
community colleges to set the capacity of each program according to market demand.
My findings also suggest that recent movements in some community colleges towards a
differential tuition system may increase access to highly sought-after programs. For example,
Aims Community College in Colorado introduced a three-tiered differential tuition system
for its programs in 2009, allowing high-cost and high-demand programs to charge higher
tuition rates than other programs. In California, a law was introduced in October 2013 that
initiated a pilot program allowing a two-tiered tuition system in six of the state’s community
colleges. The new law allows schools to charge a premium price for their most in-demand
classes. Although these policies make the in-demand programs more expensive than before,
they may in fact improve access to these programs if programs could expand their capacity
following the tuition increase. Moreover, if the alternative to attending a community college
35See for instance, Selingo (2013), pages 61-62.
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program is to attend a for-profit university, then the increase in community college tuition
will not deter many students from attending college. Future research could evaluate the
effect of the differential tuition system on the size, quality, and prices of both public and
for-profit programs.
Questions remain as to whether the existence and size of low-tuition public programs
exert competitive pressure on for-profit programs to reduce their tuition. Future research
could focus on the effect of competition on the quality and price of both public and pri-
vate for-profit universities. Such research could facilitate the design of a community college
funding and tuition system that fosters competition among different colleges and universi-
ties. Another area for future research is to understand students’ choices between the two
types of colleges. Questions remain as to whether the increasing generosity of student aid
has reduced students’ sensitivity to price and quality when choosing between different col-
leges. Community colleges and for-profit colleges together enroll more than one-third of all
post-secondary students. A better understanding of this vast sector of the higher education
market is relevant to the experiences of many people.
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Chapter 2
Money and Mission: How Colleges and Universities Responded to Endowment
Shocks from the Great Recession
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2.1 Introduction
The market for higher education is dominated by private and public non-profit institutions,
who increasingly rely on endowment payouts to fund their mission activities. Brown et al.
(2014) find that, rather than using endowments as precautionary savings to smooth out other
revenue shocks, research universities tend to hoard their endowments – reducing endowment
payouts relative to their stated payout policies following negative, but not positive, financial
shocks. Given the counter-cyclicality of demand for higher education and pro-cyclicality of
government funding (Barr and Turner, 2013, 2015), such endowment payout policies would
likely exacerbate funding shortages during economic downturns. Brown et al. (2014) also
document that contemporaneous endowment losses affect staffing decisions at large research
universities. Yet, past research have not established whether endowment losses affect student
outcomes or other aspects of university operations, or if the effects of endowment losses
persist over time. This paper measures how endowment losses during the Great Recession
affected student outcomes and various aspects of university operations, such as ’pricing,
admissions, and staffing decisions.
I focus on the Great Recession, a period that witnessed large and heterogeneous changes
to universities’ endowment assets. During the 2008-2009 academic year, some universities
saw their endowment funds reduced by nearly 30%, whereas some experienced large positive
gains during the same period (Lavelle, 2010). Although one would never wish these financial
disruptions upon the universities again, learning from this experience may offer valuable
lessons for university operations. As increasing numbers of universities start to invest in
high-risk financial assets in the pursuit of high average returns, understanding the potential
effects of large endowment losses on the operations and outcomes of colleges and universities
becomes all the more important for higher education policy.
The primary empirical challenge is to isolate the effect of endowment losses from the
effects of other concurrent changes during the Great Recession. High unemployment rate
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generated unprecedented demand for higher education. Dampened family income coupled
with plummeting housing values severely reduced students’ ability to pay for education. State
funding cuts also forced many universities to cut down programs and raise tuition rates. To
isolate the effect of endowment losses from all these other factors, I employ a difference-in-
differences empirical strategy exploiting variations in endowment shocks across universities
during the Great Recession. The assumption is that while other factors would affect a par-
ticular group of universities to the same extent, the amount of changes in endowment assets
is unique to each university because each has a unique investment portfolio. To the extent
that both the intensity and the timing of the Great Recession were largely unanticipated by
university decision makers, differences in the size of the endowment shocks provide plausibly
exogenous variations to identify the effects of endowment shocks on university operations.
Specifically, I employ a difference-in-differences identification strategy comparing the
post-recession performance of universities with large endowment shocks to those with small
endowment shocks relative to their differences before the Great Recession. I include year
fixed effects to control for any changes that affect all higher education institutions, such as
overall changes in demand for higher education and students’ ability to pay. I also include
institution fixed effects to control for any time-invariant heterogeneity across institutions,
such as differences in university management styles. The estimated effects would, therefore,
be the net effects of the endowment shocks.
I found stark contrasts among different types of universities in how they responded to the
endowment shocks. In response to large negative endowment shocks, Doctoral Universities
cut down on instructional expenses and internal financial aid to students, but not their
research expenditures; Baccalaureate Colleges cut down on administrative and supportive
expenses, and to a lesser extent, research and instructional expenses; Master’s Universities
reduced their research expenses. Similar patterns are found in staffing decisions: in response
to the negative endowment shocks, Master’s Universities reduced the size of tenure-track
faculty, whereas Baccalaureate Colleges cut down on non-tenure-track instructors and non-
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faculty staff. Doctoral Universities saw reductions in all three types of employees.
These results suggest that Baccalaureate Colleges, and Doctoral Universities to a lesser
extent, can be described as tenure-track faculty’s cooperatives, in the sense that their em-
ployment and preferences for research are given priority during times of financial constraints.
Master’s Universities, on the other hand, are more willing to substitute non-tenure-track
instructors for tenure-track professors when facing financial difficulties. Perhaps because
Doctoral and Baccalaureate institutions both represent the preferences of the tenure-track
faculty, Doctoral Universities give higher priority to research than instruction; the opposite
is true for Master’s Universities; Baccalaureate Colleges do not explicitly prioritize one over
the other.
Neither sticker price nor net tuition was affected by the endowment shocks at Masters’
and Baccalaureate institutions. Doctoral Universities with large negative shocks lowered
their sticker price slightly; however, they also offered fewer students internal financial aid.
The composition of new entering cohorts was affected as well, more so in Doctoral Uni-
versities than Masters’ and Baccalaureate institutions. Most notably, negative endowment
shocks reduced the percentage of low-income students while increasing the percentage of
international students. These findings suggest that, at least prior to the Great Recession,
universities cared about the distributional equity of their services, serving low-income stu-
dents despite the lower marginal revenue they brought in.
The differences across university types are also manifested in student outcomes. Both
Doctoral and Masters’ Universities with large negative endowment shocks experienced re-
ductions in student persistence rates and graduation rates. Student persistence at Bac-
calaureate Colleges, however, do not seem to be affected by the negative endowment shocks.
Baccalaureate College’s strategy to cut down on administrative and supportive expenses in
the protection of tenure-track faculty and student financial aid may have contributed to their
strong students persistence rates.
This chapter joins recent research, such as Brown and Hoxby (2015), in evaluating how
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the financial crisis affected the market for higher education. Turner (2015) investigates the
effect of the Great Recession on faculty labor markets and found diverging trends between
public and private institutions, especially among Doctoral Universities. Due to severe re-
ductions in state funding for higher education, public universities were more likely to freeze
hiring and lose existing faculty during the Great Recession. Long (2015) studies how the
Great Recession affected college affordability and enrollment patterns. She found that de-
spite the reduction in family income, college enrollment and total expenditures on college
tuition rose in places that are more severely affected by the Great Recession. The increase
in unemployment rate had a larger effect on the demand for college than the reduction in
family income. While Turner (2015) and Long (2015) study how the Great Recession affects
universities through government funding and student demand, this chapter examines how
the Great Recession affects universities through endowment losses.
Brown et al. (2014) study how universities adjust endowment payouts and staffing in
response to contemporaneous endowment shocks. They focus on Doctoral Universities and
the period between 1986 and 2009. They find that, in response to a 10% negative endowment
shocks in the previous year, universities reduce the size of tenure-track faculty by 4.9%, yet
barely adjust the size of Adjunct faculty. Compared to their paper, this chapter focuses on
the effects of financial shocks induced by the Great Recession and the persistence of these
effects. Compared to other contemporaneous endowment shocks, the 08/09 shock is a much
larger disruption that some schools are still recovering from today. My findings suggest
that a 10% negative endowment shock during the Great Recession reduced the number of
tenure-track faculty at Doctoral Universities by a mere 1%; in contrast, the reduction on non-
tenure-track faculty was 10% on impact, although neither effect is statistically significant.
This finding stands in sharp contrast with the results from Brown et al. (2014).
Garthwaite et al. (2013) and Adelino et al. (2015) use similar empirical strategies to
investigate the effects of the 08/09 endowment shocks on hospital operations. Garthwaite
et al. (2013) find no effect on hospital pricing, except for a small set of higher quality
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hospitals that likely have substantial market power. They also found negative effects on
technological investments and the offering of low-profit services such as trauma centers and
inpatient psychiatric services. Adelino et al. (2015) find reductions in capital investments
but no effects on hospital treatment choices or patient outcomes. In contrast to their results,
I found negative impacts on both internal financial aid for students (reflecting net prices)
and student outcomes for Doctoral and Masters’ institutions. While a hospital’ primary
product is patient treatment, a university produces both research and student instruction.
The duo product nature may set universities apart from hospitals.
2.2 Data and Summary Statistics
I draw data from various components of the Integrated Postsecondary Eduction Data System
(IPEDS). All accredited postsecondary institutions that are eligible for Title IV financial aid
are required by law to report data annual to IPEDS. The IPEDS data provides abundant
information for all degree-granting four-year institutions.
Most notably, the IPEDS Finance Surveys provide information about the universities’
financial statements, which includes detailed categorical information about university ex-
penses and revenues. Starting from 2003, all private nonprofit and public universities are
required to report investment income, which is defined as “revenues derived from the insti-
tution’s investments, including investments of endowment funds” and includes all “interest
income, dividend income, rental income or royalty income and includes both realized and un-
realized gains and losses.” By definition, this measure of investment income includes income
from all investments (both quasi and true endowment).
Information on the size of endowment funds is also reported by some institutions. I do
not use this piece of information because the definition of endowment funds varies across
institutions. For the purpose of this study, the relevant measure of endowment funds should
include any financial assets that are set aside for investment in order to generate a stream of
income for ongoing university operations or scholarship expenses. Universities, however, may
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report their relevant investment funds under several different headings; some are reported
report under endowment assets; some are reported as the asset of an alumni association or a
university foundation. It is, therefore, difficult to extract from the IPEDS database a measure
of endowment funds that consistently applies to all universities. Nonetheless, the variable
“investment income” should, by definition, include income from all relevant investment funds.
IPEDS has several advantages over other potential sources of endowment income data,
such as the annual surveys of the National Association of College and University Business
Officers (NACUBO). First, the reported investment income includes unrealized capital gains
and excludes all new donations to endowment funds. This measure includes all changes in
the value of investments due to the endowment investment strategy and excludes changes
in the endowment resulting from operating income or losses. Thus, it represents a true
exogenous shock to the university. In contrast, NACUBO data does not distinguish actual
investment income and new donations, which may prove problematic if donation patterns
follow different paths for different universities during economic downturns. Second, since
reporting to IPEDS is mandatory for all Title IV eligible institutions, IPEDS provides a
balanced panel of information for all institutions. Attrition from the data set is of minimal
concern here.
One potential caveat to using the IPEDS data is misreporting. Information provided
to IPEDS are not audited. Although IPEDS staff use various techniques to ensure data
consistency over time, we cannot exclude the possibility that some data might be misre-
ported. However, as long as measurement errors are not systematically related to the type
of university or the investment income of the university, they should not affect the empirical
findings of this chapter.
For my main specification, I include a balanced sample of public and private non-profit
institutions that reported undergraduate enrollment, investment income, expenses, and gov-
ernment funding information for all years from 2003 and 2014 and enrolled at least one
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first-time, full-time, first-year undergraduate student every year between 2003 and 2014.1
I further restrict the sample to four-year undergraduate institutions that are classified as
Doctoral University, Master’s University, or Baccalaureate College according to the 2005
Carnegie Classification of Institutions of Higher Education. All special focus four-year col-
leges, such as specialized schools for music, theater, business, and theological studies, are
excluded from this study because their mission, funding, and financial operations may be
very different from other universities in general. For-profit institutions are also excluded
because they do not have investment income from investing internal funds. This sample se-
lection procedure results in 1331 unique institutions, 244 Doctoral Universities, 540 Master’s
Universities, and 547 Baccalaureate Colleges.
Parent-child reporting poses special challenges for using IPEDS data. Institutions be-
longing to the same system are allowed to report all financial information together rather
than separately reporting individual data. In most cases when this happens, the main cam-
pus of a university system reports the financial data. 31 branch campuses are excluded
from my sample because they reported financial statement data together with their mother
institutions. As a robustness check, I create an alternative sample including these child
institutions and allocate revenues and expenditures equally on a per-FTE enrollment ba-
sis across branch campuses whenever parent-child reporting occurs (see Jaquette and Parra
(2013) for more details of parent-child reporting and allocation methods). I then estimate
all my models with this alternative sample. These results are not reported here for brevity.
IPEDS also includes campus-level data on various measures of student composition,
tuition and financial aid, student persistence, and faculty staffing and salary. This chapter
examines how endowment shocks affected each of these aspects of university operations.
Table 2.1 presents summary statistics for investment income and all other key variables. I
defer discussion of variable definitions until the results section. Several features of the data
1For subsequent regression analysis, only years 2004 to 2014 are included in order to include one-period
lagged endowment shock for all observations.
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are worthy highlighting. One, compared to the other two types of institutions, Doctoral
Universities are larger in size and spend a higher proportion of their budget on research
– 12.6% compared to 1.3% and 0.7% for Master’s and Baccalaureate institutions. Two, a
large percentage of students starting college receive some amount of financial aid from the
institution itself. These are institutional aid, aside from other federal or state financial aid
the student might receive. Throughout the sample period 2004 to 2014, 82% of freshman
students at the average private institution receive some institutional aid; 38% do at the
average public institution. Lastly, the percentage of students who receive federal grant
aid, which I use as a proxy for being a low-income student, is on average 36% at private
institutions and 38% at public institutions.
2.3 Empirical Strategy
2.3.1 Defining Endowment Shocks
Following Brown et al. (2014) and Garthwaite et al. (2013), I define endowment shock as the
rate of returns on investment normalized by the ratio of endowment size to the university’s
total expenses in the previous year. The normalization is meant to capture the notion that
a university with a larger endowment-to-cost ratio would be more responsive to a given the
rate of returns on investment. By construction, this endowment shock is equivalent to the
ratio of investment returns to the university’s expenses in the previous year. Specifically, an
endowment shock for institution i in year t is defined as
Shock
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics, Four-Year Universities 2004-2014
Number of Unique Institutions
Total Annual Expenses (in millions) $238 (566) $942 (1057) $111 (90) $48 (40)
        % of Expenses on Research 3.12 (6.48) 12.60 (9.26) 1.31 (3.31) 0.67 (1.96)
        % of Expenses on Instruction 32.34 (7.38) 31.08 (8.20) 34.80 (6.63) 30.47 (6.99)
        % of Expenses on Supporting Services 34.10 (10.74) 23.32 (9.47) 34.41 (9.43) 38.60 (8.97)
        % of Expenses on Institutional Grant Aid 19.51 (15.43) 10.79 (9.34) 17.33 (14.31) 25.55 (16.22)
Investment Income (including capital gains and losses)
        Total Amount (in millions) $22 (230) $93 (529) $3 (11) $8 (36)
        Endowment Shock excluding 2008 and 2009 0.12 (0.24) 0.12 (0.26) 0.06 (0.09) 0.18 (0.31)
        Endowment Shock 2008 and 2009 -0.09 (0.20) -0.08 (0.18) -0.04 (0.08) -0.15 (0.26)
Full-Time First-Time Entering Cohort
        Size 977.79 (1190) 2533.66 (1726) 875.26 (772) 384.98 (298)
        % Black 13.79 (21.18) 10.55 (15.68) 13.41 (18.81) 15.61 (24.99)
        % Hispanic 8.27 (11.40) 8.89 (10.28) 10.51 (14.29) 5.78 (7.50)
        % Non-Resident Alien 2.72 (3.77) 3.82 (4.24) 2.17 (3.25) 2.78 (3.91)
        25th Percentile SAT/ACT Math (out of 100) 44.32 (18.78) 58.06 (19.66) 38.76 (13.63) 43.14 (19.58)
        75th Percentile SAT/ACT Math (out of 100) 73.48 (14.67) 83.29 (12.14) 69.74 (12.50) 72.39 (15.78)
Retention Rate (%) 74.48 (12.32) 82.89 (9.77) 73.23 (9.87) 71.95 (13.82)
Graduation Rate (% six years after entry) 503.10 (753) 1493.95 (1219) 379.25 (369) 182.21 (157)
Number of Unique Institutions
Published Tuition and Fees $29,298 (9697) $38,531 (8845) $27,924 (6951) $28,345 (10428)
Institutional Grant Aid, % Receiving 82.65 (22.13) 72.45 (21.71) 87.23 (17.86) 81.62 (23.93)
        Avg Amount (conditional on receiving) $12,809 (7161) $19,006 (8366) $11,188 (4407) $12,645 (7707)
Federal Grant Aid, % Receiving 35.58 (19.37) 22.60 (13.00) 35.75 (16.24) 38.09 (21.25)
        Avg Amount (conditional on receiving) $4,717 (1268) $5,537 (1943) $4,594 (1056) $4,634 (1161)
State and Local Grant Aid, % Receiving 35.75 (22.77) 19.82 (15.62) 38.83 (21.73) 36.91 (23.37)
        Avg Amount (conditional on receiving) $3,689 (2091) $3,942 (2454) $3,863 (2149) $3,520 (1953)
Number of Full-Time Employee
        Tenure-Track Instructional Faculty 148 (188) 524 (339) 132 (96) 82 (60)
        Non Tenure-Track Instructional Faculty 25 (67) 113 (149) 17 (27) 13 (39)
        Other Non-Medical Non-Faculty Staff 436 (908) 2080 (2067) 302 (241) 192 (146)
Avg Monthly Salary of Instructional Faculty
         Full Professor $9,592 (3206) $14,642 (3902) $9,380 (2201) $8,660 (2588)
         Associate Professor $7,633 (1905) $10,409 (2036) $7,607 (1446) $7,056 (1617)
         Assistant Professor $6,522 (1491) $8,870 (1765) $6,494 (1142) $6,039 (1125)
         Non-Tenure-Track Instructor $5,517 (1298) $6,851 (1338) $5,475 (1095) $5,246 (1238)
Number of Unique Institutions
Published Tuition and Fees (Out-of-State) $18,727 (6118) $23,513 (6473) $16,741 (4013) $15,760 (5226)
Published Tuition and Fees (In-State) $7,884 (2707) $9,216 (3071) $7,350 (2090) $7,008 (2631)
Institutional Grant Aid, % Receiving 38.48 (21.45) 45.57 (18.04) 33.31 (20.78) 39.89 (24.63)
        Avg Amount (conditional on receiving) $3,917 (2177) $5,110 (2403) $3,530 (1845) $2,898 (1618)
Federal Grant Aid, % Receiving 36.69 (17.00) 28.63 (13.67) 39.25 (17.05) 43.71 (16.78)
        Avg Amount (conditional on receiving) $4,302 (864) $4,419 (794) $4,259 (866) $4,212 (948)
State and Local Grant Aid, % Receiving 37.85 (21.57) 35.06 (22.84) 39.56 (21.23) 38.16 (19.67)
        Avg Amount (conditional on receiving) $3,025 (1641) $3,359 (2033) $2,941 (1339) $2,679 (1507)
Number of Full-Time Employee
        Tenure-Track Instructional Faculty 425 (391) 815 (441) 289 (160) 111 (76)
        Non Tenure-Track Instructional Faculty 88 (99) 163 (131) 61 (52) 26 (23)
        Other Non-Medical Non-Faculty Staff 1249 (1696) 2841 (2237) 597 (332) 239 (150)
Avg Monthly Salary of Instructional Faculty
         Full Professor $10,702 (2261) $12,742 (2082) $10,032 (1520) $8,931 (1527)
         Associate Professor $8,348 (1312) $9,296 (1105) $8,099 (1085) $7,351 (1150)
         Assistant Professor $7,161 (1109) $8,006 (976) $6,932 (853) $6,291 (949)
         Non-Tenure-Track Instructor $5,595 (986) $5,869 (1042) $5,549 (933) $5,238 (882)
Panel C:  Tuition, Financial Aid, Faculty Size and Salary;  Public Institutions 
471 151 231 89
Notes: Data source is IPEDS. Sample includes all Doctoral, Masters, and general Baccalaureate Universities (by Carnegie classification) that 
consistently reported financial and enrollment information to IPEDS from 2003 to 2014. Statistics are calculated using data from 2004 to 2014. 
Financial aid information refers to the full-time, first-time entering cohort only.  Dollar values are adjusted to 2014 dollars. 
1331 244 540 547
Panel B:  Tuition, Financial Aid, Faculty Size and Salary;  Private Non-Profit Institutions 
860 93 309 458
All Doctoral Master's Baccalaureate




include interest and dividends, as well as any realized and
unrealized capital gains and losses from investments.2 By definition, a 10% endowment
shock represents investment losses that are equal to 10% of the university’s annual budget.
Brown et al. (2014) find that universities respond asymmetrically to positive and nega-
tive shocks. Following their specification, I, too, decompose endowment shocks to negative
and positive components:
NEG Shocki,t =  min{0, Shocki,t} (2.3.2)
POS Shocki.t = max{0, Shocki,t} (2.3.3)
Figure 2.1 shows the distribution of endowment shocks over the sample period 2003 to
2014. For years other than 2008 and 2009, the median endowment shock is 0.034, indicating
an investment income that could cover 3.4% of the university’s annual budget; the average
endowment shock is 0.11, representing an investment income that could cover 11% of the
university’s budget. As shown in Figure 2.1, 2008 and 2009 saw two years of large negative
financial shocks to most universities. 41% of universities experienced negative shocks in
2008; 69% had negative shocks in 2009; whereas in all other years, on average, a mere
5.6% experienced negative shocks to their investment. The size of the negative shock was
particularly large in 2009, with a median endowment shock of -0.055 and an average of -0.18.
2.3.2 Estimation and Identification
The focus of this chapter is the impact of the large negative endowment shocks due to the
Great Recession on university operation and student outcomes. I use the average of the
negative components of the 2008 and 2009 endowment shocks as a measure of the negative
endowment shock due to the Great Recession:
2One advantage of using IPEDS data is that total investment income is directly reported.
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Figure 2.1: Distribution of University Endowment Shocks at Four-Year Universities, 2003-
2014
Notes: Data source is IPEDS Finance Survey. Sample includes all IPEDS institutions whose
Carnegie Classification in 2005 was Doctoral University, Master’s University, or Baccalaureate
College. Endowment shock is defined as investment income (including interests, dividends,
and realized and unrealized capital gains) normalized by university expenses of the previous
academic year. For endowment shocks, year t refers to the academic year ending in year t (e.g.
2008 is the academic year from July 2007 to June 2008).
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NEG Shocki,0809 = (NEG Shocki,08 +NEG Shocki,09)/2
(henceforth, negative 0809 endowment shock).
To measure the impact of this negative 0809 endowment shock on university operations
and student outcomes, I pursue a difference-in-differences strategy, exploiting variations
across universities in the size of the endowment shock. Specifically, I use NEG Shocki,0809
as a measure of “treatment intensity”, compare the differences in university operations and
student outcomes for those with large versus small 0809 endowment shocks, and contrast
the differences for years before and after the crisis. The remaining difference-in-differences
is attributed to the effects of the endowment shocks.
To investigate the time pattern of the effects of endowment shocks, I estimate the









+   ·NEG Shocki,t,t 6=2008,t 6=2009 + ⌘ ·NEG Shocki,t 1,t 6=2009,t 6=2010
+   · POS Shocki,t +   · POS Shocki,t 1 +  ·Xi,t +  i +  t + "i,t (2.3.4)
where NEG Shocki,0809 is interacted with a indicator variable It=⌧ equal to one if the sub-
script ⌧ is equal to the year t;  
i
is a set of institution fixed effects, and  
t
is a set of year fixed
effects. This estimation renders a series of estimates  
⌧
for all years other than 2007. Each
 
⌧
measures the relationship between the negative 0809 endowment shock and the change in
the outcome variable between year ⌧ and year 2007. Coefficients  
⌧
for all years before 2007
inform us whether the 0809 endowment shocks are correlated with other factors that were
already impacting the outcome variable of interest before the onsite of the financial crisis.
Coefficients  
⌧
for all years after 2007 measure the effects of the endowment shocks on the
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outcome variable in year ⌧ .
Outcome variable y
i,t
is measured in percentage points ranking from 0 to 100 whenever
it is a rate or a percentage ranking (e.g. graduation rate, SAT percentage rankings) and
in logs whenever it is not a rate or percentage (e.g. expenses and tuition). Time varying
control variables X
i,t
included in the regressions are log federal appropriations and state and
local appropriations for each institution in each year. They are annual legislative funding
intended for the general operations of the university and are largely exogenous to university
management. Research grants and external scholarships for students and faculty members
are not included in these measures – I intentionally exclude these external grants from X
i,t
because they themselves may be affected by changes in university behavior induced by the
endowment shocks.
Also included in time-varying control variables are the positive and negative components
of contemporaneous endowment shocks and one period lagged endowment shocks. Negative
endowment shocks are set to zero for years 2008 and 2009, and one period lagged negative
endowment shocks are set to zero for years 2009 and 2010, so that all the effects of the
0809 endowment shock would be captured by  
⌧
. This set up allows for the negative 0809
endowment shocks to have lasting impacts on the outcome variable, while only allowing
shock in other periods to affect outcomes for the next two periods. This specification also
assumes that positive shocks in 2008 and 2009 have the same impact on university operation
as positive shocks in all other periods.
Standard errors are clustered at the state level to allow for correlations across schools
within the state as well as over time (Bertrand et al., 2004). All observations are weighted by
the size of the full-time, first-time, degree-seeking, undergraduate entering cohort of 2007.3
When evaluating the impacts on the size and salary of university faculty and staff, I
include separate year fixed effects for private and public institutions. This allows for dif-
ferential trends among public and private institutions after the financial crisis. Differential
3Estimates for unweighted regressions are qualitatively similar to the weighted estimates.
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trends by institutional type is a particular concern for university staff – Turner (2015) doc-
uments that the financial crisis has widened the gap in staff and salary between public and
private institutions. I, therefore, estimate the following equation for all outcomes related to









+   ·NEG Shocki,t,t 6=2008,t 6=2009 + ⌘ ·NEG Shocki,t 1,t 6=2009,t 6=2010
+   · POS Shocki,t +   · POS Shocki,t 1 +  ·Xi,t +  i +  t ⇥ privatei +  t ⇥ publici + "i,t
(2.3.5)
Identification of the causal impact of the endowment shocks on university operation
rests on the assumption that the losses resulting from the Great Recession are uncorrelated
with other factors that may affect university operation. If endowment shocks are correlated
with university management practices or university preferences, this would be a threat to
identification. While it is hard to directly verify the validity of my identification assumption,
the coefficient estimates for  
⌧
before 2007 can provide an indirect test of the assumption.
Besides, in the introductory chapter to their book, Brown and Hoxby (2015) documents
anecdotal evidence that in most universities, at least prior to the Great Recession, the
endowment management team and the university management are two separate teams that
share little understanding of the functions of the other side. Most endowment management
teams share the simple goal of maximizing investment returns without taking into account the
anticipated needs of the university. These anecdotal evidence provide some assurance that
the endowment shocks should be uncorrelated with the management style of the university.
In subsequent empirical analysis, I estimate equation 2.3.4 separately for the subsets
of Doctoral, Master’s, and Baccalaureate universities, as well as for all institutions as one
group. This allows me to compare institutions within each group, since institutions within
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Figure 2.2: Distribution of 0809 Endowment Shocks by Carnegie Classification
Notes: Data source is IPEDS Finance Survey. Sample includes all IPEDS institutions whose
Carnegie Classification in 2005 was Doctoral University, Master’s University, or Baccalaureate
College. 0809 endowment shock is average of the endowment shocks of years 2008 and 2009.
Endowment shock is investment income normalized by university expenses of the previous
academic year.
each group are more likely to share the same mission with each other. It is important to
ensure there is sufficient variation in the treatment variable within each group. Figure 2.2
plots the (truncated) distribution of 0809 endowment shocks (both negative and positive
shocks) by Carnegie institution type. Perhaps surprisingly, the range of endowment shocks
do not differ much across groups even though Doctoral Universities are in general of much
larger scale than the other two types. There appears to be ample variation in endowment
shocks within each group.
2.4 The Persistent Effects of Endowment Shocks during the Great Recession
2.4.1 Effects on Student Persistence and Degree Attainment
I start with describing the effects of the endowment shocks on two sets of student out-
comes: persistence and baccalaureate degree attainment. Student persistence is measured
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by the retention rate (percent of entering cohort returning to school at the beginning of
the second year) of full-time undergraduate students. Baccalaureate degree attainment rate
(henceforth, graduation rate) is the percent of full-time, first-time, degree-seeking obtaining
a baccalaureate degree within six years of initial enrollment.
Because retention rates are reported as soon as each cohort enters their second year of
college, they allow for immediate evaluations of the effects of endowment shocks on student
outcome. Figure 2.1 presents estimates of  
⌧
by year when estimating Equation 2.3.4 using
retention rate (⇥100) as the outcome variable. These results demonstrate the large persistent
impacts of the negative 0809 endowment shocks on student outcomes and the stark contrasts
of the differential effects across institution mission types – Doctoral and Master’s institutions
with negative 0809 endowment shocks experienced substantial and persistent reductions in
retention rates, whereas retention rates of Baccalaureate Colleges are barely affected by the
0809 endowment shocks.
Estimates in Panel A of Figure 2.1 indicates that a college with 0809 investment losses
equivalent to 10% of its annual budget experienced a statistically significant 0.2 to 0.3 per-
centage points reduction in retention rate immediately after the recession. These effects
persist till the end of the sample period, 2014. The negative impacts were particularly
severe for Doctoral and Master’s institutions. For Doctoral Universities, a 10% negative en-
dowment shock during the 2008-2009 crisis leads to a 0.3 to 0.4 percentage point reduction in
retention rates for years 2008 to 2012. For Master’s institutions, the reduction in retention
rates is 1.2 to1.3 percentage points for years 2009 and 2010 and 0.6 to 0.9 percentage points
for 2011 to 2014. The impacts on Baccalaureate institutions are small and insignificant from
2008 to 2012.
Interestingly, while the negative effects of the 0809 endowment shocks persist till the
end of the sample period 2014, the effects are noticeably attenuated for years 2011 and 2012,
when the economy recovered from the 2008 financial crisis. Recoveries of endowment funds
post 2009 are included in university investment incomes and are, therefore, accounted for
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in the contemporaneous endowment shocks in years post 2009. Given that the estimation
Equation 2.3.4 directly controls for both contemporaneous and one-period lagged endowment
shocks, the attenuation of impacts in 2011 and 2012 are unlikely to have resulted from the
recovery of university endowment funds in those years.
One plausible reason for the attenuated impacts in 2011 and 2012 is changes in stu-
dents’ ability to pay for college. Increases in family income, housing values, and work-study
opportunities during those years could raise the average student’s ability to pay for college.
If net tuition and financial aid were one of the main channels through which negative 0809
endowment shocks affected student persistence through college, increases in students’ ability
to pay for college would attenuate the gap in retention rates between colleges with large
and small negative 0809 endowment shocks. This offers the first set of suggestive evidence
that changes in net tuition and student financial aid may be one important channel through
which 0809 endowment shocks affected students. I will return to this point in subsequent
analysis of colleges’ funding allocation and pricing behavior.
Turning into graduation rates, large negative impacts are seen again for Doctoral and
Master’s Universities, whereas no significant changes are detected for Baccalaureate Colleges.
Because bachelor’s degree attainment rates are reported six years after initial enrollment,
the latest data contain graduates rates for the entering cohort of 2008. This data limitation
prevents me from studying the long-run effects of the 0809 endowment shocks on graduation
rates. Nonetheless, all cohorts entering college after 2004 may have been affected by the 0809
endowment shocks during their time in college, while the later cohort are more intensely
affected than the earlier ones. I, therefore, compare cohorts entering after 2004, whose data
are reported in 2010, to earlier cohorts.
Figure 2.2 presents the estimates of  
⌧
by year using graduation rate (⇥100) as the
outcome variable. The basic patterns found for retention rates are borne out again for grad-
uation rates. Doctoral and Master’s Universities with more intense 0809 endowment shocks
experienced declines in graduation rates post crises, starting with the entering cohort of 2004
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and declining incrementally for each cohort thereafter. Estimates in Panel B and C show
that for Doctoral Universities, a 10% negative 0809 endowment shock leads to a statistically
significant 0.5 percentage points reduction in graduation rates for the entering cohort of
2008; for Master’s Universities, the impact is a statistically significant 0.97 percentage point
reduction. Panel D shows that graduation rates of Baccalaureate Colleges are barely affected
by the negative endowment shocks.
These first two sets of results present the impacts of 0809 endowment shocks on student
outcomes. I now turn to a more detailed analysis of how universities responded to the en-
dowment shocks to shed light on the channels through which these shocks affected university
operations.
2.4.2 Do Endowment Shocks Affect Resource Allocation within an Institution?
As a first step towards understanding how universities responded to the 0809 endowment
shocks, I investigate whether the endowment shocks affected the allocation of financial re-
sources within each institution. The first question I ask is: did the 0809 endowment shocks
affect institutions’ overall expenses? After all, it was possible for most institutions to continue
to expand as prior to the financial crisis even if they were experiencing large negative endow-
ment shocks. To cope with the reductions in endowment funds, they could either increase
the payout rate from endowment funds to maintain the same level of endowment spending,
or make up for the reductions in endowment spending by increasing tuition, obtaining more
external funding, or borrowing funds from external sources.
To examine whether the endowment shocks affected universities’ total expenses, I esti-
mate Equation 2.1 using log(total expenses) as the outcome variable. Figure 2.3 presents
the corresponding estimates of  
⌧
by year. Overall, an investment loss equal to 10% of a
university’s annual budget reduced total expenses by 0.9% in 2008, 1.7% in 2009, and around
1.1% to 1.3% in subsequent years. The point estimates are similar across institution types.
However, we lose statistical significance when restricting the sample to Doctoral Universities
69
and masters’ universities. Baccalaureate Colleges uniformly reduced expenditures after an
investment loss. In contrast, there are large variations in how Doctoral and Master’s Uni-
versities responded to investment losses – some may have reduced their expenses by a large
amount, while some may have continued to expand as before the financial crisis.
I now probe further into how resources are allocated across different categories. Four
main categories of expenditure are considered here: research, instruction, supporting services,
and institutional grant aid to students. These four categories constitute 90% of expenses at
a typical four-year institution (see Table 2.1 for summary statistics of expenses by category).
Supporting service expenses include all expenses for academic support, student services, and
institutional support. Although institutional financial aid reflects reductions in economic
revenue rather than increases in economic costs, it is conventionally reported as part of
“expenses” in higher education financial accounting. Nonetheless, to the extent that many
financial aid decisions are made after a student is admitted into a college, changes in the
total amount of institutional aid is a decision of resource allocation as well as pricing. I,
therefore, follow the accounting convention in organizing my results.
Changes in these four categories of spending could potentially have very different im-
pacts on colleges. Changes in research spending may affect research output. Changes in
instructional expenses may reflect reductions in both the cost and quality of instruction. To
the extent that salary payments to administrative and supportive staff constitute a large
portion of supporting service expenses, changes in supporting service expenses may reflect
efforts to curtail costs; however, they may also affect the quality of educational services.
Lastly, changes in institutional grant aid to students directly affect the net prices paid by
students.
For the rest of this chapter, all results in outcome variables are reported in reference
to a 10% negative 0809 endowment shock (i.e. investment losses equivalent to 10% of the
institution’s annual expenses). Figures 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, and 2.7 present results for these four
categories of expenses, respectively. Again, there are stark contrasts in how the three types
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of colleges responded to their endowment shocks.
For Doctoral Universities, negative 0809 endowment shocks had no meaningful effect
on research expenses, but led to statistically significant reductions in instructional expenses
(3%) and institutional grant aid to students (5%). They also induced considerable, although
not statistically significant, reductions in supportive service expenses.
For Baccalaureate Colleges, negative 0809 endowment shocks had no meaningful impacts
on institutional grant aid to students, but induced statistically significantly reductions in
supportive service expenses. They also led to small and (sometimes) significant reductions
in instructional expenses. Research expenses were not affected, although there are some
signs of reduction after 2011.
For Master’s Universities, negative 0809 endowment shocks led to substantial reductions
in research expenses in the immediate years after the crisis (8% in 2009 and 9% in 2010). This
reduction in research spending appears to have recovered by 2014. There is no statistically
significant impact on expenses in instruction, supporting services, or institutional grant
to students. Yet, the large standard deviation for these estimates suggest that there are
substantial variations within Master’s Universities in how they adjusted resources in response
to the endowment shocks. Some universities might have increased their spendings while
others are reducing expenses in these categories.
It is worth noting that on average Master’s Universities and Baccalaureate universities
spend very small portions of their budget on research (1.31% for Master’s Universities, and
0.67% for Baccalaureate Colleges). However, even with limited room for reduction, we still
found a 8% to 9% negative impact for Master’s Universities’ research expenses.
To alleviate the concern that endowment shocks might be correlated with, or affect,
an institution’s ability to obtain external research grants, I present evidence that the total
amount of research funding received from federal sources, such as NSF and NIH, is uncorre-
lated with the 0809 endowment shocks (Appendix Figure B.6). This suggests that changes
in research funding post the financial crisis are largely a results of reallocation of internal
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funds.
2.4.3 Effects on College Pricing
Turning to changes in college pricing behavior, I present responses in both the published
tuition price and the institutional aid granted to students. Published tuition and fees re-
flect the maximum amount of revenue the college can generate from enrolling any student.
The percentage and amount of institutional aid granted to students reflect how widely the
institution is engaging in price discrimination.
Figure 2.8 presents the estimates of  
⌧
by year using log(tuition) as the outcome variable;
Figure 2.9 and Figure 2.10 use the percentage and average amount (in logs) of institutional
aid granted to full-time freshman cohort as the outcome variables. Perhaps surprisingly, the
endowment shocks did not lead to any statistically significant increases in published tuition
for any type of institutions; on the contrary, they led to a small reduction in published tuition
among private Doctoral Universities and public institutions of all types. However, effects on
net tuition reveal a different story.
Among Doctoral Universities, a 10% negative endowment shock induced a statistically
significant 2 percentage point reduction in the percent of freshman cohort receiving insti-
tutional aid, and a 3% reduction in the average amount of institutional aid per recipient.
Among Baccalaureate and Master’s Universities, the endowment shock induced no mean-
ingful changes in either the percent of freshmen receiving aid or the average amount of aid
per recipient. While these results reflect the net prices received by first-year students, the
patterns are consistent with the results on total institutional grant aid presented in the last
section.
2.4.4 Effects on Rationing and Student Composition
Other than pricing, colleges and universities actively use admissions strategies to recruit the
set of students that maximize their institutional goals. This section examines the effects of
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endowment shocks on the characteristics of new entering students. I consider four sets of
cohort characteristics: the percentage of low-income students, the percentage of minority
students, the percentage of international students, and the distribution of academic ability.
Data on family income for each cohort is not available. I use the percentage of federal
grant recipients as a proxy for the ratio of low-income students because eligibility for most
federal grant aid, such as Pell Grant, depends on family income rather than merit – most
low-income students are eligible for Pell Grant; and the majority of them do receive Pell aid.
Figure 2.11 presents results using the percentage of federal aid recipients among freshman
cohort as the outcome variable.
The percent of international students, on the other hand, reflects efforts to attract stu-
dents with high willingness to pay. Although the original purpose for admitting international
students was to increase diversity and facilitate the exchange of viewpoints and cultural ex-
periences, recent years have seen colleges recruiting international students for their high
willingness to pay. Figure 2.12 presents results using the percentage of non-resident aliens
among freshman cohort as the outcome variable.
Figure 2.12 uses the percent of Blacks and Hispanics among the freshman cohort. Figure
2.14 presents results using the 25th and 75th percentile of SAT and SCT ranking of freshman
cohort as the outcome variable.
For Doctoral Universities, negative endowment shocks led to severe reductions in the
percent of low-income and Hispanic students, as well as the 75th percentile of SAT/ACT
score rankings of freshman students. Moreover, they led to higher percentages of interna-
tional students among entering cohort. A 10% negative endowment shock induced 1 to 2
percentage points reductions in the percent of federal aid recipients, 0.6 to 0.7 percentage
points reductions in the percent of Hispanic students among freshman cohort, and 3 to 5
percentage points reductions in the 75th percentile SAT/ACT score rankings. It also led to
5 percentage points increases in the portion of international students.
For Baccalaureate Colleges, the effects on low-income students were initially small and
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positive, but turned negative after 2011; similarly, the effects on international students were
positive but statistically insignificant before 2012. Endowment shocks led to no meaningful
changes in the percent of Hispanic students, or the SAT/ACT score rankings.
For Master’s Universities, there are large (albeit insignificant) negative impacts on the
percent of federal aid recipients (1.5 to 2 percentage points reductions) from 2008 to 2011,
and even larger (and statistically significant) negative impacts after 2012 (3 to 4 percentage
points reductions). The effects on other outcomes are all small and statistically insignificant.
To sum up, the negative endowment shocks led to reductions in the percentage of low-
income students in all three types of institutions, although the impact was much smaller for
Baccalaureate Colleges than for Doctoral and Master’s Universities. Notably, for all three
sets of institutions, the negative endowment shocks had no meaningful impact on the per-
centage of Black students, but substantially reduced the percentage of Hispanic students in
Doctoral Universities. Gorbachev et al. (2016) document that compared to Blacks, Hispanic
wealth rose faster during the boom and fell faster during the subsequent bust. This suggests
that the estimated impacts on Hispanic students may reflect changes in university admissions
strategies for low-income students, rather than for minority students.
2.4.5 Effects on Faculty Hiring and Faculty Salary
Faculty and staff are the main inputs of a university. The quality of a university could be
partially reflected in the composition and salary of its faculty and staff. University-wide
hiring freeze and salary freeze are not uncommon during the financial crisis, especially in
public institutions. Those with severe financial constraints may lack the funds to hire new
faculty members; they may even lose existing faculty members if their salary cannot keep
up with competing universities. In this section, I investigate how the endowment shocks
affected university staffing. I estimate the effects on the size and salary of faculty and staff
by their academic rank.
Figures 2.15, 2.16, and 2.17 presents the effects of negative 0809 endowment shocks
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on the numbers of tenure-track instructional faculty, non-tenure-track instructional faculty,
and non-faculty staff, respectively. For Doctoral institutions, a 10% negative endowment
shock reduces the size of tenure-track instructional faculty by 1%; it reduces the number of
non-tenure-track instructors by 10% initially and 5% for the later years; it reduces the size
of administrative and supportive staff by around 1% during the crisis; however, the effects
dwindled after 2010. Granted that these effects are estimated with limited precision.
For Baccalaureate Colleges, there is no meaningful effect on the number of tenure-track
faculty, but an over 2% reduction in non-tenure-track instructor and a 1% reduction in the
size of administrative and supportive staff. Both effects disappear by 2014. In contrast, for
Master’s Universities, the endowment shocks affected neither the number of non-tenure-track
instructors or the size of administrative and supportive staff; however, they induced a 5%
reduction in the size of tenure-track faculty after 2011.
Although the effects on Master’s Universities are estimated with limited precision, the
contrasts here are consistent with the earlier findings of reductions in instructional and ad-
ministrative expenses for Baccalaureate Colleges verses reductions in research for masters’
universities. Taken together, these results provide evidence that Baccalaureate Colleges
offered protection for research and tenure-track faculty against financial turmoils; these pro-
tection came at the costs of non-tenure-track instructors and staff workers. In contrast,
Master’s Universities were more willing to temporarily give up research and substitute non-
tenure-track instructors for tenure-track faculty during times of financial constraints.
Turning to faculty salary, IPEDS data only provide average salaries by faculty rank.
Without detailed micro data on who left the university and who stayed, it is impossible
to know whether the endowment shocks affected salaries of remaining faculty members, or
whether the endowment shocks induced higher (or lower) salary faculty members to leave
the institution. For instance, the following two scenarios represent very different economics
changes, but lead to the same change in average salaries of remaining faculty members. One,
recently tenured faculty with relatively low salary leave the institution, perhaps for pursuit
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Table 2.2: Summary of Empirical Findings
University Type by Carnegie Classification Doctoral Mater’s Baccalaureate
Student Outcome
Retention Rate - - 0
Graduation Rate - ~ 0
Expenses
Research 0 -, 0 0
Instructional - 0 -
Supportive ~ 0 -
Aid to Students - 0 0
Tuition
Published Tuition 0 0 0
% Granted Inst. Aid - 0 0
Avg. Amount of Inst. Aid 0 0 0
Student Composition
% Low Income - 0, - 0, -
% Hispanic - 0 0
% Foreign + 0 0, +
75th percentile SAT/ACT - ~ 0
Staffing
Faculty on Tenure-Track - ~ 0
Instructor Non-Tenure-Track ~ 0 -
Non-Faculty Staff ~ 0 -
Notes: Table summaries the main empirical findings of this chapter. All signs are for the estimated
effects of a 10% negative 0809 endowment shock. “-” represent significant negative effects; “+”
significant positive effects; “0” no meaningful effects; “~” substantial negative effects that are not
statistically significant in any year; “0, -” no meaningful effects in the initial years after the crisis,
but turning negative and significant in later years; “0, +” no meaningful effects in the initial years
after the crisis, but turning positive and significant in later years. See Tables 2.3 to 2.9 for regression
results.
of higher salary elsewhere, and all remaining faculty stay on the old salary schedule; two,
older faculty members opt for retirement, and everyone else gets a bump in salary. Both
scenarios would lead to a reduction in the size of the faculty and an increase in the average
salary; yet, the effects of these two scenarios on faculty quality would be very different.
For these reasons, I refrain from putting too much meaning on the estimated effects on
average salary. The results are presented in Appendix Figures B.9 and B.10. While there are
some variations in how endowment shocks affected salary at different types of institutions,
none of the estimated effects is statistically significant. This provides suggestive evidence
that the endowment shocks did not induce meaningful changes in faculty salary.
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2.5 Discussion and Conclusion
Table 2.2 summaries the main empirical findings of this chapter. These findings suggest that
Baccalaureate and Doctoral Universities are to some extent tenure-track faculty’ coopera-
tives in the sense that, at times of financial difficulty, tenure-track professors’ employment
and preferences for research are protected at the expense of the non-tenure-track staff. In
contrast, Master’s Universities’ objective functions do not represent the collective preferences
of their tenure-track faculty. The relative change in research and instructional expenditures
suggest that tenure-track professors prioritize research, whereas administrators at Master’s
institutions do not.
We can confidently reject the hypothesis that any of these three types of universities
are profit-maximizers. A profit-maximizer would not serve low-income students before the
financial crisis unless the low-income students are of higher ability than the average student
body, in which case the university would continue to admit them during the financial crisis in
order to maximize their profits. The change in student composition suggests that universities
were not profit maximizing prior to the financial crisis, but rather they placed higher weights
on serving low-income students than serving other students.
Future research could focus on what contributed to the negative effects on student
outcomes at Doctoral and Master’s institutions. Was it due to the reduction in institutional
financial aid, or was it due to the reduction in faculty members? Future research could also
examine how these financial shocks affected research outcomes.
The fact that Baccalaureate Colleges with large negative shocks managed to reduce
administrative and supportive service costs without affecting student outcomes suggests that
there were room for cost reduction prior to the financial crisis. This poses new challenges
for public policy to offer incentives for non-profit organizations to include cost minimization
in their objectives.
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Figure 2.1: Effects of Endowment Shocks on Student Retention Rate
Notes: Figure shows the coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals of  ⌧ from esti-
mating Equation 2.3.4 using student retention rate (⇥100) as the outcome variable. Panel
A includes all four-year Doctoral, Master’s, and general Baccalaureate institutions; Panel B,
C, and D present results from separate regressions that divide institutions by their Carnegie
classification in 2005. Retention rate of year t is percent of full-time undergraduate entering
cohort from year t   1 returning to school at the beginning of year t. Academic year 2007 is
the omitted year. Data source is IPEDS Fall Enrollment Survey. Time varying control vari-
ables Xi,t include federal appropriations and state and local appropriations for institution i in
academic year t. Robust standard errors are clustered at the state level. All observations are
weighted by the size of the institution’s full-time, first-time entering cohort in fall 2007.
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Figure 2.2: Effects of Endowment Shocks on Student Graduation Rate
Notes: Figure shows the coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals of  ⌧ from estimat-
ing yi,t =
P
⌧ 6=2007  ⌧ ·NEG Shocki,0809 ⇥ It=⌧ +  i +  t + "i,t using student graduation rate
(⇥100) as the outcome variable. Panel A includes all four-year Doctoral, Master’s, and general
Baccalaureate institutions; Panel B, C, and D present results from separate regressions that
divide institutions by their Carnegie classification in 2005. Graduation rate of year t is percent
of full-time, first-time, degree-seeking undergraduate entering cohort from year t  6 receiving
a Baccalaureate degree within six years of initial enrollment. Year label indicates the year
data is reported. Year in bracket indicates the entering year of the cohort for whom data is
reported. Academic year 2007 is the omitted year. Dashed grey line , placed before year 2010,
indicates the starting cohort whose college experience was definitely affected by the 2008 Great
Recession. Data source is IPEDS Graduation Rate Survey. Unlike other results presented
in this chapter, this set of regressions excludes all contemporaneous shocks and time-varying
control variables Xi,t, because these measures were largely missing for years before 2003, where
the earlier cohorts were actually attending college. Robust standard errors are clustered at the
state level. All observations are weighted by the size of the institution’s full-time, first-time
entering cohort in fall 2007.
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Figure 2.3: Effects of Endowment Shocks on University Total Expenses
Notes: Figure shows the coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals of  ⌧ from esti-
mating Equation 2.3.4 with log(total expenses) as the outcome variable. Panel A includes
all four-year Doctoral, Master’s, and general Baccalaureate institutions; Panel B, C, and D
present results from separate regressions that divide institutions by their Carnegie classifica-
tion in 2005. To stay consistent with IPEDS data reporting conventions, total expenses for
year t are expenses of the academic year ending in year t (e.g. total expenses for year 2008 is
the expenses of the academic year from June 2007 to July 2008). Year 2007 is the omitted.
Data source is IPEDS Finance Survey.
Time varying control variables Xi,t include federal appropriations and state and local appro-
priations for institution i in academic year t. Robust standard errors are clustered at the state
level. All observations are weighted by the size of the institution’s full-time, first-time entering
cohort in fall 2007.
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Figure 2.4: Effects of Endowment Shocks on Research Expenses
Notes: Figure shows the coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals of  ⌧ from estimat-
ing Equation 2.3.4 with log(research expenses) as the outcome variable. Other details same
as Figure 2.3.
Figure 2.5: Effects of Endowment Shocks on Instructional Expenses
Notes: Figure shows the coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals of  ⌧ from estimat-
ing Equation 2.3.4 with log(instructional expenses) as the outcome variable. Other details
same as Figure 2.3.
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Figure 2.6: Effects of Endowment Shocks on Supporting Service Expenses
Notes: Figure shows the coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals of  ⌧ from esti-
mating Equation 2.3.4 with log(supporting services expenses) as the outcome variable. Sup-
porting service expenses are the sum of expenses for academic support, student services, and
institutional support. Other details are the same as in Figure 2.3.
Figure 2.7: Effects of Endowment Shocks on Total Institutional Aid to Students
Notes: Figure shows the coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals of  ⌧ from estimat-
ing Equation 2.3.4 with log(institutional grant aid) as the outcome variable. Other details
are the same as in Figure 2.3.
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Figure 2.8: Effects of Endowment Shocks on Published Tuition and Fees
Notes: Figure shows the coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals of  ⌧ from estimat-
ing Equation 2.3.4 with log(tuition) as the outcome variable. Tuition is the sum of published
tuition and fees. In-state tuition and fees are used for public institutions. Other details are the
same as in Figure 2.3.
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Figure 2.9: Effects on the Percentage of Freshmen Receiving Institutional Aid
Notes: Figure shows the coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals of  ⌧ from estimat-
ing Equation 2.3.4 using the percentage of full-time freshmen receiving institutional aid as the
outcome variable. Other details are the same as in Figure 2.3.
Figure 2.10: Effects on the Average Amount of Institutional Aid for Freshman Recipients
Notes: Figure shows the coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals of  ⌧ from estimat-
ing Equation 2.3.4 using log(Average Aid) as the outcome variable. Average aid is the average
amount of institutional aid per full-time freshman aid recipient. Other details are the same as
in Figure 2.3.
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Figure 2.11: Effects on the Percentage of Federal Aid Recipients in Entering Cohort
Notes: Figure shows the coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals of  ⌧ from estimat-
ing Equation 2.3.4 using the percentage of federal aid recipients in the full-time freshman cohort
as the outcome variables. Full-time freshman cohort of year t refers to the cohort entering in
Fall of year t. Other details are the same as in Figure 2.3.
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Figure 2.12: Effects on the Percentage of Non-Resident Aliens in Entering Cohort
Notes: Figure shows the coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals of  ⌧ from estimat-
ing Equation 2.3.4 using the percentage of non-resident aliens in the full-time freshman cohort
as the outcome variables. Full-time freshman cohort of year t refers to the cohort entering in
Fall of year t. Other details are the same as in Figure 2.3.
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Figure 2.13: Effects on the Percentage of Minorities in Entering Cohort
Notes: Figure shows the coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals of  ⌧ from esti-
mating Equation 2.3.4 using the percentage of Blacks (Panel A through D) and percentage
of Hispanics (Panel E through G) in the full-time freshman cohort as the outcome variables.
Full-time freshman cohort of year t refers to the cohort entering in Fall of year t. Other details
are the same as in Figure 2.3.
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Figure 2.14: Effects on SAT and ACT Math Rankings of Entering Cohort
Notes: Figure shows the coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals of  ⌧ from estimat-
ing Equation 2.3.4 using the 75th percentile of SAT/ACT rankings (Panel A through D) and
25th percentile of SAT/ACT rankings (Panel E through G) for the full-time freshman cohort
as the outcome variables. SAT/ACT rankings are computed as a weighted sum of the SAT
and ACT percentile rankings, weighting SAT and ACT rankings by the percentage of students
submitting each score. Full-time freshman cohort of year t refers to the cohort entering in Fall
of year t. Other details are the same as in Figure 2.3.
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Figure 2.15: Effects on the Number of Tenure-Track Instructional Faculty
Notes: Figure shows the coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals of  ⌧ from esti-
mating Equation 2.3.5 using the number of full-time tenure-track instructional faculty as the
outcome variable. Data sources are IPEDS Human Resource Survey. Number of staff for year
t refers to the numbers in October of year t. Other details are the same as in Figure 2.3.
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Figure 2.16: Effects on the Number of Non-Tenure-Track Instructional Faculty
Notes: Figure shows the coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals of  ⌧ from es-
timating Equation 2.3.5 using the number of full-time instructional faculty that are not on
tenure-track as the outcome variable. Data sources are IPEDS Human Resource Survey. Num-
ber of staff for year t refers to the numbers in October of year t. Other details are the same as
in Figure 2.3.
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Figure 2.17: Effects on the Number of Non-Faculty Staff Members
Notes: Figure shows the coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals of  ⌧ from estimat-
ing Equation 2.3.5 using the number of full-time non-medical staff that do not have faculty
status as the outcome variable. Data sources are IPEDS Human Resource Survey. Number of
staff for year t refers to the numbers in October of year t. Other details are the same as in
Figure 2.3.
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Table 2.3: Effects of Endowment Shocks on Student Retention Rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Doctoral Universities Master’s Universities Baccalaureate Colleges
NEG_Shock_0809 -2.561*** -2.417*** -1.906*** -5.272** -5.601** -5.001** -0.658 -0.146 0.0755
* 2008 to 2011 (0.749) (0.806) (0.602) (2.093) (2.259) (2.208) (0.710) (0.413) (0.535)
NEG_Shock_0809 -2.366** -2.119** -2.290*** -4.415* -2.412 -6.508** -0.880 -0.0897 -0.00353
* 2012 to 2014 (0.891) (0.958) (0.707) (2.618) (2.691) (3.001) (0.956) (0.707) (0.820)
Institution FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FEs Yes Subsumed Yes Yes Subsumed Yes Yes Subsumed Yes
Year*Selectivity FEs No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No
Weighting Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Number of Institutions 244 244 244 540 540 540 542 542 542
Number of Clusters 51 51 51 49 49 49 48 48 48
Adjusted R2 0.948 0.949 0.920 0.879 0.880 0.787 0.889 0.890 0.808
Notes: Outcome variable is the percentage of first-time, full-time undergraduate students returning to the
institution in the fall of their second year. Data is reported in the fall of their second year. Years included in
the regression are 2004 to 2014. All regressions include the following time-varying control variables: federal
appropriations (in logs), state and local appropriations (in logs), contemporaneous and one-period lagged
positive endowment shocks, contemporaneous and one-period lagged negative endowment shocks (with the
2008 and 2009 negative shocks set to zero).
Robust standard errors clustered at the state level are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.4: Effects of Endowment Shocks on Graduation Rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Doctoral Universities Master’s Universities Baccalaureate Colleges
NEG_Shock_0809 -1.562** -2.892*** -1.142** -3.533 -10.00*** -4.813 1.190 -0.506 1.499
* 2008 to 2011 (0.644) (0.763) (0.548) (3.001) (3.149) (3.620) (1.111) (0.663) (1.022)
NEG_Shock_0809 -4.565*** -5.938*** -3.475*** -8.340** -14.73*** -6.692* 0.0429 -1.997* 0.777
* 2012 to 2014 (1.124) (1.374) (0.767) (3.739) (4.416) (3.611) (1.142) (1.107) (1.051)
Institution FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FEs Yes Subsumed Yes Yes Subsumed Yes Yes Subsumed Yes
Year*Selectivity FEs No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No
Weighting Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Number of Institutions 244 244 244 536 536 536 521 521 521
Number of Clusters 51 51 51 49 49 49 48 48 48
Adjusted R2 0.968 0.969 0.965 0.941 0.942 0.878 0.932 0.933 0.870
Notes: Outcome variable is the percentage of first-time, full-time undergraduate students obtaining BA
degree within 6 years of initial enrollment. Data is reported 6 years after graduation. For example, graduation
rate in 2014 is the percentage of 2008 entering cohort that have obtained a BA degree from the institution
by June 30, 2014. Years included in the regression are 2004 to 2014. No time-varying control variables are
included in this set of regressions because graduation data are reported 6 years after enrollment.
Robust standard errors clustered at the state level are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.5: Effects of Endowment Shocks on Expenses by Category
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Doctoral Universities Master’s Universities Baccalaureate Colleges
Panel A: Research Expenses
NEG_Shock_0809 0.118 0.0554 0.387 -3.546 -5.916 -0.761 -0.712** -0.486 -0.606**
* 2008 to 2011 (0.284) (0.305) (0.647) (2.502) (3.612) (1.184) (0.304) (0.310) (0.255)
NEG_Shock_0809 0.0436 -0.0421 0.208 -1.961 -5.474 0.566 -1.382** -0.970* -0.854**
* 2012 to 2014 (0.239) (0.273) (0.541) (4.621) (5.770) (2.227) (0.587) (0.534) (0.357)
Adjusted R2 0.960 0.960 0.958 0.916 0.917 0.937 0.934 0.934 0.929
Panel B: Instructional Expenses
NEG_Shock_0809 -0.0961* -0.116** -0.0699 -0.184 -0.254* -0.137 -0.104** -0.0797** -0.0799*
* 2008 to 2011 (0.0502) (0.0560) (0.0573) (0.131) (0.133) (0.101) (0.0398) (0.0384) (0.0410)
NEG_Shock_0809 -0.0880 -0.121* -0.0457 -0.0734 -0.197 -0.0290 -0.103** -0.0613 -0.0596
* 2012 to 2014 (0.0645) (0.0710) (0.0658) (0.193) (0.192) (0.143) (0.0457) (0.0406) (0.0392)
Adjusted R2 0.990 0.990 0.991 0.984 0.984 0.980 0.974 0.974 0.961
Panel C: Academic Support, Instructional Support, and Student Service (Supporting Service) Expenses
NEG_Shock_0809 -0.0187 -0.0645 -0.00226 -0.138 -0.137 -0.123 -0.160*** -0.0906** -0.135***
* 2008 to 2011 (0.0417) (0.0614) (0.0400) (0.110) (0.117) (0.0935) (0.0535) (0.0409) (0.0501)
NEG_Shock_0809 -0.0702 -0.157* -0.0264 -0.0540 -0.127 -0.0779 -0.140** -0.0433 -0.104*
* 2012 to 2014 (0.0570) (0.0872) (0.0546) (0.171) (0.181) (0.140) (0.0676) (0.0469) (0.0542)
Adjusted R2 0.982 0.982 0.985 0.972 0.973 0.970 0.950 0.951 0.942
Panel D: Total Institutional Aid to Students
NEG_Shock_0809 -0.230** -0.0613 -0.164* -0.00687 -0.0578 -0.310 -0.0256 -0.0781 -0.267
* 2008 to 2011 (0.108) (0.108) (0.0873) (0.390) (0.478) (0.370) (0.186) (0.0861) (0.198)
NEG_Shock_0809 -0.347** -0.149 -0.283** -1.729** -1.710** -1.483* -0.165 -0.109 -0.362
* 2012 to 2014 (0.143) (0.165) (0.114) (0.800) (0.771) (0.767) (0.209) (0.0975) (0.217)
Adjusted R2 0.951 0.952 0.955 0.720 0.720 0.729 0.841 0.841 0.765
Institution FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FEs Yes Subsumed Yes Yes Subsumed Yes Yes Subsumed Yes
Year*Selectivity FEs No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No
Weighting Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Number of Institutions 244 244 244 540 540 540 547 547 547
Number of Clusters 51 51 51 49 49 49 48 48 48
Notes: Outcome variables are log expenses by category. All regressions include the following time-varying
control variables: federal appropriations (in logs), state and local appropriations (in logs), contemporaneous
and one-period lagged positive endowment shocks, contemporaneous and one-period lagged negative endow-
ment shocks (with the 2008 and 2009 negative shocks set to zero). Robust standard errors clustered at the
state level are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.6: Effects of Endowment Shocks on Tuition
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Doctoral Universities Master’s Universities Baccalaureate Colleges
Panel A: Percentage of Students Receiving Institutional Aid
NEG_Shock_0809 -11.08*** -8.601** -8.012** 5.253 4.957 -0.287 -1.545 -1.771 -2.518**
* 2008 to 2011 (3.384) (4.134) (3.301) (6.212) (6.623) (5.906) (1.429) (1.520) (1.115)
NEG_Shock_0809 -19.58*** -11.08** -15.92*** -2.531 -4.431 -7.652 -4.343** -4.818** -5.194***
* 2012 to 2014 (4.940) (4.632) (4.792) (9.293) (10.53) (7.945) (1.638) (1.817) (1.485)
Number of Institutions 243 243 243 538 538 538 539 539 539
Number of Clusters 51 51 51 49 49 49 48 48 48
Adjusted R2 0.847 0.853 0.860 0.932 0.933 0.924 0.912 0.914 0.867
Panel B: Published Tuition, Private Institutions (in logs)
NEG_Shock_0809 -0.0596*** -0.0468*** -0.0488 0.0453 -0.0323 0.0346 -0.00314 -0.00588 -0.00310
* 2008 to 2011 (0.0125) (0.0142) (0.0298) (0.0575) (0.0593) (0.0641) (0.00935) (0.00871) (0.00962)
NEG_Shock_0809 -0.0730*** -0.0500** -0.0587 0.0859 -0.00610 0.0785 0.220 0.292 0.208
* 2012 to 2014 (0.0182) (0.0217) (0.0398) (0.0802) (0.0792) (0.0850) (0.191) (0.247) (0.185)
Number of Institutions 92 92 92 308 308 308 450 450 450
Number of Clusters 28 28 28 48 48 48 47 47 47
Adjusted R2 0.995 0.996 0.989 0.974 0.974 0.960 0.969 0.971 0.960
Panel C: Published (In-State) Tuition, Public Institutions (in logs)
NEG_Shock_0809 -0.682 -0.794 -0.559 -0.0222 0.0758 0.369 0.0119 -0.0634 -0.0258
* 2008 to 2011 (0.485) (0.527) (0.531) (1.281) (1.154) (1.573) (0.496) (0.442) (0.443)
NEG_Shock_0809 -1.180** -1.315* -0.959 -1.124 -0.919 -0.283 -1.161* -1.272* -1.115
* 2012 to 2014 (0.577) (0.662) (0.622) (1.732) (1.558) (2.053) (0.624) (0.679) (0.675)
Number of Institutions 151 151 151 230 230 230 89 89 89
Number of Clusters 50 50 50 46 46 46 35 35 35
Adjusted R2 0.932 0.934 0.929 0.915 0.917 0.912 0.950 0.951 0.943
Institution FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FEs Yes Subsumed Yes Yes Subsumed Yes Yes Subsumed Yes
Year*Selectivity FEs No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No
Weighting Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Notes: Outcome variable is percent receiving institutional aid in Panel A and log published tuition in Panel
B and Panel C. All regressions include the following time-varying control variables: federal appropriations (in
logs), state and local appropriations (in logs), contemporaneous and one-period lagged positive endowment
shocks, contemporaneous and one-period lagged negative endowment shocks (with the 2008 and 2009 negative
shocks set to zero). Robust standard errors clustered at the state level are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.7: Effects of Endowment Shocks on Composition of New Entering Cohort
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Doctoral Universities Master’s Universities Baccalaureate Colleges
Panel A: Percent Receiving Federal Aid (Low-Income)
NEG_Shock_0809 -8.416*** -6.334*** -6.628*** -8.242** -1.533 -8.680** -0.676 2.332** -0.0760
* 2008 to 2011 (2.124) (2.115) (2.066) (4.003) (4.283) (4.148) (0.703) (0.907) (0.951)
NEG_Shock_0809 -16.84*** -11.04*** -13.43*** -26.57*** -16.57*** -17.26*** -3.956** 1.433* -2.527*
* 2012 to 2014 (3.863) (3.279) (3.860) (5.553) (5.594) (4.863) (1.574) (0.844) (1.315)
Adjusted R2 0.872 0.880 0.850 0.896 0.898 0.829 0.902 0.905 0.853
Panel B: Percent Hispanic
NEG_Shock_0809 -3.337*** -3.183** -1.828** -3.104 -1.982 -0.294 0.184 0.260 0.433
* 2008 to 2011 (1.127) (1.318) (0.795) (4.049) (3.576) (2.033) (0.413) (0.308) (0.516)
NEG_Shock_0809 -4.403*** -3.873** -2.581** -3.970 -0.605 1.329 -0.237 0.0361 0.387
* 2012 to 2014 (1.625) (1.864) (1.198) (6.554) (5.332) (2.673) (0.783) (0.454) (0.764)
Adjusted R2 0.973 0.973 0.965 0.974 0.974 0.950 0.935 0.936 0.893
Panel C: Percent Black
NEG_Shock_0809 -0.914 0.0730 -0.317 1.301 3.032 1.502 0.0177 0.485 -0.357
* 2008 to 2011 (0.999) (1.109) (1.008) (2.483) (2.457) (2.296) (0.643) (0.542) (0.548)
NEG_Shock_0809 -1.456 -0.0605 -0.719 1.492 2.298 2.403 0.0698 0.381 -0.339
* 2012 to 2014 (0.908) (1.058) (0.824) (3.590) (3.597) (2.936) (0.907) (0.823) (0.926)
Adjusted R2 0.951 0.952 0.947 0.977 0.977 0.959 0.977 0.978 0.970
Panel D: Percent Foreign
NEG_Shock_0809 2.556*** 0.447 2.629*** 2.567** 1.957** 1.645 1.794*** 0.317 1.796**
* 2008 to 2011 (0.895) (1.206) (0.939) (1.105) (0.958) (1.056) (0.570) (0.581) (0.705)
NEG_Shock_0809 1.904 -2.293 2.442* 4.139** 3.955** 2.480 3.131*** 0.465 3.141***
* 2012 to 2014 (1.506) (2.508) (1.366) (1.968) (1.817) (2.057) (0.738) (0.657) (0.863)
Adjusted R2 0.766 0.790 0.769 0.701 0.703 0.572 0.755 0.769 0.637
Institution FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FEs Yes Subsumed Yes Yes Subsumed Yes Yes Subsumed Yes
Year*Selectivity FEs No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No
Weighting Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Number of Institutions 244 244 244 540 540 540 547 547 547
Number of Clusters 51 51 51 49 49 49 48 48 48
Notes: Outcome variables are the percent of the Federal aid recipient, Hispanic, Black, or foreigners among
the full-time, first-time entering cohort of each year. All regressions include the following time-varying control
variables: federal appropriations (in logs), state and local appropriations (in logs), contemporaneous and
one-period lagged positive endowment shocks, contemporaneous and one-period lagged negative endowment
shocks (with the 2008 and 2009 negative shocks set to zero). Robust standard errors clustered at the state
level are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.8: Effects of Endowment Shocks on SAT and ACT Math Percentile Rankings of New
Entering Cohort
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Doctoral Universities Master’s Universities Baccalaureate Colleges
Panel A: 75th Percentile of SAT/ACT Math Percentile Rankings
NEG_Shock_0809 -1.708*** -2.310*** -1.685*** 0.876 -0.0719 1.587 -0.831 -0.657 -0.532
* 2008 to 2011 (0.543) (0.622) (0.593) (2.196) (2.307) (2.105) (0.608) (0.651) (0.627)
NEG_Shock_0809 -2.892*** -2.954*** -3.153*** -0.962 0.0356 -0.0401 0.0119 0.0155 0.261
* 2012 to 2014 (0.585) (0.617) (0.802) (3.600) (3.024) (3.271) (0.774) (0.816) (0.818)
Adjusted R2 0.964 0.965 0.959 0.911 0.912 0.883 0.945 0.946 0.919
Panel B: 25th Percentile of SAT/ACT Math Percentile Rankings
NEG_Shock_0809 -1.491 -3.205** -1.590* 3.206 3.387 0.964 -1.331* -1.046 -1.180*
* 2008 to 2011 (1.207) (1.352) (0.914) (3.956) (4.162) (3.092) (0.673) (0.811) (0.681)
NEG_Shock_0809 -2.490 -3.793** -3.178** 6.549 8.420* 4.294 -0.263 0.137 -0.285
* 2012 to 2014 (1.584) (1.728) (1.217) (5.081) (4.811) (4.252) (1.032) (1.190) (1.043)
Adjusted R2 0.965 0.967 0.968 0.927 0.928 0.899 0.956 0.957 0.942
Institution FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FEs Yes Subsumed Yes Yes Subsumed Yes Yes Subsumed Yes
Year*Selectivity FEs No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No
Weighting Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Number of Institutions 222 222 222 415 415 415 336 336 336
Number of Clusters 50 50 50 47 47 47 41 41 41
Notes: Outcome variables are the 75th and 25th percentile of SAT/ACT Math score percentile rankings of
the full-time, first-time entering cohort of each year. All regressions include the following time-varying control
variables: federal appropriations (in logs), state and local appropriations (in logs), contemporaneous and
one-period lagged positive endowment shocks, contemporaneous and one-period lagged negative endowment
shocks (with the 2008 and 2009 negative shocks set to zero). Robust standard errors clustered at the state
level are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.9: Effects of Endowment Shocks on Faculty and Staff Composition
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Doctoral Universities Master’s Universities Baccalaureate Colleges
Panel A: Number of Tenure-Track Instructional Faculty (in logs)
NEG_Shock_0809 -0.0147 0.0183 -0.0315 -0.352** -0.115 -0.233 -0.0204 -0.0329 -0.0111
* 2008 to 2011 (0.0278) (0.0297) (0.0262) (0.136) (0.0925) (0.177) (0.0203) (0.0239) (0.0290)
NEG_Shock_0809 -0.0473 0.0401 -0.0598 -0.561 -0.102 -0.263 -0.0396 -0.0373 -0.0300
* 2012 to 2014 (0.0351) (0.0409) (0.0407) (0.366) (0.248) (0.205) (0.0337) (0.0261) (0.0466)
Number of Institutions 244 244 244 538 538 538 537 537 537
Number of Clusters 51 51 51 49 49 49 48 48 48
Adjusted R2 0.985 0.985 0.987 0.946 0.946 0.932 0.968 0.969 0.927
Panel B: Number of Non-Tenure-Track Instructional Faculty (in logs)
NEG_Shock_0809 -0.0422 0.243 0.173 0.0325 0.256 0.0455 -0.0591 -0.149* 0.0156
* 2008 to 2011 (0.238) (0.259) (0.201) (0.392) (0.315) (0.349) (0.0730) (0.0811) (0.0705)
NEG_Shock_0809 0.275 0.348 0.416 -0.0527 0.111 0.172 -0.0335 -0.101 -0.00190
* 2012 to 2014 (0.366) (0.305) (0.258) (0.662) (0.421) (0.487) (0.125) (0.0932) (0.140)
Number of Institutions 244 244 244 538 538 538 537 537 537
Number of Clusters 51 51 51 49 49 49 48 48 48
Adjusted R2 0.831 0.832 0.848 0.916 0.917 0.883 0.871 0.873 0.809
Panel C: Number of Staff Members without Faculty Status (in logs)
NEG_Shock_0809 2.10e-05 0.0293 0.0183 -0.0839 0.0380 -0.0979 -0.0754* -0.0549* -0.0497
* 2008 to 2011 (0.0404) (0.0485) (0.0345) (0.239) (0.200) (0.183) (0.0425) (0.0283) (0.0315)
NEG_Shock_0809 0.0350 0.118* 0.0360 -0.194 0.0654 -0.134 -0.0116 0.0102 -0.00709
* 2012 to 2014 (0.0423) (0.0684) (0.0475) (0.322) (0.244) (0.214) (0.0590) (0.0426) (0.0400)
Number of Institutions 244 244 244 539 539 539 546 546 546
Number of Clusters 51 51 51 49 49 49 48 48 48
Adjusted R2 0.984 0.985 0.987 0.958 0.958 0.958 0.915 0.916 0.911
Institution FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FEs Yes Subsumed Yes Yes Subsumed Yes Yes Subsumed Yes
Year*Selectivity FEs No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No
Weighting Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Notes: All regressions include the following time-varying control variables: federal appropriations (in logs),
state and local appropriations (in logs), contemporaneous and one-period lagged positive endowment shocks,
contemporaneous and one-period lagged negative endowment shocks (with the 2008 and 2009 negative shocks




Attending a Four-year College Directly or Transferring from a Two-Year




Community colleges, also referred to as two-year colleges or junior colleges, are institutions
accredited to award the associate’s in arts or science as its highest degree. They offer courses
equivalent to that of the first two years of a bachelor’s degree program and students are
offered the opportunity to transfer to a four-year college upon completion of the associate’s
degree. In fact, the community college system were created to relieve the overcrowding in
four-year colleges at a time when increasing numbers of Americans were going to college.
As the number of students seeking a bachelor’s degree continues to grow, transferring
from a two-year college to a four-year college has become an increasingly important path to
a bachelor’s degree. About 33 percent of students at two-year colleges eventually transfer,
of which 61 percent (or 250,000) transferred to four-year colleges from 2006 to 20111. Many
state education systems promote transferring from two-year colleges as a cost-effective way to
increase bachelor degree attainment2. However, the literature is unclear about the potential
quality differences between two-year and four-year colleges. Compared to four-year colleges,
two-year colleges have fewer resources and a less selective student body. In addition, transfer
students may also experience the disruption from changing schools. These factors may
dampen labor market returns for transfer students, leading to lower wages of transfer students
compared to peers who start in a four-year college directly.
This chapter seeks to compare the relative labor market returns of two different pathways
to a bachelor’s degree: transferring from a two-year college and attending a four-year college
directly. We use data from the National Education Longitudinal Study of 1988, a nationally
representative sample of individuals first surveyed in the spring of 1988 (as eighth-graders)
and last surveyed in 2000. The data contain a rich set of pre-college student characteristics
1“Transfer & Mobility Report: A National View of Pre-Degree Student Movement in Postsecondary
Institutions,” National Student Clearinghouse Research Center.
2For instance, californiacolleges.edu, run by the state of California, states that “A California community
college is a great place to begin your four-year degree [...] you can save thousands of dollars in tuition and
fees.”
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that allows us to control for observable differences among students who chose different path-
ways. These observable characteristics include standardized test scores before college, high
school grades, extracurriculars, geographic characteristics, family socio-economic status, and
parental education.
Despite the rich set of observable characteristics that we control for, there may still be
other unobservable differences between transfer students and direct attendees that are crucial
to their choice of BA degree pathways. To control for selection on unobservables, we use
distance to the nearest four-year college as an instrument for transfer status. This instrument
is motivated by the fact that college starters may want to live at home in order to save on
room and board. There is a two-year community college in almost every neighborhood, but
not so for four-year colleges. Those who live close to a four-year college are, therefore, more
likely to attend a four-year college directly, while those without a four-year college nearby
are more likely to attend a two-year college and transfer to a four-year college
To our knowledge, this instrument has not been used to estimate labor market outcomes
of transfer students. Our IV estimates for the dampening effect of transferring are substan-
tially larger than our OLS estimates, suggesting that there are large degrees of unobserved
heterogeneity among the bachelor’s degree seekers.
Our results indicate that there is a large negative effect on young adult wages due to
transferring. This is true for all students that ever attended a four-year institution as well as
for students that eventually completed a bachelor’s degree. Since students may transfer at
different points during their post-secondary career, we also examine the effect of a change in
the proportion of post-secondary credits obtained from two-year institutions on labor market
returns and find similar large negative results.
Examining the relative labor market returns of two-year and four-year paths to a BA
has important policy implications. In particular, state governments trying to maximize
educational returns need to be aware of the relative cost and benefits of encouraging transfers
from two-year colleges. In addition, students may not be fully informed about the quality
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differences between two-year and four-year colleges. Although transferring may lead to lower
wage outcomes, two-year colleges are significantly less expensive. Thus, the relative size of
the wage premium is important. We hope this research aids in quantifying these tradeoffs.
There are two extensive margins that affect the number of students attending two-year
colleges. One type of marginal student is deciding between attending a two-year college
and no college at all. The other marginal student, ostensibly a higher performing student,
is deciding between attending a two-year college and a four-year college. In this chapter,
we focus only on students on the latter margin. In particular, we consider only students
deciding between transferring to four-year college and starting at a four-year college.
Among all the students who started a two-year college in our sample, 32 percent even-
tually transferred to a four-year college and 15 percent obtained a bachelor’s degree within
eight years of high school graduation. However, around 32 percent of two-year college stu-
dents said they wished to transfer to a four-year college but never went on to receive a
bachelor’s degree. Rather than using this “intention to obtain a bachelor’s degree” as the
basis for comparison, we condition on students that actually attended (or graduated from) a
four-year college. Our primary concern is that students that claim they wish to transfer may
have done so due to social desirability bias–stating that they intend to receive a bachelor’s
degree because they believe this is what the survey designers wish to hear. We admit that
our method of conditioning the sample on students who ever attended a four-year college
has its own limitations. Most notably, our instrument may not be independent of the sample
selection criterion. However, this concern may be minimal. Although some researchers, such
as Long and Kurlaender (2008) and Alfonso (2006), have found that attending a two-year
college reduces the likelihood of obtaining a bachelor’s degree conditional on observable stu-
dent characteristics, others, such as Rouse (1995) and Leigh and Gill (2003), also find that
the diversion effect is rather inconsequential. In future work, we wish to further address
concerns of sample selection by including all post-secondary students in the sample.
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3.2 Literature Review
The education literature has focused on various ways students utilize two-year colleges.
Brand et al. (2012) examines postsecondary outcomes of Chicago students and finds that
two-year colleges provide a stepping stone for disadvantaged students. Other studies, such as
Wang (2009), examine additional factors that effect bachelor degree attainment of two-year
college students.
Some work has been done to examine the wage outcomes of students who attend two-
year colleges. Kane and Rouse (1995a) use OLS estimates to analyze labor market returns to
two-year college credits and find they are not significantly lower than four-year college credits.
Hilmer (1999), again using OLS estimates, finds that there is a larger effect for students who
transfer to more selective college. Light and Strayer (2004) conduct a similar OLS analysis
as Kane and Rouse (1995a) to compare two-year college students who transfer versus those
who do not and find that transferring is often beneficial. Reynolds (2012) compares wage
outcomes for students that begin at at two-year colleges with students that begin at four-
year colleges without conditioning on bachelor degree attainment. Using propensity score
matching, the study finds large negative effects from starting at a two-year college. However,
students may have heterogeneous preferences for degrees (or heterogeneity in non-pecuniary
costs of education) so many students may not want to transfer to a four-year college. These
low returns are due in part to two-year students choosing not to obtain bachelor’s degrees.
The use of distance as an instrument for college attendance has a long history beginning
with Card (1995). More recently, Card (2001) has reviewed the literature and found that
estimated returns to education tend to be as big or bigger using instruments rather than
OLS. Our results are in accordance with this fact— we find IV estimates that are much larger
than OLS estimates. This suggests that there is a large degree of selection on unobservables
when students decide to transfer biasing OLS estimates.
Finally, this research is related to the literature on the returns to college quality. Dale
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and Krueger (2002) control for whether a student was accepted or rejected from various
colleges and find little return to attending selective colleges except for students from low-
income families. Conversely, Hoekstra (2009) and Saavedra (2009) find a large effect from
attending selective universities using a regression discontinuity design.
3.3 Data
Our data were drawn from the restricted-use version of the National Education Longi-
tudinal Study of 1988 (NELS:88), a nationally representative longitudinal study of American
high school students. NELS:88 first surveyed 13,590 eighth-graders in 1988, who were then
resurveyed through four follow-ups in 1990, 1992, 1994, and 2000. The multipurpose nature
of the NELS:88 survey provides us with a rich set of exogenous covariates on students’ pre-
college characteristics, including their family income and social-economic status, parental
education and occupation, academic as well as non-academic performance during and after
high school. We also obtained wage and employment information from the fourth follow-up,
when most surveyed individuals are around age 26 and have often been in the labor market
for a significant period.
We compare the wage outcomes of students who transferred from a two-year college
to a four-year college, to those who started at a four-year college directly. Our definition
of “transfer students” include all students who has ever attended a two-year institution or
received an associate degree and whose last institution attended was a four-year institution.
Table 1 summarizes some of the key demographic variables by college attendance type.
Students that start at a four-year institution rather than transfer are more likely to have a
parent with higher levels of education and live in a city. They are also less likely to come from
western states, likely because there are more two-year colleges in this region. In addition,
direct attendees to four-year institutions are more likely to come from a family with a higher
level of income, consistent with the fact that two-year colleges are significantly less expensive.
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Table 2 shows additional summary statistics by postsecondary education path. Two-
year credits and four-year credits have been standardized using the Carnegie Unit, defined
as 120 hours of contact with an instructor. Note that students who started at a four-year
institution may still receive credits at a two-year college, either because they transferred to
a two-year institution or because they took additional classes at a two-year institution (for
instance, over the summer). The mean wage for both 1999 and 2000 is over $1 higher for
direct attendees than for transfer students. Direct attendees also tend to work for longer
hours and receive a higher annual income. They also had lower unemployment.
As would be expected, direct attendees tend to be of higher ability. Direct attendees to
four-year institutions have a lower class rank and higher SAT or ACT scores. In addition,
students who actually attained a bachelor’s degree also had significantly lower class rank
and higher test scores.
We also obtained a supplemental NELS:88 dataset with home zip code for each of
the students in the 1988 sample. The latitude and longitude of four-year colleges in 1992
is obtained from the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS). When the
exact latitude and longitude is not available, a college’s zip code is used to obtain the latitude
and longitude. For each student we calculate the distance from the student’s home in 1988
to the nearest four-year college. We only consider nonselective public four-year colleges
since students attending selective colleges or private colleges are unlikely to be considering
attending a two-year college first. In fact, very few students transfer to these schools. We
also calculate the distance to the nearest two-year public college using a similar methodology.
Table 3 summarized the distance measures. Students who transferred tend to live farther
from the nearest four-year college and closer to the nearest two-year college. We use distance
to the nearest four-year college as our preferred instrument for transfer status for a number
of reasons. First, there is less variation in the distance to the nearest two-year colleges since
there are more two-year colleges leading to a weaker first-stage using two-year distance.
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Secondly, the cost savings from having a four-year college nearby is expected to be larger
than the cost savings from having a two-year college nearby. A student who attends a four-
year college close to their parent’s residence will save on transportation costs and living
expensive since the student can live at home for all four years. A close two-year college only
benefits the student until the student has to transfer. Therefore, distance to the nearest four-
year college is a larger determinant of transfer choice than distance to the nearest two-year
college.
The third reason for not using two-year college distance as an instrument is the likely
failure of the exclusion restriction. Four-year colleges have often been in existence for decades,
if not longer, so location is likely exogenous. In addition, students often live on campus so the
characteristics of the surrounding area are more likely to be uncorrelated with the presence
of a four-year college. Conversely, the location of two-year colleges is likely endogenous.
State governments may build public two-year colleges in areas with high demand such that
the distance to the nearest two-year college is correlated with unobservables that affect labor
market outcomes.
We combine additional information on student’s postsecondary institution from IPEDS
and Barron’s Admissions Competitiveness Index. IPEDS contains information on the 25th
and 75th percentile of SAT and ACT scores at each postsecondary institution. Barron’s
contains information on the selectivity rankings of the postsecondary institutions. These
allow us to control for the selectivity of a student’s four-year college when estimating the
relative returns of transferring.
3.4 Methodology
We wish to quantify how the path to a four-year college or, alternatively, a bachelor’s degree,
affects future labor market outcomes. The main outcome of interest is log wages in 2000.
We use 2000 wages instead of 1999 wages because we have better controls, such as whether
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The outcome is W
i
, the log wages for individual i. T
i
is an indicator for transferring (or
percent of credits at a two-year college), X
i
is a vector of individual and household charac-
teristics, and C
i
is a vector of characteristics of the last four-year university that individual i
attends. Individual controls include sex, race, bilingual, handicap, whether student was held
back in school, standardized test scores, class rank, how often the student skipped class,
extracurricular activities, whether the student took gifted classes, and SAT/ACT scores.
Additional household controls include urbanity, geographic region, family income, parent’s
education, a poverty indicator, and a socioeconomic composite variable. Four-year college
controls include 25th and 75th percentile of SAT/ACT scores and Barron’s ranking. We also
control for whether students are currently enrolled in school, which may include graduate
school. For the sample of students that attended a four-year institution but did not neces-
sarily graduate, we also control for receiving a bachelor’s degree as well as the interaction
between receiving a bachelor’s degree and being currently enrolled. State fixed effects are
also included to control for differences in the relative quality of public two-year and four-year
colleges across states.
The coefficient of interest is ↵. For this to reflect the causal effect of transferring from
a two-year college, it must be that T
i
is uncorrelated with unobservables that affect the
outcome. To address endogeneity concerns, we instrument for T
i
using the distance from
student i’s home to the nearest four-year college. Students who live close to a four-year
college are more likely to attend that college rather than transfer from a two-year college.
Similarly, students living far from a four-year college are more likely to transfer. We exclude
private (including for-profit) colleges since students on the margin between transferring and
107
directly attending a four-year college are unlikely to consider expensive or elite colleges.
Results are robust to including private colleges when computing the instrument. For some
specifications, we include distance squared as an additional instrument to capture convex
transportation cost and to increase the precision of your results. The first-stage F-stat for
distance on transferring status is 71, and for distance and distance squared it’s 38 indicating
that these are not weak instruments.
Card (2001) and others have assumed that distance to the nearest four-year college sat-
isfies the exclusion restriction when analyzing college attendance. The exclusion restriction
is even more likely to hold in this context. Conditional on students eventually attending a
four-year college and controlling for urbanity and geographic region, distance to the nearest
four-year university is orthogonal to unobserved characteristics that affect labor-market out-
comes. As a check, we summarize wages in 2000 by the quartile of the distance to the nearest
four-year public college. Table 4 presents these results for students that did not attend col-
lege, two-year college students, transfer students, and direct attendees to four-year colleges.
We can see that distance to the nearest four-year alone does not have a monotonic effect on
wage outcome conditional on the type of college attendance. We do fine that those who live
farthest away from a four-year institution have significantly lower wages than individuals
in the first three quartiles of the distance distribution, however, this is due to observable
characteristics such as the fact that these individuals often live in rural areas. Control-
ling for observables we find that distance to the nearest four-year college is not statistically
significant when regressing wages on distance for each of the subpopulations
3.5 Results
3.5.1 The Effect of Transferring from Two-Year Colleges
Table 5 presents simple OLS results examining the effect of transferring on log 2000
wages. We examine wages for two sub-populations. The first includes all students that
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eventually attended a four-year college. This includes students who did not graduate with a
bachelor’s degree or were still enrolled in 2000. Controlling for a rich set of individual, family,
and four-year college characteristics, OLS estimates reveal a small negative impact from
transferring. These results are highly significant for student who received a bachelor’s degree,
but not for the full sample of students that eventually attended a four-year college. OLS
estimates may be biased due to the presence of unobservables such as student motivation.
Table 6 reports first stage results using distance to the nearest four-year institution and
distance squared. The squared term helps capture nonlinearities in transportation costs. We
find that distance is a strong predictor of transfer status both conditional on four-year college
attendance as well as conditional on receiving a bachelor’s degree. The squared distance term
is positive and significant, indicating that the marginal cost per mile is increasing in distance.
The first stage is relatively strong with an R-square between 0.18 and 0.19.
In the preferred instrumental variable specifications, we find a significantly negative
effect of transferring to a four-year college. Point estimates imply a 27% to 29% reduction
in hourly 2000 wages due to transferring from a two-year college. In Table 7, we present IV
estimates for various sub-populations. We estimate wage outcomes for those that attended a
four-year college and those that actually received a bachelor’s degree. Within each of these
groups, we also examine the subset of students who took the SAT or ACT standardized test
in high school. This is our preferred specification since students who took the SAT or ACT
in high school are more likely to be considering a four-year college at that time. In any case,
results are similar for all of these subpopulations.
Estimates are robust to conditioning on four-year college quality. Students that decide
to attend a two-year college and transfer may eventually attend a more selective or less
selective college than they would have attended if they had gone to a four-year college
directly. This should be captured when controlling for the selectivity of the four-year college
that students attend (as measured by Barron’s ranking and average standardized test scores).
Conditioning on four-year college quality results in slightly lower point estimates providing
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suggestive evidence that transfer students are attending slightly better four-year colleges
than they would have if they had attended directly.
Why are IV point estimates so large compared to OLS estimates? These differences could
be driven by unobserved heterogeneity. For instance, there may be motivated students from
poor socioeconomic backgrounds whose standardized test scores or grades do not reflect their
true ability. These students often decide to transfer, making OLS estimates small since these
students have relatively good labor market outcomes. However, these students may benefit
greatly from attending a four-year college directly implying large estimates after accounting
for unobserved heterogeneity. Echoing Card (2001), there also may be higher marginal
returns to direct attendance for students on the margin between transferring and attending
a four-year college directly due to high marginal costs of schooling. These constrained
students would benefit greatly from the increased quality or social capital from attending a
four-year college directly, however, the cost is prohibitive if the four-year college is far from
the student’s home. Using the framework of Imbens and Angrist (1994), Reynolds (2012)
also points out that the Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE) may be quite different
than the average treatment effect (ATE) when examining transfer students. Students that
are influenced by the distance to the nearest four-year institution may have a much larger
return to direct attendance than the average students.
3.5.2 The Effect of Transferring from Two-Year Colleges by Gender
Men and women may respond differently to the relative costs and benefits of transferring.
In particular, social capital accumulation and peer effects may vary depending on sex. Table
8 reports separate estimates for men and women (for all students that attended a four-year
college as well as conditional on receiving a bachelor’s degree). Estimates indicate that
women’s wages are impacted much more than men’s wages. Although negative, the effect of
transferring to a four-year college is insignificant for men, albeit with a smaller sample size.
Results indicate a very large effect for women, ranging from a 37% decrease in wages for the
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sample of women who attended four-year colleges to a 30% decrease in wages for the sample
of women who received a bachelor’s degree. There is more heterogeneity in wages for women
and specifications with the sample of women have a lower R-square value.
3.5.3 The Effect of Transferring from Two-Year Colleges by Ability
All estimates using distance as an instrument estimate the weighted averages of Local Average
Treatment Effects (LATE), however, we can examine the LATE for various subpopulations to
examine heterogeneity in the treatment effect. In particular, heterogeneity in the treatment
effect for students of different abilities can be analyzed by considering only students with a
certain range of SAT/ACT scores. For each group of students with a SAT/ACT percentile
within a 30 point window, we estimate the effect of transferring and present the results in
Figure 1—4.
Again, we estimate the effect with and without conditioning on college quality as well as
for students that attended a four-year college and students that actually received a bachelor’s
degree and find similar results. Figure 1—4 provide suggestive evidence that the effect of
transferring has the largest negative impact on low ability students (with low SAT/ACT
scores) and for high ability students (with high SAT/ACT scores). For students in the
middle range point estimates are very small and not statistically different from zero.
More work should be done to examine what is driving the heterogeneity in the treatment
effect by ability. It may be that the various costs and benefits of transferring, including peer
effects, returns to quality, and disruption from transferring, differentially affect high and low
ability students.
3.5.4 The Effect of Credits from Two-Year Colleges
Table 9 presents alternative results using the percent of credits from a two-year institution.
Students that initially attend a two-year institution may transfer after only a short period or
they may take a majority of their credits at a two-year institution. Using the percent of two-
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year credits as the independent variable allows us to estimate the effect of taking additional
credits at a two-year institution. OLS estimates show a negative but insignificant effect
of credits, however, IV estimates are significant and show a negative effect that is similar
in magnitude to our preferred specification. In particular, for the sample that attended a
four-year college the point estimate implies that going from 0% two-year credits to 50%
two-year credits reduces wages by 34%. For the sample that received a bachelor’s degree it
reduced wages by 33%. Note that there is significant heterogeneity in the percent of two-
year credits for transfer students. Students that transferred but did not receive a bachelor’s
degree obtained 60.2% of their credits from a two-year college while students that transferred
and obtained a bachelor’s degree obtained 40.0% of credits from a two-year college.
3.6 Conclusion
Are two-year colleges a cost-effective way of obtaining a bachelor’s degree given expected
wage outcomes? The relative returns for various paths to a bachelor’s degree has important
implications for both education policy-makers and students deciding on their educational
path. Unlike the previous literature, we find a very large negative effect of transferring to a
four-year college after accounting for unobservables. The estimated effect on wages is 27% to
29%, with a larger effect for women. We find a large degree of heterogeneity in the treatment
effect, with some evidence that low and high ability transfer students fare the worst.
We are not able to examine long-term labor market outcomes, only wages for young
adults entering the labor market. The relative total cost of transferring from a two-year
college depends on lifetime earnings, the cost differential between two-year and four-year
college (including living expenses), as well as any non-pecuniary costs. This study provides
evidence that the cost savings from attending a two-year college have to be quite large to
counteract negative returns in the labor market.
Any additional labor market returns from attending a higher quality or more selective
college may be due to either higher acquisition of general human capital, an increase in
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social capital, or signaling effects. The signaling effect from attending a selective college
may be large since employers may update their beliefs about a student’s ability based on
the average ability from that college. Students who transfer to a four-year college may
also be receiving a different level of human capital (or social capital) than their peers that
attended a four-year college for their entire postsecondary career. However, since students
who transfer to four-year institutions are usually indistinguishable from direct attendees
from the employers’ perspective, this provides evidence that education quality affects labor-
market outcomes irrespective of signaling. In other words, the college name on a diploma is
not all that matters. The path to a bachelor’s degree matters as well.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
No Only 2-yr Transferred to Transferred to Started at Started at 4-yr
College no transfer 4-yr, no BA 4-yr, attained BA 4-yr, no BA attained BA
Race
Asian/Pacific Islnd 2.31% 5.85% 7.29% 10.85% 6.39% 11.50%
Hispanic 12.18% 17.80% 16.89% 10.13% 13.23% 5.67%
Black, not Hispanic 8.61% 9.98% 7.68% 3.44% 12.26% 6.96%
White, not Hispanic 45.63% 64.77% 66.79% 75.59% 66.90% 75.38%
Parents’ highest level
of education
High school dropout 12.80% 11.04% 7.29% 5.24% 6.52% 2.25%
High school or GED 19.49% 21.71% 15.55% 12.66% 17.94% 9.07%
Some college 24.92% 45.50% 46.26% 42.86% 42.26% 29.00%
College grad 3.92% 9.43% 14.59% 19.35% 15.74% 24.41%
M.A. 1.22% 3.40% 7.87% 11.39% 8.65% 18.46%
Ph.D., M.D. 0.57% 0.69% 2.50% 3.80% 4.58% 13.48%
Data missing 37.08% 8.22% 5.95% 4.70% 4.32% 3.33%
High School Urbanity
City > 50,000 people 26.05% 27.84% 32.83% 24.40% 33.19% 32.43%
Suburb of city > 50,000 16.49% 19.22% 23.26% 28.40% 16.10% 25.23%
Rural/farming area 27.89% 24.00% 16.52% 17.20% 23.40% 15.08%
Small city < 50,000 29.35% 28.56% 27.39% 30.00% 27.02% 27.26%
Indian reservation 0.22% 0.38% 0.00% 0.00% 0.28% 0.00%
High School Region
Northeast 10.65% 12.35% 13.82% 14.83% 21.61% 26.54%
Midwest 18.41% 23.98% 22.65% 22.78% 28.00% 27.32%
South 24.55% 31.83% 33.97% 30.56% 33.35% 30.65%
West 11.61% 27.08% 26.10% 30.56% 14.90% 15.10%
Unknown 34.78% 4.75% 3.45% 1.27% 2.13% 0.39%
Annual Family Income
< $5,000 14.45% 8.66% 4.85% 3.12% 5.20% 1.63%
$5,000— $20,000 41.94% 34.36% 26.05% 20.16% 30.27% 15.16%
$20,000— $100,000 42.66% 55.94% 66.22% 72.15% 59.60% 69.75%
> $100,000 0.96% 1.05% 2.87% 4.58% 4.92% 13.46%
Number of Obs 4,900 2,740 520 550 1,550 3,330
Notes: Transfer refers only to students who started at a public or non-profit two-year institution and whose last or most recent
institution is a public or non-profit four-year institution. Our transfer definition excludes students who attended a four-year
institution at some point between 1990 and 2000, but eventually transferred back to a two-year institution. It also excludes
students who transferred from or to a private for-profit institution (since two-year and four-year for-profit institutions are not
separately identified in NELS:88). Note observation counts are rounded to the nearest 10 due to data security requirements
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Table 3.2: Additional summary statistics
No Only 2-yr Transferred to Transferred to Started at Started at 4-yr
College no transfer 4-yr, no BA 4-yr, attained BA 4-yr, no BA attained BA
Male 0.3471 0.4719 0.5393 0.4231 0.5135 0.4440
(0.0068) (0.0095) (0.0219) (0.0210) (0.0127) (0.0086)
Bilingual 0.0414 0.0420 0.0288 0.0271 0.0329 0.0261
(0.0028) (0.0038) (0.0073) (0.0069) (0.0045) (0.0028)
Percent 2-yr credits 0.5715 0.9714 0.6019 0.3981 0.1733 0.0282
(0.0192) (0.0033) (0.0151) (0.0111) (0.0089) (0.0019)
4-yr credits 35.1172 2.4682 33.4217 81.9411 57.2690 128.8408
(2.1592) (0.3252) (1.5969) (1.6311) (1.3621) (0.5142)
2-yr credits 27.7254 35.5492 44.4971 48.0858 10.8774 3.0911
(1.3020) (0.7198) (1.4865) (1.2096) (0.6165) (0.1931)
Wage (1999) 12.9116 13.2642 12.8727 15.2619 14.3389 16.5728
(0.2808) (0.2795) (0.5569) (0.5435) (0.5482) (0.2348)
Wage (2000) 12.2368 13.0934 14.2165 16.0405 14.1288 17.1154
(0.1916) (0.2129) (0.7174) (0.4500) (0.3014) (0.1979)
Work hours/week 42.7429 42.1323 38.7943 41.3078 41.6954 42.7356
-1999 (0.2019) (0.2100) (0.5397) (0.4470) (0.3179) (0.2099)
Current hours/week 40.7156 39.9930 36.4238 40.3764 39.0664 41.3402
(0.1881) (0.2051) (0.5464) (0.4359) (0.3170) (0.2075)
Income, 1999 21,814 23,332 21,804 27,910 24,575 29,484
(373.9) (335.6) (1013.8) (1185.0) (483.9) (366.2)
Employed 0.3363 0.5618 0.5029 0.6908 0.5665 0.6926
(0.0068) (0.0095) (0.0219) (0.0197) (0.0126) (0.0080)
Test Score 44.9753 47.3868 50.8924 53.8878 53.4263 58.9481
(0.1586) (0.1690) (0.4038) (0.3440) (0.2367) (0.1346)
Class rank percentile 0.6062 0.5714 0.5035 0.3545 0.4227 0.2587
(0.0061) (0.0058) (0.0130) (0.0111) (0.0077) (0.0044)
SAT (Math) 26.16 63.01 135.05 242.72 235.19 403.67
(1.56) (3.14) (10.49) (11.99) (7.33) (5.06)
SAT (Verbal) 22.99 56.84 123.67 214.98 210.55 357.87
(1.37) (2.83) (9.49) (10.56) (6.59) (4.53)
ACT (Math) 18.1508 17.6419 18.1831 20.4245 20.0018 22.9645
(0.2265) (0.1711) (0.2969) (0.2923) (0.1849) (0.1289)
ACT (Verbal) 18.1803 17.8288 18.7183 20.3208 20.0989 23.1664
(0.2668) (0.2116) (0.3874) (0.2910) (0.2109) (0.1275)
Number of Obs 4,900 2,740 520 550 1,550 3,330
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Transfer refers only to students who started at a public or non-profit two-year
institution and whose last or most recent institution is a public or non-profit four-year institution. Our transfer definition
excludes students who attended a four-year institution at some point between 1990 and 2000, but eventually transferred back to
a two-year institution. It also excludes students who transferred from or to a private for-profit institution (since two-year and
four-year for-profit institutions are not separately identified in NELS:88). Note observation counts are rounded to the nearest
10 due to data security requirements.
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Table 3.3: Distance to Nearest Four-Year and Two-Year Public Institutions
No Only 2-yr Transferred to Transferred to Started at Started at 4-yr
College no transfer 4-yr, no BA 4-yr, attained BA 4-yr, no BA attained BA
Miles to nearest 4-yr
Mean 18.3 19.7 17.4 22.9 16.1 15.2
Standard deviation (0.28) (0.41) (0.91) (1.00) (0.48) (0.30)
Median 12.3 13.2 11.3 14.5 10.01 10.1
Miles to nearest 2-yr
Mean 15.9 13.4 12.2 12.9 18.2 14.0
Standard deviation (0.34) (0.40) (0.80) (0.93) (0.72) (0.36)
Median 8.4 7.1 6.6 6.0 9.1 7.3
Number of Obs 4,290 2,440 480 530 1,460 3,180
Notes: Transfer refers only to students who started at a public or non-profit two-year institution and whose most recent
institution is a public or non-profit four-year institution. Observation counts are rounded to the nearest 10 due to data security
requirements
Table 3.4: Average Wage by Distance to Nearest Four-Year Institutions
Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4





No college 12.19 12.78 12.27 11.84
(0.31) (0.43) (0.36) (0.39)
Attended 2-yr only 12.76 13.91 13.46 12.58
(0.26) (0.57) (0.47) (0.30)
Attended 2-yr and transferred 14.53 16.31 15.62 13.90
(0.48) (1.12) (0.73) (0.52)
Attended 4-yr only 16.49 16.70 16.55 15.32
(0.33) (0.37) (0.39) (0.26)
Notes: Transfer refers only to students who started at a public or non-profit two-year institution and whose most recent
institution is a public or non-profit four-year institution.
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Table 3.5: OLS Results
Dependent variable: log 2000 wage
Conditional on 4-yr Quality Not Conditional on 4-yr Quality
Attended 4-yr Received BA Attended 4-yr Received BA
Transferred -0.0290 -0.0668*** -0.0267 -0.0661***
(0.0193) (0.0236) (0.0192) (0.0234)
Male 0.0979*** 0.0975*** 0.0985*** 0.0986***
(0.0157) (0.0178) (0.0155) (0.0177)
SAT/ACT percentile 0.152*** 0.163*** 0.191*** 0.214***
(0.0537) (0.0622) (0.0522) (0.0600)
Currently enrolled -0.104*** -0.116*** -0.0930*** -0.115***
(0.0283) (0.0210) (0.0280) (0.0210)
Received BA 0.130*** 0.123***
(0.0231) (0.0216)
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Family controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
4-yr college controls Yes Yes No No
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-square 0.192 0.219 0.149 0.182
Number of obs 4,910 5,590 3,360 3,800
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *significant at 0.10 level, ** significant at 0.05 level, and *** significant at 0.01
level. Sample is all students who took the SAT or ACT. Additional individual controls include race, bilingual, handicap, whether
student was held back, standardized test score, class rank, skipped class, extracurricular activities, took gifted classes, and
interaction between received BA and currently enrolled when relevant. Additional family controls include urbanity, geographic
region, socioeconomic composite, family income, parent’s education, and poverty indicator. Four-year college controls include
25th and 7th percentile of SAT/ACT scores and Barron’s ranking. Note observation counts are rounded to the nearest 10 due
to data security requirements.
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Table 3.6: First Stage Results
Dependent variable: transferred from a two-year college
Conditional on 4-yr Quality Not Conditional on 4-yr Quality
Attended 4-yr Received BA Attended 4-yr Received BA
Distance 0.00205** 0.00137 0.00193* 0.00144
(0.00102) (0.00105) (0.00103) (0.00104)
Distance squared 2.57e-05* 2.91e-05** 2.72e-05** 2.93e-05**
(1.33e-05) (1.46e-05) (1.34e-05) (1.46e-05)
Male -0.00730 -0.0154 -0.00732 -0.0174
(0.0119) (0.0118) (0.0120) (0.0118)
SAT/ACT percentile -0.262*** -0.0593 -0.243*** -0.0312
(0.0414) (0.0379) (0.0429) (0.0392)
Currently enrolled 0.0744*** -0.0345*** 0.0780*** -0.0321**
(0.0271) (0.0128) (0.0278) (0.0127)
Received BA -0.0687*** -0.0576***
(0.0189) (0.0194)
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Family controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
4-yr college controls Yes Yes No No
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-square 0.188 0.178 0.188 0.178
Number of obs 4,060 2,990 4,060 2,990
Notes: Dependent variable is transferred from a two-year college. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *significant at 0.10
level, ** significant at 0.05 level, and *** significant at 0.01 level. Sample is all students who took the SAT or ACT. Additional
individual controls include race, bilingual, handicap, whether student was held back, standardized test score, class rank, skipped
class, extracurricular activities, took gifted classes, and interaction between received BA and currently enrolled when relevant.
Additional family controls include urbanity, geographic region, socioeconomic composite, family income, parent’s education,
and poverty indicator. Four-year college controls include 25th and 7th percentile of SAT/ACT scores and Barron’s ranking.
Note observation counts are rounded to the nearest 10 due to data security requirements.
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Table 3.7: Instrumental Variable Results
Dependent variable: log 2000 wage
Conditional on 4-yr Quality Not Conditional on 4-yr Quality
Attended 4-yr Received BA Attended 4-yr Received BA
Panel A: All students
Transferred -0.318* -0.330** -0.354** -0.352**
(0.166) (0.158) (0.166) (0.163)
Male 0.101*** 0.0889*** 0.104*** 0.0923***
(0.0133) (0.0157) (0.0133) (0.0156)
SAT/ACT percentile 0.0814* 0.135*** 0.101** 0.168***
(0.0455) (0.0497) (0.0473) (0.0492)
Currently enrolled -0.0822*** -0.130*** -0.0675** -0.131***
(0.0307) (0.0191) (0.0303) (0.0193)
Received BA 0.113*** 0.112***
(0.0209) (0.0204)
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Family controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
4-yr college controls Yes Yes No No
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-square 0.176 0.156 0.156 0.142
Number of obs 5,230 3,610 5,320 3,640
Panel B: Students who took SAT/ACT
Transferred -0.316** -0.338** -0.346** -0.347**
(0.149) (0.144) (0.150) (0.147)
Male 0.0960*** 0.0932*** 0.0963*** 0.0948***
(0.0158) (0.0178) (0.0157) (0.0178)
SAT/ACT percentile 0.0819 0.0982 0.108 0.141**
(0.0652) (0.0704) (0.0662) (0.0706)
Currently enrolled -0.0835*** -0.128*** -0.0707** -0.127***
(0.0307) (0.0215) (0.0306) (0.0217)
Received BA 0.112*** 0.0998***
(0.0253) (0.0252)
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Family controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
4-yr college controls Yes Yes No No
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-square 0.185 0.176 0.167 0.167
Number of obs 3750 2800 3810 2810
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *significant at 0.10 level, ** significant at 0.05 level, and *** significant
at 0.01 level. The instrumental variable is distance to the nearest four-year college. Additional individual controls include
race, bilingual, handicap, whether student was held back, standardized test score, class rank, skipped class, extracurricular
activities, took gifted classes, and interaction between received BA and currently enrolled when relevant. Additional family
controls include urbanity, geographic region, socioeconomic composite, family income, parent’s education, and poverty indicator.
Four-year college controls include 25th and 7th percentile of SAT/ACT scores and Barron’s ranking. Note observation counts
are rounded to the nearest 10 due to data security requirements.
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Table 3.8: Instrumental Variable Results by Gender
Dependent Variable: log 2000 wage
Men Women
Attended 4-yr Received BA Attended 4-yr Received BA
Transferred -0.198 -0.239 -0.470** -0.363*
(0.181) (0.178) (0.216) (0.191)
SAT/ACT percentile 0.168* 0.134 -0.00886 0.0830
(0.0900) (0.102) (0.0947) (0.0981)
Currently enrolled -0.136*** -0.137*** -0.0449 -0.107***
(0.0435) (0.0342) (0.0444) (0.0284)
Received BA 0.0848** 0.126***
(0.0347) (0.0358)
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Family controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
4-yr college controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-square 0.241 0.235 0.139 0.188
Number of obs 1,720 1,230 2,030 1,560
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *significant at 0.10 level, ** significant at 0.05 level, and *** significant at
0.01 level. Instrument variable is distance to the nearest four-year college. Sample is all students who took the SAT or ACT.
Additional individual controls include race, bilingual, handicap, whether student was held back, standardized test score, class
rank, skipped class, extracurricular activities, took gifted classes, and interaction between received BA and currently enrolled
when relevant. Additional family controls include urbanity, geographic region, socioeconomic composite, family income, parent’s
education, and poverty indicator. Four-year college controls include 25th and 7th percentile of SAT/ACT scores and Barron’s
ranking. Note observation counts are rounded to the nearest 10 due to data security requirements.
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Table 3.9: OLS and Instrumental variable results using percentage of two-year credits
Dependent variable: log 2000 wage
OLS IV
Attended 4-yr Received BA Attended 4-yr Received BA
Percent 2-yr Credits -0.0789** -0.119*** -0.825* -0.793*
(0.0317) (0.0443) (0.427) (0.405)
Male 0.102*** 0.0955*** 0.0967*** 0.0949***
(0.0162) (0.0182) (0.0171) (0.0183)
SAT/ACT percentile 0.129** 0.165*** 0.0176 0.0760
(0.0547) (0.0636) (0.0853) (0.0826)
Currently enrolled -0.109*** -0.115*** -0.0509 -0.124***
(0.0305) (0.0213) (0.0463) (0.0219)
Received BA 0.113*** 0.0480
(0.0247) (0.0462)
Additional Controls
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Family controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
4-yr college controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-square 0.233 0.218 0.131 0.166
Number of obs 3,490 2,650 3,490 2,650
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *significant at 0.10 level, ** significant at 0.05 level, and *** significant
at 0.01 level. For IV results, the instrument is distance to the nearest four-year college. Sample is all students who took the
SAT or ACT. Additional individual controls include race, bilingual, handicap, whether student was held back, standardized test
score, class rank, skipped class, extracurricular activities, took gifted classes, and interaction between received BA and currently
enrolled when relevant. Additional family controls include urbanity, geographic region, socioeconomic composite, family income,
parent’s education, and poverty indicator. Four-year college controls include 25th and 7th percentile of SAT/ACT scores and
Barron’s ranking. Note observation counts are rounded to the nearest 10 due to data security requirements.
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Figure 3.1: Instrumental Variable Estimates by SAT/ACT Percentile Subpopulations (Sam-
ple: Attended 4-Year)
Notes: Regressions do not include controls for four-year college quality. Error bars indicate 95 percent confidence intervals.
Each point estimate is calculated using on the subpopulation of individuals with a SAT/ACT percentile range between -15 and
+15 of the indicated percentile.
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Figure 3.2: Instrumental Variable Estimates by SAT/ACT Percentile Subpopulations (Sam-
ple: Received BA)
Notes: Regressions do not include controls for four-year college. Error bars indicate 95 percent confidence intervals. Each point
estimate is calculated using on the subpopulation of individuals with a SAT/ACT percentile range between -15 and +15 of the
indicated percentile.
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Figure 3.3: Instrumental Variable Estimates by SAT/ACT Percentile Subpopulations (Sam-
ple: Attended 4-Year), with Controls for 4-Year College Quality
Notes: Regressions include controls for four-year college quality. Error bars indicate 95 percent confidence intervals. Each
point estimate is calculated on the subpopulation of individuals with a SAT/ACT percentile range between -15 and +15 of the
indicated percentile.
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Figure 3.4: Instrumental Variable Estimates by SAT/ACT Percentile Subpopulations (Sam-
ple: Received BA), with Controls for 4-Year College Quality
Note error bars indicate 95 percent confidence intervals. Each point estimate is calculated on the subpopulation of individuals
with a SAT/ACT percentile range between -15 and +15 of the indicated percentile.
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Appendix Table A.10: Timing of the Adoption of X-ray Permission
State Time Statutes, Regulations and Documentation of the Relevant Amendments
Alabama Septmber, 1982 Ala. Admin. Code r. 270-X-3-.10
Alaska October, 2008 Alaska Stat. § 08.36.346 
Arizona March, 2004 A.R.S. § 32-129
Arkansas January, 2001 Code of Arkansas Rules and Regulations 038 00 CARR 001
California January, 1985 Cal Bus & Prof Code § 1656 and California Code of Regulations 16 CCR 1085
Colorado July, 1993 Code of Colorado Regulations 3 CCR 709-1 Rule X
Connecticut October, 2005 Conn. Gen. Stat. § 20-112a as amended in Oct 2005
Delaware July, 2002 CDR 16-4000-4466 as amended by 6 DE Reg. 100; Statute 24 Del. C. § 1101
District of 
Columbia
July, 2011 CDCR 17-9001; CDCR 17-9003; CDCR 17-9004; CDCR 17-9005
Florida April, 1980 64B5-9.011, F.A.C
Georgia November, 1996 Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. r. 150-9-.01 as amended in Nov 1996
Hawaii Febuary, 1989 Hawaii Administrative Rules WCHR 16-79
Idaho March, 2004 Idaho Code § 54-903 (SENATE BILL NO. 1292); IDAPA 19.01.01.035
Illinois Jan, 1988 225 ILCS 25/17
Indiana November, 2006 410 IAC 5.2-10-1; 410 IAC 5.2-10-2
Iowa January, 2001 650 IAC 20.1; 650 IAC 20.3; 650 IAC 20.6 
Kansas 1943 K.S.A. § 65-1423
Kentucky July, 2010 KRS § 313.050; KRS § 313.045
Louisiana October, 1970 LAC 46:XXXIII.501
Maine 1983 32 M.R.S. § 9854
Maryland Febuary, 1991 COMAR 10.44.19.00 to COMAR 10.44.19.11
Massachusetts January, 1987 234 CMR 2.00 (http://www.mass.gov/eohhs/docs/dph/regs/234cmr002.pdf)
Michigan July, 1992 MICH. ADMIN. CODE R 338.11403.
Minnesota October, 1976 Minn. R. 3100.8500
Mississippi June, 1985 CMSR 50-010-2301
Missouri July, 1995 § 332.093 R.S.Mo.
Montana November, 1995 MONT. ADMIN. R. 24.138.406
Nebraska January, 1973 Nebraska Admin. Code Title 172, Ch. 53
New Hampshire January, 1974 N.H. Admin. Rules, Den 401.03; N.H. Admin. Rules, Den 401.02; N.H. Admin. Rules, Den 302.05
New Jersey April, 1995 N.J.A.C. 13:30-2.4
New Mexico September, 1984 16.5.33.9 NMAC; 16.5.33.9 NMAC
New York November, 1996 8 NYCRR § 61.13
Nevada October, 1983 NAC 631.220
North Carolina September, 1976 21 N.C.A.C. 16H.0201; 21 N.C.A.C. 16H.0102; 21 NCAC 16H .0206
North Dakota September, 1980 N.D. Admin. Code 20-03-01-01
Ohio October, 1994 ORC Ann. 4715.51; ORC Ann. 4715.53; OAC Ann. 4715-12-01; OAC Ann. 4715-12-02
Oklahoma July, 1998 O.A.C. § 195:15-1-1.1; O.A.C. § 195:15-1-4; O.A.C. § 195:15-1-5
Oregan January, 2000 Or. Admin. R. 818-042-0050; Or. Admin. R. 333-106-0055; Or. Admin. R. 818-042-0070
Pennsylvania January, 1986 63 P.S. § 130e; 49 Pa. Code § 33.302
Rhode Island January, 1986 Amendments to CRIR 14-140-007
South Carolina May, 1989 S.C. Code Regs. 39-12 (SC State Register, Volumn 13, Issue 5)
South Dakota November, 1984 ARSD 20:43:07
Tennessee December, 2003 Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. R. 0460-04-.08 
(https://health.state.tn.us/boards/Dentistry/PDFs/Den_Winter_2003.pdf)
Texas September, 1999 Tex. Occ. Code § 258.002; Tex. Occ. Code § 258.054; Tex. Occ. Code § 265.005
Utah October, 1996 U.A.C. R156-69-603
Virginia September, 1987 18 VAC 60-20-230
Vermont September, 1994 CVR 04-030-080
Washington November, 1995 WAC § 246-817-520
West Virginia April, 2002 W. Va. CSR § 5-13-4 (WV State Register April 5th 2002 Issue; Senate Bill No. 2014)
Wisconsin May, 1990 Wis. Stat. § 447.065
Wyoming May, 1991 WCWR 024-034-007
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Appendix Figure A.5: Distribution of Program Capacity by Institution Type
Notes: This figure plots the density of program capacity from each individual institution in each year. The
dashed blue line plots distribution of all public institution-year pairs before the regulatory change. The solid
blue line plots distribution of all public institution-year pairs after the change. Similarly, the dashed and
solid red lines plot distribution of all private for-profit institution-year pairs before and after the regulatory
change, respectively. For illustrative clarity, density estimates for programs larger than 200 are not plotted
in this graph. Institutions that reported “no applicable capacity constraints” are not included in the density
estimation.
Source: American Dental Association Survey of Allied Dental Education 1973 to 2013.
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Appendix Table A.11: Effect of X-ray Permission on Total Number of Graduates, Restricted
States
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DA Permitted to Expose X-ray 0.0213 0.0273 0.0200 0.260** 0.264** 0.237***
in State in Year of Observation (0.0725) (0.0671) (0.0558) (0.123) (0.122) (0.0865)
State FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region-by-Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Time-Varying Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Public Funding for High-Ed Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-Specific Trend Yes Yes
Observations 988 988 988 747 747 747
Number of States 33 33 33 29 29 29
Notes: Sample includes only the 32 states and DC that reformed after 1987. Robust standard errors clustered at the state level are shown in 
parentheses. Unit of observation is at the state-year level. Each column is a separate regression using Poisson QMLE. For columns (1) to (3), 
the dependent variable is the total number of DA graduates from public institutions; sample includes 32 states and DC from 1984 to 2013. For 
columns (4) to (6), the dependent variable is the total number of DA graduates from for-profit institutions; sample includes 29 states and years 
1987 to 2013; DC, MT, VT, and WY are dropped because these states have zero for-profit DA graduates for all years in the sample and the 
Conditional Maximum Likelihood estimation process drops groups with no variation in the outcome variable. All regressions include state fixed 
effects, region-by-year fixed effects, and a set of controls for state time-varying characteristics. State time-varying characteristics include: state 
poverty rate, state eitc rate, state mininum wage, a dummy for having a Democratic governor, the fraction of the house that is Democratic, the 
percent of the population that are non-Hispanic white, the percent of the population that is between age 15 and 24, and the percent of the 
population that is over 65. Significant levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Number of DA Graduates in State-Year, By Institution Type
 Public Institutions Private For-Profit Insitutions
Appendix Table A.12: Effect of X-ray Permission on Individual Program Capacity by School
Type
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DA Permitted to Expose X-ray -0.0309 0.0167 0.0915 0.158***
in State in Year of Observation (0.0309) (0.0324) (0.160) (0.0607)
Institution FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Institution-Specific Trend Yes Yes
Observations 7,514 7,514 382 382
Number of Institutions 249 249 21 21
Pre-Treat. Mean of Dependent Var. 30.93 30.93 80.17 80.17
Capacity of Each Program, By Institution Type
 Public Institutions Private For-Profit Insitutions
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the state level and shown in parentheses. Unit of observation is at the institution-
year level. Dependent variable is program capacity each year. Each column is a separate regression using Poisson Quasi-
Maximum Likelihood estimation. Sample includes all DA programs that reported capacity information to the ADA between 
1973 and 2013 and was in operation at least one year before and one year after the X-ray permission. All regressions include 
institution fixed effects and year fixed effects.  Columns (2) and (4) also include institution-specific time trends.
Significant levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix Table A.13: Heterogeneous Response: Alternative Outcome Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DA X-ray Permitted in State-Year
     × Lower Quartile of -0.0898 -0.0803 -0.164* -0.144**
            Tuition Surcharge (0.0635) (0.0717) (0.0849) (0.0724)
     × Second Quartile of -0.116** -0.0422 -0.0405 -0.0308
            Tuition Surcharge (0.0532) (0.0524) (0.0497) (0.0285)
     × Third Quartile of -0.0376 -0.0238 -0.0326 0.0370
            Tuition Surcharge (0.0518) (0.0533) (0.0636) (0.0794)
     × Upper Quartile of 0.0297 0.103 0.0534 0.0898
            Tuition Surcharge (0.0590) (0.0677) (0.0604) (0.0732)
Year-by-Quartile FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Institution FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Institution-Specific Trend Yes Yes
Observations 6,644 6,644 6,644 6,644
Number of Institutions 196 196 196 196
Number of Graduates from Each Community College DA Program
Categorization 1 Categorization 2
Notes: Dependent variable is the number of graduates from each program. Other details are the same as Table 7 of the main 
text. Significant levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix Table A.14: Heterogeneous Response: Alternative Quartile Categorization
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DA X-ray Permitted in State-Year
     × Lower Quartile of -0.0971* -0.0221 -0.233*** -0.0509
            Tuition Surcharge (0.0554) (0.0461) (0.0797) (0.0481)
     × Second Quartile of -0.0451 0.0311 -0.0365 -0.0236
            Tuition Surcharge (0.0748) (0.0911) (0.0336) (0.0489)
     × Third Quartile of 0.0180 0.0262 -0.0188 0.0304
            Tuition Surcharge (0.0524) (0.0411) (0.0392) (0.0300)
     × Upper Quartile of 0.0563 0.0617 0.0803 0.119*
            Tuition Surcharge (0.0510) (0.0488) (0.0498) (0.0673)
Year-by-Quartile FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Institution FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Institution-Specific Trend Yes Yes
Observations 6,257 6,257 5,895 5,895
Number of Institutions 196 196 181 181
Capacity of Each Community College DA Program
Alternative Categorization 1 Alternative Categorization 2
Notes: This table presents coefficient estimates using alternative quartile categorizations of programs. In the first 
categorization shown in columns (1) and (2), programs are ranked by tuition surcharges within each state-year. The mode of 
a program's quartile categories from all years is assigned to each program as its final quartile category.  In the second 
categorization shown in columns (1) and (2), only programs in states that passed the X-ray permission are ranked within 
each year. The mode of a program's quartile categories from all years post X-ray permission is assigned to each program as 
its final quartile category.  Dependent variable is program capacity. Other details are the same as Table 7 of the main text.
Significant levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix Table A.15: Effect of X-ray Permission on Dental Hygienists’ Wages (Falsification
Test)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DA Permitted to expose X-ray -0.000413 0.00548 0.00930 0.00873 -0.00580
in State in Year of Observation (0.0263) (0.0240) (0.0244) (0.0242) (0.0249)
State FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month of the Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual Education Level Yes Yes Yes
State Controls Yes Yes
State-Specific Trend Yes
Observations 5,833 5,833 5,833 5,833 5,833
Adj. R-squared 0.113 0.141 0.165 0.167 0.170
Pre-Treat. Mean Wage (in 2014$) 26.74 26.74 26.74 26.74 26.74
Log Real Wage of Each Dental Hygienist Respondent
Notes: Outcome variable is the log real wages of each dental hygienist measured in 2014 dollars.
Unit of observation is at the individual-year level. Sample includes all individuals with non-
zero earnings report in the CPS-ORG survey from 1979 to 2014 whose reported occupation
is dental hygienist. Each column is a separate regression using OLS estimation. Controls
for individual characteristics include experience, experience squared, a dummy for each of the
following variables: female, married, veteran, black, Hispanic, of other minority origin, living
in a metropolitan area, living in the central area of a city, being covered by a union contract,
working full time and reported dentist’s office as industry of work. Controls for education level
include a dummy for each of the following: having high-school graduation or GED, having some
college degree but no bachelor’s degree, having a bachelor’s or more advanced degree. State
controls include state unemployment rate and per capita personal income. All regressions are
weighted by the CPS earnings weight. Robust standard errors clustered at the state level are
shown in parentheses. Significant levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix Table A.16: Effect of X-ray Permission on Dental Hygienists’ Employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DA Permitted to expose X-ray -0.000413 0.00548 0.00930 0.00873 -0.00580
in State in Year of Observation (0.0263) (0.0240) (0.0244) (0.0242) (0.0249)
State FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month of the Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual Education Level Yes Yes Yes
State Controls Yes Yes
State-Specific Trend Yes
Observations 5,833 5,833 5,833 5,833 5,833
Adj. R-squared 0.113 0.141 0.165 0.167 0.170
Pre-Treat. Mean Wage (in 2014$) 26.74 26.74 26.74 26.74 26.74
Log Real Wage of Each Dental Hygienist Respondent
Notes: Outcome variable is log estimated employment of dental hygienists. Unit of observa-
tion is at the state-year level. Employment is estimated using CPS Basic Monthly sample from
1976 to 2014. State controls include state unemployment rate and per capita personal income.
Sample includes all 50 states and DC, state-year pairs with no actively employed dental hy-
gienists in CPS are dropped. Robust standard errors clustered at the state level are shown in
parentheses. Significant levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Appendix Table A.17: Effect of X-ray Permission on Dental Hygienists’ Education (Falsifi-
cation Test)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DA Permitted to Expose X-ray 0.0193 0.0114 0.0109 0.0233
in State in Year of Observation (0.0417) (0.0425) (0.0405) (0.0379)
State FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region-by-Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Time-Varying Characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Public Funding for High-Ed Yes Yes
State-Specific Trend Yes
Observations 1,375 1,375 1,375 1,375
Number of States 51 51 51 51
Pre-Treat. Mean of Dependent Var. 82.29 82.29 82.29 82.29
Notes: Outcome variable is the total number of graduates from all dental hygienist programs. Unit of observation is at the 
state-year level. Each column in each panel is a separate regression using Poisson QMLE estimation. Robust standard 
errors clustered at the state level are shown in parentheses. Significant levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Total Number of Graduates from Dental Hygiene Programs    
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Appendix Figure B.6: Endowment Shocks and Federal Research Funding
Notes: Figure shows the coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals of  ⌧ from esti-
mating Equation 2.3.4 with log(federal research funding) as the outcome variable. Data
source for federal research funding is NSF Survey of Research and Development Expenditures
at Universities and Colleges. Other details same as Figure 2.3.
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Appendix Figure B.7: Effects on the Number of Tenured Faculty
Notes: Figure shows the coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals of  ⌧ from estimat-
ing Equation 2.3.5 using the number of full-time, non-medical tenured faculty as the outcome
variable. Data sources are IPEDS Human Resource Survey. Number of staff for year t refers
to the numbers in October of year t. Other details are the same as in Figure 2.3.
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Appendix Figure B.8: Effects on the Number of Not-Yet-Tenured Faculty
Notes: Figure shows the coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals of  ⌧ from estimat-
ing Equation 2.3.5 using the number of full-time tenure-track faculty that has not yet obtained
tenure status as the outcome variable. Data sources are IPEDS Human Resource Survey. Num-
ber of staff for year t refers to the numbers in October of year t. Other details are the same as
in Figure 2.3.
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Appendix Figure B.9: Effects on Salary of Full and Associate Professors
Notes: Figure shows the coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals of  ⌧ from esti-
mating Equation 2.3.4 using the average monthly salary of full professors (Panel A through
D) and associate professors (Panel E through G) as the outcome variables. Data sources are
IPEDS Human Resource Survey. Salary statistics for year t refers to the terms of contract as
of October of year t. Other details are the same as in Figure 2.3.
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Appendix Figure B.10: Effects on Salary of Assistant Professors and Non-Tenure-Track
Instructors
Notes: Figure shows the coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals of  ⌧ from estimat-
ing Equation 2.3.4 using the average monthly salary of assistant professors (Panel A through D)
and non-tenure-track instructors (Panel E through G) as the outcome variables. Data sources
are IPEDS Human Resource Survey. Salary statistics for year t refers to the terms of contract
as of October of year t. Other details are the same as in Figure 2.3.
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